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Abstract  
This thesis aims to deconstruct the monotheism of public private partnerships 
(PPP) for health and demonstrate the polytheism of practices enabled by it. It 
contributes to the body of knowledge on PPP in two respects: theoretical and 
substantive.  
 
At a theoretical level, using a critical enquiry lens, I deconstruct the 
partnership phenomenon and the notion of shared power within these 
interactions. This diverges from the traditional problem solving approach 
intrinsic to „good‟ governance literature on PPP, which focuses on how 
partnerships can be made more effective. The thesis gives a plural account 
of the rationale and emerging paradoxes and examines the role of structural 
(institutions and mechanisms) and ideational (ideas and discourse) factors in 
constituting and constructing the practice of PPPs. 
 
The substantive aim of the thesis is to advance the study on PPP by 
understanding the contingencies and plurality of practices as a departure 
from the rhetoric on global health PPPs. Drawing on the case of Global Fund 
to fight AIDS TB and Malaria (GFATM), one of the three largest global health 
partnerships, and its country wide operations with respect to HIV and AIDS in 
India, I also discuss the implications of the discursive practices for the 
management of HIV and equity in health care. Through a critical examination 
of the governance mechanisms and arrangements of GFATM it is argued 
that these have instilled an environment characterised by a proliferation of 
multiple unaccountable entities which emerge as sites where principles of 
partnership are subsumed by competition for resources, power and individual 
and organisational gains. This raises an important question that the thesis 
attempts to answer: How despite the tensions and ruptures is it possible for 
the global health PPPs to rise to prominence as a key mechanism in global 
and national health governance? In response to this, I focus on the role of 
the development brokers and street level bureaucrats who act at the 
interface of the global discourse and the local perspectives and create 
“order” by negotiating dissent, building coherent representations and 
translating common meanings into individual and collective objectives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Global Fund to fight AIDS TB and Malaria, henceforth referred to as „the 
Fund‟, follows a plethora of global public private partnerships (GPPP) on 
health also referred to as global health initiatives (GHI). The past decade has 
witnessed a meteoric rise in the prominence of GPPPs as a key mechanism 
of global health provision (Utting and Zammit 2009, Widdus 2005, Harmer 
2005, Buse and Walt 2002). Three of the largest global health initiatives – the 
Fund, the US President‟s Emergency fund (PEPFAR) and the World Bank 
Multi Country AIDS programme - all include a focus on HIV and AIDS and 
together provide two-thirds of all external funding for HIV and AIDS (Bennett 
et al. 2006).  
 
While several of these initiatives are able to increase the scale of resources 
committed to specific health goals, the evidence base backing this model of 
organisation is rather limited and inconclusive. Literature focuses either on 
operational issues such as determinants of successful partnerships (Druce 
and Harmer 2004, Dowling et al. 2004, Gillies 1998) or on coordination of 
national programmes and the governance structures (Brugha 2003, Buse 
1997, Caines et al. 2003). Little work is undertaken to examine the meanings 
and practices generated by these institutional arrangements, the range of 
 17 
structural and ideational factors underlying these, and the different logics and 
agendas involved.  
 
One of the aims of my thesis is to redress this deficit. Such examination is 
useful because it unpicks the complex forces of power and processes that 
underpin these arrangements and thus, helps to explain the rise in 
prominence of PPPs as an „innovative‟ and „effective‟ policy mechanism in 
global and national health governance. Buse et al. (2009) argue that such 
analysis is also crucial to facilitate the meeting of health objectives.  
 
The aims and objectives of the thesis are outlined after briefly engaging with 
the historical background and concepts that are further examined in the 
following chapters.   
 
1.2 Understanding Public Private Partnerships 
 
1.2.1 Clarifying concepts and definitions 
There is no single comprehensive acceptable definition of partnerships (Gray 
and Wood 1991, Asante and Zwi 2007, Jamali 2004). The meaning of the 
expression „partnership‟ is often implicit in different terms that are used 
interchangeably – „collaboration‟, „network‟, „alliance‟, „mix‟ - leading to a 
„terminological quagmire‟ (Leathard 1994, Elston 2005, Sen and Davala 
2002).  
 18 
Nijikamp et al. (2002) refer to PPP as an institutionalised form of cooperation 
of public and private actors, which on the basis of their own objectives, work 
together towards a joint target. Within the health arena, one of the most 
accepted definitions of global PPPs defines them as: 
 
 “collaborative relationships that transcend national boundaries and bring 
together at least three parties, among them a corporation and an inter-
governmental organisation, so as to achieve a shared health creating goal on 
the basis of a mutually agreed and explicitly defined division of labour” (Buse 
and Walt 2000a: 550).  
 
Evident in these definitions and other attempts to describe partnerships, is 
the loose use of the term „collaboration‟ or „cooperation‟. However, the 
operational reality of PPPs in developing countries, as presented in the 
subsequent chapters, suggests a contrary scenario. Green and Matthias 
(1997) propose a continuum to assess the inter-organisational relationships 
(Refer figure 1). Starting with competition, which suggests a scenario where 
organisations compete with each other and there is limited communication 
and functional linkage between them, the continuum progresses through 
cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and ends in control. The control end 
represents a relationship where one organisation gains full autonomy and 
control over another (ibid). It has been argued that inter-organisational 
relationships form a continuum of increased structure, decreased autonomy 
and intensified communication. (Zafar Ullah et al. 2006, Begum 2000).  
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Source: Green and Matthias (1997) 
 
Figure 1: The competition- control continuum  
 
However, as Robinson and White (1997) rightly point out, the debate has 
largely focussed on „complementarity‟ and not „cooperation‟ or conflict 
between the actors. This, in their view, reduces PPPs to a mechanism 
through which the state provides an enabling environment for the other social 
actors. Thus we find an increasing use of metaphors like „oversight‟, 
„facilitation‟ and   „supervision‟ in the context of the changing role of the State 
from a provider and regulator to a co-provider of services.  
 
Alternative modes of conceiving PPPs, although limited, have begun to 
emerge. Roy Widdus (2001) and Buse and Waxman (2001) view 
partnerships as „social experiments‟ that are attempting to learn how to tackle 
intractable health problems in better ways. Judith Richter (2003) on the other 
hand, proposes the term „interactions‟ in view of her objection to the term 
„partnership‟ which disguises unequal power relations between public 
institutions and private corporations or between institutions in the global north 
and south or between the non profit and for profit sector. She also argues 
that lumping together diverse categories of public-private interactions such 
as fundraising (corporate donations in cash/kind), research collaborations, 
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negotiations and consultations with corporations and business associations, 
corporate social responsibility projects, contracting out of services etc. under 
a common label of PPPs obscures important distinctions (Richter 2004a). 
More recently, constructivist approaches have been applied to understanding 
and reconceptualising partnerships. Buse and Harmer (2004), for example, 
discuss the utility of the application of Hacking‟s (1999) constructivist 
framework (Box 1) to reflect on partnerships as a governance mechanism 
and challenge the assumptions underlying it.  
 
Box 1: Hacking’s constructivist framework  
 
Substituting PPP in the framework and adding a cautionary note, rather than 
dismissing the concept, Buse and Harmer (2004) argue that the framework 
can be particularly useful for assessing partnerships in comparison to 
alternative global health frameworks. Hacking‟s framework is a departure 
from other approaches to examine the partnership phenomenon, for which 
the starting point is not an analysis of the assumptions or rationale 
underpinning the phenomenon but the practices which it generates. This 
thesis builds further on the critical view inherent in this framework and does 
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not assume, rather questions, the inevitability, and legitimacy of PPPs in 
general and the Global Fund in particular. 
 
The above understandings suggest the significant variation in the meaning 
and practice of partnerships where the term is used loosely to refer to almost 
any kind of arrangement between the „private‟ and the „public‟. Partnering 
has extended to describe a wide range of activities involving an ever-
expanding web of relationships between donors, high and low income 
country governments, NGOs, community members, and corporate and 
business houses and their representatives (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 
1992, Hall et al. 2005). Tracing these interactions Nishtar (2004) highlights a 
continuum where transnational / global partnerships with a visible for-profit 
partner occupy one end of the spectrum while the other end is occupied by 
informal arrangements between national governments and individual 
practitioners or an NGO in service provision such as TB control or control of 
non communicable diseases. Somewhere in the spectrum also lie ‘informal 
and direct‟ relationships between the civil society and corporate partners 
(NGOs seeking support from corporate sector) for supporting global 
programmes (ibid).  
 
1.2.2 Novel arrangements or old wine in a new bottle? 
Arguably, PPPs represent a transformation in public-private relations and 
interactions (Lethbridge 2002, Harmer 2005). This claim has been refuted on 
many accounts. I summarise the criticism through two main arguments.   
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The first argument rests on the false and contested distinction between the 
terms „public‟ and „private‟ which has historically been critiqued by social 
movements (Pateman 1989), predominantly feminists and Marxists, as mere 
social constructions with its roots in patriarchy (Cochran 1999) and economic 
relations of productions (Waltzer 1984). This distinction is even more 
contested today, given the blurring traditional boundaries between what 
constitutes „public‟ and what is „private‟ (Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b). If the 
nation state and the private for-profit corporations were the evidently distinct 
public and private entities, a series of other institutions such as the 
multilateral development agencies (like WHO, WB) and international NGOs 
occupy a space in between them. The dichotomy is further blurred with the 
business sector/ corporations setting up private foundations registered as 
trusts and societies (Hellen Keller, Bill Melinda Gates, Global Business 
Coalition etc.) and setting up public health initiatives as part of their corporate 
social responsibility. The Handwashing Initiative, set up as a partnership 
between Unilever, Procter & Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, and development 
agencies such as UNICEF, USAID and others, is an example of the latter.  
 
The second argument challenges the novelty of public-private interactions. 
Historically, the public and private sector, especially if the latter were to 
include the non-government and non-profit actors such as missionaries, have 
engaged in both formal and informal relationships and the United Nations 
and World Health Organisation have had explicit interactions with the 
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business community. These interactions include: contracting out services, 
research collaborations, fundraising, corporate social responsibility projects, 
and negotiations or public tenders for low product pricing (Richter 2004b). In 
addition, most nation states have collaborated with members of the civil 
society constituency in generating awareness and providing support 
structures for services delivered in the public sphere. Richter (2004a) argues 
that subsuming such widely differing issues under a common label of „public 
private partnerships‟ obscures important distinctions between interactions 
and creates a false sense of novelty of the PPP approach.  
 
I do not deny that historically, both public and private sectors have enjoyed 
formal and informal relations in the health sector. However, as Widdus 
(2001) argues, the division of roles between the public and private 
constituted “a poorly defined partnership in which the outcomes desired by 
different parties were never explicitly negotiated”.  This emphasis on „explicit 
negotiation‟ as the key distinguishing characteristic of partnership from other 
interactions is also explicated by Jane Nelson (2002) who regards the 
“shared process of decision making” as the unique feature of this policy 
paradigm. She argues that the novelty of most strategic partnerships can be 
attributable to “the partners work(ing) together at all levels and stages, from 
the design and governance of the initiative, to implementation and 
evaluation” (Nelson 2002:47) 
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These understandings render my concurrence with Richter‟s observation that 
the novelty about PPPs today is the framework of thought underlying the 
approach (Richter 2004b). This framework of thought, or ideas, that inform 
the discursive understanding of PPP is evident in the current literature across 
disciplines, which regards PPP as „inevitable‟, „win-win‟ arrangements 
desirable to resolve the current global health crisis (Buse and Harmer 2004). 
Additionally, partnering implies a notion of joint sharing of efforts, risks and 
benefits by all partners (Reich 2000, Zafar Ullah et al. 2006). Since there is 
little disagreement on their potential to act as a transformative mode of 
governance, negative outcomes, if any, are viewed as „unintended 
consequences‟ and attributed to “process-related challenges” which can be 
overcome by using set of global principles and norms (Nishtar 2004). 
 
This renders an analysis of the thoughts and ideas, which inform the 
hegemony of PPPs. The ideas that underlie the PPP phenomenon have 
evolved over time: a period marked by economic, political, and financial 
crisis. I start by looking at the historical context within which the discursive 
understanding on PPPs evolved. I discuss the number of key global 
developments that acted as precursor to this new model of interaction.  
 
1.2.3. Historical development: tracing the global 
PPPs were introduced as a new form of governance in a period marked by 
significant shifts in the political economy of health across nations. The inter-
war period (1919 to 1939) witnessed the entry of a number of international 
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NGOs and private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation (Loughlin 
and Berridge 2002). Despite the proliferation of these non-state agencies, 
health responses and initiatives remained a mandate of the State and the 
League of nations.  In the post war period (1940s) the idea of “partnership” 
was mooted at an inter-governmental level. Rooted in the functionalist school 
of thought, which was sceptical of the ability of the nation States to ensure 
peace and order and enable public welfare outside its traditional boundaries, 
the proponents argued for joint working through novel international 
institutions (Mitrany 1975). The alternative proposed was a “cobweb of 
diverse and overlapping institutions...that would help to cement processes of 
growing interdependence among states and societies” (Rosamond 2000:35). 
However, it wasn‟t until the mid 1970s that the phenomenon of PPP (distinct 
from intergovernmental collaborations) gathered momentum at the 
international level. The UN special programme for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases (WHO/TDR), created in 1975, adopted the PPP approach 
between public sector and private companies for drug discovery and 
development (Nwaka and Ridley 2003).  
 
The start of 1980‟s was also marked by a gradual shift from the emphasis on 
strengthening public health care (and the centrality of the State in 
development), as highlighted in the Alma Ata declaration in 1978, to the 
debate on „health care financing‟. The economic and fiscal crises and the rise 
of the World Bank in this period was instrumental in shifting the discourse 
away from state-oriented health care towards a market driven approach to 
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health sector reforms. The Bank‟s growing hegemony in defining health and 
financing international and global health policy and its role in “diffusing 
knowledge of its neoliberal principles” (Lister 2005) enabled a quest for 
efficiency and ways to cut public spending on services (Hong 2000). For 
example, in its report „Financing health services in developing countries: An 
agenda for reform‟ (1987), the Bank points out to the inability of the nation 
States to ensure efficiency and equity. The early 1990‟s thus witnessed a 
clear move away from the public sector reform, towards the privatisation of 
public infrastructure, utilities and services including health and education 
(Lister 2005). This development conveniently overlooked the emerging 
evidence which questioned the myth that competitive markets facilitate 
increases in cost containment, equity or efficiency in health care markets 
(Maynard 1994, Hsiao 1994).    
 
With the introduction of the reforms package in the later part of the 1990s, 
there was also a gradual shift to a „modernisation‟ narrative that emphasised 
values of social cohesion (Newman 2004) through network building, holistic 
governance and partnerships. The impact was visible at various levels. At the 
global level, institutions like WHO, that played a significant role in formulating 
health policies and prescribing standards of health care, welcomed and 
encouraged partnerships between the State and the market in financing, 
provisioning and researching health care (Baru and Nundy 2008). The 
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Jakarta declaration1 was the first in the series of global political ratifications to 
draw upon the „widest possible range of resources‟ to tackle health 
determinants in the 21st century, thus seeking the involvement of the private 
sector in health promotion efforts.  
 
“To address emerging threats to health, new forms of action are needed. 
There is a clear need to break through traditional boundaries within the 
government sector, between governmental and non-governmental 
organisation, and between public and private sectors. Cooperation is 
essential; this requires the creation of new partnerships at all levels of 
governance in society” (Excerpt from the Jakarta declaration, WHO 1997)  
 
By the late 1990s, there was a general acknowledgement of the need for 
multiple sources of health financing and an acceptance of “modified” 
interpretation of state-market relations. PPPs were now regarded as an 
important component of health sector reforms and gained legitimacy and 
visibility in the health sector on the basis of various rationales (rooted in 
diverse theoretical perspectives) which I further elaborate in the next chapter. 
 
The dominant rationale that emerged was that the “fiscal constraints 
demanded a prioritisation and restriction of public expenditures”, and that 
turning to the private sector could “address cost and investment challenge, 
improve efficiency, understood largely in terms of service provision and 
                                                 
1
 The Jakarta declaration was a product of the „Fourth International Conference on Health Promotion: 
New Players for a New Era‟, a meeting held in Jakarta in July 1997 with the objective of leading 
health promotion into the 21
st
 century. 
 28 
management at reduced costs, and enhance service quality” (Nikolic and 
Mikisch 2006).  
 
The proponents of global governance argued that global PPPs promote 
cooperation between the various stakeholders and facilitate coordination of 
policies at all levels, from local to global (Brugha 2008, Benner et al. 2002, 
Spicer et al. 2010). Given the rise of corporations, PPPs were also seen as a 
means to harness the perceived benefits of corporate resources and 
expertise, while maintaining public protection of social value (Harmer 2005). 
In the process, it was argued, the corporate sector could “advance its own 
cause by embracing the universal values...and weave them into global 
market relations” (Ruggie 2000). Pharmaceutical companies and businesses 
thus began to play a significant role in the technical boards of disease control 
programmes of the WHO and in funding research and product development. 
Several global health initiatives were launched as partnerships between 
multiple actors – multilateral (World Bank, UN agencies) and bilateral 
organisations (Dfid, USAID, EU), international NGOs, pharmaceutical 
companies (Merck, Smith-Kline), and private foundations (Bill and Melinda 
Gates, Clinton) - in complex relationships.  
 
The millennium development goals (MDG) further triggered a spate of new 
alliances and consortia set up to accelerate action to scale up coverage and 
deliver improved outcomes against the health-related goals. The focus was 
on increasing aid effectiveness, improving transparency, accountability, and 
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cooperation in the programs executed by „typically rival agencies‟ (Schneider 
and Garrett 2009). One such attempt to improve relations and coordination 
between global international health agencies resulted in the formation of the 
H-8 (health -8: WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNFPA, WB, GFATM, GAVI and 
Gates Foundation), health alliance formed to foster cooperation and discuss 
challenges to scaling-up health services. In September 2007 the world‟s 
wealthy governments and private donors created the International Health 
Partnership, a consortium that seeks to „re-design‟ the relationship between 
donors and recipient nations. It promised longer term financial commitments 
in exchange for commitments from recipients to accountability of every dollar 
spent at the country level (DFID 2007). 
 
These developments reveal that various discourses and shifts within them 
have played a role in establishing the necessity of PPPs and thus shaped the 
rationale on the basis of which participation of specific actors/ institutions has 
been invoked. Harmer (2005) identifies four such discourses: The economic 
discourse underscores the shift from state-oriented health care of the 1970s 
(public) to health care financing models and competitive markets of the 
1980s (private) to modified markets (public-private) in the 1990s; the 
Sociological focuses on the changing relationship of the state and the market 
and the move from social to neoliberal democracy, which paved way for a 
„third way‟ of sociological and political thought (Giddens 1998); the 
Technological suggests a shift from the emphasis on broader social-
economic determinants of health to a narrow focus on biomedical responses 
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and technological fixes to global health problems; and the Globalisation 
discourse focusing on the evolution of ideas on global public goods and 
global health governance. Several other ideas, for example, injecting 
business like principles to public agencies (Management discourse) and 
participation of the local and affected communities (International human 
rights discourse), played a significant role in defining the PPP policy model.   
 
These overlapping and often divergent ideas together made it possible to 
establish the inevitability of PPPs, in order to resolve global health problems. 
A negative consequence of this is that the rationale around a specific PPP is 
then applied to, and serves as the rationale for, all kinds of public private 
interface arrangements.  PPPs have been variously promoted but usually 
with no distinction made between the pluralities in its forms and working. 
Hence, at the outset of this thesis, I outline the global partnership and 
country level public private arrangements which are the focus of my 
investigation and describe the context in which these emerged.  
 
1.3 The Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
 
1.3.1 Background: Infectious diseases in a new light 
While the control of infectious diseases has always been high on nations 
health agenda, the turn of the century (and the decade preceding it) 
witnessed a growing hysteria marked by a renewed awareness of the rapid 
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globalisation of these diseases and a greater global will to tackle the 
„warfare‟2. A variety of discourses and arguments have led to its re-
prioritisation at both global and domestic levels.  These include rapidly 
growing social inequalities, industrial and ecological change that impacts the 
distribution and spread of diseases, a re-conceptualisation of some of the 
infectious diseases as a threat to international security and development and 
above all, the moral-rational model of „global public goods‟ that proposes a 
re-conception of the benefits of infectious disease control in the developing 
world for the global community (Tan et al 2003, Price-Smith 1998). Recent 
reports and research on infectious diseases also highlight the link between 
the impact of these global shifts on States‟ capacities for governance and 
economic growth and an increased threat of inter or intra state conflict.  
 
I adopt the phrase „cognitive evolution‟, as proposed by Emmanuel Adler 
(1997), to describe the series of events that transpired as a precursor to the 
Fund. These served as a medium for translation of the multiple viewpoints 
into a common language, thus evoking support of multiple stakeholders. 
Adler describes cognitive evolution as a process wherein institutional facts 
are socially constructed and established by “collective understanding of the 
physical and social world that are subject to authoritative selection process 
and thus to evolutionary change” (1997:339). 
                                                 
2
 See Ian Harper (2005) in Mosse and Lewis (ed)  „An Aid effect‟, for a discussion on the use of the 
idiom of warfare in disease control programmes. Referring to the TB control programme in Nepal, 
Harper (pg 137-139) argues that such metaphors structure a public health perception, for example, the 
tubercle bacillus waging terror on the human populations, and shape its focus and direction.    
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1.3.2 Cognitive evolution of the Fund 
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a new resolve to scale up the 
global response to three infectious diseases – HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria- which were declared as global public health emergencies. A 
milestone in this global awakening was the launch of the report of the WHO 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health3 (WHO 2001). The report that 
was presented in 2001 marked a culmination of a series of projects 
undertaken by the World Health Organisation on economics in health policy, 
systems and services. It was presented as a new „global blueprint for health‟ 
to save millions of lives at a small cost relative to large improvements in 
health and prosperity (WHO 2002).  
 
Commentators welcomed the progressive elements of the report such as its 
critique of user fees as a means of health care financing and its demand for 
greater funds for tackling ill health. However, the report was criticised for the 
implicit shift from an emphasis on poverty and other social determinants of 
health upheld in the Alma Ata declaration to an exclusive focus on economic 
productivity (Banerji 2002a). The report was argued to mirror the conceptual 
and methodological approaches of the World Bank and was regarded as the 
next step towards widening opportunities for private investment in public 
programmes and promoting vertical programmes at the behest of donors 
(ibid). In confining itself to the economic concept of public good and further 
defining it only in the context of a few of the numerous communicable 
                                                 
3
 Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development was presented on 20
th
 
December 2001 to the Director General of World Health Organisation 
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diseases, the report presented a narrow perspective on public health. Critics 
point out that this exclusive focus on only three of the infectious diseases 
namely, HIV and AIDS, TB and malaria is linked to the potential they carry for 
expansion of markets for vaccines, diagnostic kits, antiretroviral and other 
drugs (Banerji 2002b). Such views were reinforced by another blue print 
entitled „Scaling up the response to Infectious Disease: A way out of poverty 
(2002)‟ which immediately followed the Commission report. The 
Commissioners elaborated on how the increased investment in health could 
be „well spent‟. In providing a „single road map to scale efforts to control the 
three killer diseases‟ it stressed specific interventions and called for „an 
unprecedented deployment of communications and marketing strategies to 
encourage preventive behaviour among more than a billion people at risk‟ 
(WHO 2002). 
 
Meanwhile, a series of international meetings played an important role in 
wielding support and commitment for the policy processes at the global level. 
The first in this chronology was the G8 Summit at Okinawa (2000) where the 
leaders of the world‟s richest countries made ambitious commitments to 
achieve substantial reduction in the global burden due to the three „killer 
diseases‟ (Brugha and Walt 2001). In the HIV arena specific targets were 
endorsed for reducing the number of new infections among young people by 
25% by the year 2010. Ideas and activities around the creation of a global 
„war chest‟ to fight the three diseases began to converge. This war chest, or 
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a global health fund, was envisaged as the cornerstone of measures taken to 
meet these commitments.   
 
Following on from the targets adopted the previous year at Okinawa, the 
African Summit at Abuja (April 2001) and the UN General Assembly Session 
(UNGAS) on HIV and AIDS (June 2001) were other key events in mobilising 
a global response through pledges from respective countries. The UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan concluded the UNGAS session with a 
commitment and call for raising US$ 7-10 billion annually in new funding for 
the three diseases. These series of events culminated at the Genoa G8 
Summit (July 2001) where countries including US, UK, Japan, the European 
Union; private corporations; foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
among others, committed resources to a global partnership that was officially 
launched in January 2002, as the Global fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
(WHO 2002). For the purpose of this thesis, this global initiative or 
partnership is referred to as the Fund.   
 
1.3.3 Purpose of the Fund: Examining the public transcript4 
As evident from the historical developments preceding the setting up of the 
Fund, the purpose of such an institutional arrangement was to dramatically 
increase resources available to fight the three diseases- HIV and AIDS, TB 
                                                 
4
 The term introduced by James C. Scott in his seminal work „Domination and the arts of resistance: 
The hidden transcript of subordinate group‟ (1992) refers to the surface or public interactions present 
in the systems of domination between the oppressed and those who dominate (ibid:2), In contrast, the 
term hidden transcript pertains to “the discourse that takes place offstage, beyond direct observation 
by power holders” (ibid:4).  
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and Malaria. Similar to other global initiatives in health, the Fund is constantly 
evolving and expanding in terms of its outreach, in-country presence and 
influence. Since its creation in 2002, the Fund has approved funding of US$ 
19.3 billion for more than 572 programs in 144 countries (GFATM 2010). The 
Fund‟s contribution is particularly notable in HIV and AIDS for which it has 
leveraged significant amounts of funding. It provides a quarter of all 
international financing for AIDS globally, two-thirds for tuberculosis and three 
quarters for malaria (GFATM 2009).  
 
It serves to attract, manage and disburse funds in order to mitigate the 
impact of the diseases in countries. The Fund is regarded as a new finance 
mechanism, a move away from traditional bilateral assistance. The public 
transcript of the Fund sets it apart from other approaches to financing health 
sector by laying claims on: 
1. Country ownership: The Fund operates “only” as a “financing 
instrument and not as an implementing entity”. Grant proposals 
submitted to the Fund‟s global secretariat are developed by recipient 
countries, thus underscoring a commitment towards supporting 
„country driven‟ (and not donor driven) programs that reflect national 
ownership.  
2. Inclusiveness and partnership:  It is set up as a partnership between 
governments, civil society, private sector and the affected 
communities. The Fund‟s commitment to the mechanism of public-
private partnerships is not only restricted to fundraising and 
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management at the global level but also extends to operations in the 
recipient countries. However, the notion of „partnership‟ in both these 
areas – resource mobilization at global level and in-country utilization 
of those resources - differs considerably with respect to the 
governance structures, the accountability and information flows, the 
conflict among interests, and consequently, in the play out of power 
among „partners‟. 
3. No in-country institutional presence: Coordinated through a secretariat 
in Geneva and a board which comprises of 24 members including 
nation states, corporate members, and the civil society, the Fund 
exerts its country presence by contracting a local fund agent (LFA) to 
oversee progress and ensure the continuity of grants. Structures 
central to Fund governance in countries include a national 
coordinating mechanism, CCM and a Secretariat.  
4. Conditions precedents and legal provisions essential to signing and/or 
disbursement of grant: These are conditions that must be achieved by 
the recipient before disbursements of funds will be made under the 
grant agreement. These may include: expanding the composition of 
CCM to include private sector, developing M&E systems to enable 
efficient reporting on programmatic success, Failure to meet a 
condition precedent by the terminal date decided by the Fund can lead 
to termination of the grant agreement. 
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Finally, „performance based‟ funding, with emphasis on achievement of clear 
and measurable results and timely implementation rather than inputs and 
processes, is a key organising principle of the fund arrangements. While the 
Fund claims to be open to supporting a diverse range of activities among the 
recipient countries, a closer examination of the content and strategies of 
proposals that are successful in securing a grant suggests certain salient 
features. Bennett and Fairbank (2003) in a policy research paper developed 
for the Fund highlight these as follows – 
- greater role of the business and corporate sector (and wider „civil 
society‟) in service delivery 
- a substantial investment in purchase of drugs, in particular ARVs,  
purchase of new equipment, strengthening of health systems, and 
capacity building of human resources. 
 
A recent development in the Fund‟s operations was that, starting January 
2009, its administrative services agreement with WHO was terminated 
rendering it as a fully autonomous institution. This step was perceived to 
allow this international financing institution greater independence and 
flexibility in “shaping its organisational culture, applying its corporate policies 
exclusively and managing its own administrative services (HR, finance, 
procurement, administration)” (GFATM 2008). These changes were argued 
to have additional implications for the policy environment and governance 
processes in recipient countries. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the core structures of the Fund governance which will be 
further elaborated in chapter four. The Fund awards grants to „principal 
recipients‟ on the basis of proposals submitted by the country coordinating 
mechanism (CCM), a structure central to governance of the Fund‟s country 
level operations. Country proposals are reviewed by a technical review panel 
(TRP) of independent experts and considered for approval by the board 
members.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Core governance structures and grant process of The Global Fund 
 
The entire process of bidding, identifying projects and partners and 
subsequently submitting a country proposal to Global fund is coordinated by 
the CCM, which is “key to maintaining the Fund‟s commitment to local 
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ownership and participatory decision making” (GFATM 2007a). Once a grant 
is approved, the CCM is also responsible to „oversee progress during 
implementation phase‟.   
1.3.4 Critical analysis of the Fund: emerging hidden transcript 
The magnitude of the funding generated and given to countries and the 
novelty of institutional arrangements that the Fund claims to operate through 
has generated an unprecedented interest among the global health 
practitioners as well as academic researchers. Since its inception, the 
development with respect to the funding rounds approved and the technical 
evaluations undertaken have been closely monitored by both national 
governments and the civil society actors. This is evident from the abundance 
of websites/ newsletters (the Global Fund Observer) and organisations, for 
example the Initiative on PPPs for Health (IPPH), dedicated to the analysis 
and commentary on the Fund.  
 
Much of the debate, however, revolves either around the need for increasing 
donor commitments to the Fund to ensure sustainability of the grants and the 
initiatives supported by it or the difficulties in governance of these 
programmes in resource poor settings. Underlying the debate on 
sustainability is a growing recognition that donor commitments are 
insufficient to continue grant cycles (Radelet 2004). Concerns have been 
raised about the significant gap that exists between the funding raised and 
that required by countries that bear the largest burden of disease. Sceptics 
have also raised apprehensions about how and on what priority areas the 
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limited amount of money will be spent. Another set of criticisms is around the 
emphasis laid by the Fund on purchase of brand-name drugs (Ford and 
Hoen 2001). This has implications for equity of treatment since triple therapy 
from generic manufacturers in India costs five times less than pharmaceutical 
companies in the west. In the context of the study, the emphasis on 
procuring only „good manufacturing practice (GMP) certified drugs‟ has 
resulted in procurement difficulties for states/ regions since the drug 
companies do not cater to small quantities required by the state 
governments. 
 
Technical evaluations commissioned by the Fund and a few independent 
studies highlight the system wide effects of the Fund arrangements (Bennett 
and Fairbank 2003, Hanefeld 2008, Banteyerga et al. 2005). While the 
Fund‟s primary goal is towards “increasing coverage of critical and cost-
effective interventions”, its public transcript also commits to the use of these 
resources “in ways that contribute to the strengthening of health systems” 
(GFATM 2009).  However, evidence suggests that in view of the relatively 
large sums of money that the Fund grants and its emphasis on timely and 
„efficient‟ disbursement, there are likely to be significant effects on elements 
of the broader system for delivering health care within a country (Bennett and 
Fairbank 2003). These system-wide effects have been traced in terms of 
potential i) stewardship and regulatory challenges to government with 
involvement of non-traditional actors in policy processes, ii) shifts in 
distribution of human resources to better funded focal disease programmes 
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and, iii) verticalization of service delivery and development of parallel 
pharmaceutical distribution, health information and management information 
systems (ibid). 
 
Notwithstanding the need for a systematic independent evaluation of the 
Fund processes and outcomes in India, the aim of this thesis is not to 
undertake an impact assessment of the Fund. The substantive aim of the 
study, however, does contribute to building the evidence base on the 
implications of the Fund arrangements for the equity of health systems and 
HIV management in India. The full scope of the thesis is presented in the 
next section.  
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the thesis 
The thesis has two inter-related aims. From a theoretical point of view, the 
thesis aims to examine and deconstruct the rhetoric on public private 
partnerships and the notion of shared power within this discourse. Specific 
objectives are: 
1.1 To examine the various understandings of public private partnerships and 
their ability to capture the ambiguities and plurality of interests 
1.2 To explore and better understand the role of global and local structure, 
actors, and ideas/ discourse in enabling the development and practice of 
PPPs   
1.3 To examine how power mediates the public private interface 
arrangements and shapes the practices and outcomes  
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From a substantive view point, the thesis aims to demonstrate the 
contingency and realities of practices of public private arrangements set off 
by the Global Fund in India as a departure from its discursive understanding, 
and consider its implications for the health systems and outcomes. Specific 
objectives are: 
2.1 To examine the structures (institutions and mechanisms) of the Fund and 
the meanings and practices they generate  
2.2 To understand how the fund regime constitutes the actors and how the 
actors in turn negotiate the discourse-practice divide. 
2.3 To consider the system and programme wide effects with respect to 
equity of treatment and care resulting from the practices. 
 
The Fund arrangements (and public-private interactions) are examined in the 
context of the national AIDS programme in India. This is primarily because, 
as evident from table 1 below, HIV and AIDS has received approximately 
67% of the grant amount sanctioned by the Global Fund to fight AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. Moreover, the discourse around the magnitude of 
the crisis of AIDS and the challenge posed by inequitable access to 
treatment and care, together, have created opportunities for strategic 
partnerships and legitimised greater involvement of the private sector in the 
public health arena.  
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1.5 India’s HIV and AIDS epidemic and the responses 
The dominant narratives that establish the „crises‟ of the AIDS epidemic are 
well documented elsewhere (UNAIDS/ WHO 2005, UNDP 2009). Rather 
than reproducing or reinforcing these, this section presents a brief overview 
of the contested nature of knowledge, which has shaped the nature of public 
health response and the complexities highlighted by the political economy of 
AIDS in India. While in chapter five I describe the key features of the AIDS 
„industry‟ and relate the shifts in the national response to the Fund 
requirements, I restrict the scope of this section to understand the 
background against which the Fund arrangements operate.  
1.5.1 The dwindling figures 
The number of people estimated to be living with HIV and AIDS in India rose 
from 3.9 million in 1997 to 5.7 million in 2005. The difference was attributed 
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to an expanding number of sentinel sites and changing methodologies in the 
calculation of estimates, rendering the task of describing trends in prevalence 
difficult (NACO 2004, UNAIDS 2006). The national sentinel survey 
established that the epidemic was largely concentrated in six states: Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Nagaland and Tamil Nadu 
(Refer map in section 3.5.2) where HIV prevalence was 5% among „high risk 
groups‟ and 1% in the antenatal population (NACO 2004, UNAIDS 2006, 
Amin 2004). 
 
In 2006, however, the estimates arrived at through a more rigorous 
methodology5 “attested to and backed by international agencies namely 
UNAIDS and WHO” (NACO 2007c), suggested an almost 50 percent 
reduction in these figures. With a national prevalence rate of approximately 
0.36 percent, the numbers amounted to an average of 2.5 million people with 
HIV and AIDS and were confirmed as the most accurate reading thus far 
(NACO and NIMS 2006). The impact of this reduction was evident in all the 
discussions had with the research participants as they highlighted the 
tensions between the NACO and the civil society organisations. First, while 
NACO regarded these figures as an opportunity to make claims over the 
success achieved by the national programme partly attributing the 
discrepancy to earlier faulty techniques, the civil society organisations were 
concerned over the retreating commitments of the donor community. 
                                                 
5
The new estimates were arrived at through a composite methodology using multiple sources: Sentinel 
surveillance covering all districts in the country, the National Family Health Survey or NFHS 3 
conducted in 2005-2006, and a behavioural and biologic assessment focusing on high risk groups in 
high prevalence states. See NACO online for a more detailed discussion. 
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Second, a change was observed in the national strategy with the focus 
shifting from “high prevalence states” to “emerging districts of concern” 
located in high or low prevalence states (NACO 2007c).   
 
Notwithstanding the dispute around figures and its implications for multiple 
stakeholders, the sheer numbers affected masks a complex reality which, as 
also noted by NACO, suggests that India has not one but two epidemics in 
various stages of progression. As per the previous estimates, heterosexual 
transmission was argued to be the main mode of transmission accounting for 
85% of cases although in regions such as the northeast injecting drug use 
(IDU) accounted for a majority of the infections (NACO 2004). However, the 
revised estimates indicated alarming trends: IDU and homosexual route has 
emerged as important routes of HIV transmission across the country, 
prevalence among the female sex workers is increasing in the North east 
region, and there is rising prevalence among ANC clinic attendees in North 
Indian states (NACO and NIMS 2006).   
 
1.5.2 The public health response 
The epidemic in India has been handled primarily in terms of regulation and 
risk management, although the various interventions have conformed to the 
internationally recognised best practice models. A brief history of the state 
response is presented in box 2.  
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Box 2: The state response: Timeline and key features 
The national response was initiated in 1986 and largely restricted to national 
surveillance programmes and mass media campaigns focussing on „risky 
behaviours‟ to generate awareness. Despite the timely response, much of 
this early prevention effort was argued to be inadequate and resulted in 
stigmatisation of vulnerable populations (Dube 2000, Solomon et al. 2004).  
In 1991, a renewed commitment arising from a World Bank (WB) loan to the 
Government of India (GOI) for a national programme for AIDS control 
facilitated the setting up of the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO), 
the nodal agency under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW), 
to implement HIV control efforts in India (Solomon et al. 2004). The first 
phase of the programme made little progress, the failure attributed largely to 
the lack of political will of the State and poor utilisation of funds (Imam 1994). 
The second phase of the programme (NACP II) was launched in 1999 with 
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funding from multiple donors including a five-year loan from the WB, GOI and 
bilateral agencies. The budget was over USD 392 million, extended for two 
years and revised upwards to USD 474 million. The World Bank‟s assistance 
of USD 192 million amounted to approximately 47 percent of the total 
earmarked funds (NACO 2007a). The Global Fund was introduced in 2002 
and the first grant agreement was signed in January 2003. Subsequently, the 
programme received increasing contributions from the Fund with its share 
increasing from 6 percent of the funds earmarked in NACP II to 25 percent in 
NACP III (NACO 2007a). A landmark achievement in this period was the 
phased introduction of free antiretroviral treatment at select public hospitals 
in India in 2004.  
 
The field studies on which the thesis is based commenced when the 
programme was in its third phase, NACP III. The third phase, launched in 
2006, has treatment as its prime focus and seeks to integrate with 
prevention, care and support initiatives.  The programme articulates 
„mainstreaming‟ and „partnerships‟ as key approaches to facilitate multi-
sectoral response and leverage technical and financial resources of the 
development partners (NACO 2007b). The Fund is the single largest donor 
with the funding disbursed for round II, III, IV and VI alone amounting to 44 
percent of the external AID component and 25 percent of the total funds 
earmarked for NACPIII (Refer Table 2). 
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Sl.No Source Amount 
(RS./billion)
I Direct Budgetary Support 28.61
II EAC (External Aid Component) 41.48
(i) World Bank (USD 295 mill. including 
Retroactive f inancing for 2006-07) 13.28
(ii) DFID(95 mill. Pounds) 8.08
(iii) GFATM (Round II, III & IV) 8.24
(iv) GFATM (Round VI) 9.63
(vi) USAID 2.25
Grand Total (I +II) 70.09
Table 2: Source of Funding of NACP III
 
The national AIDS control programme in India is a vertical programme that 
has added to the burden of the health system which is struggling to meet the 
demands placed on it (MOHFW 2005). NACO implements the programme 
through 35 AIDS Prevention and Control Societies in the States (SACS) and 
works with nearly 700 NGOs, CBOs, bilateral donors and private foundations 
to carry out targeted interventions (NACO 2007d). The SACS are quasi 
governmental organisations that receive funding from the NACO (and not the 
State governments) towards the implementation of the state AIDS 
programmes. Different components of the national programme include 
phased ART roll out across the country, targeted infections (TIs), prevention 
of parent to child transmission (PPTCT), Integrated counseling and treatment 
centre (developed by merging together voluntary counselling and testing 
centres and the PPTCT component), blood safety, and care provision. 
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1.5.3 The battle for ARVs 
India is the also the largest supplier of generic ARVs to low and middle 
income countries, exporting two-thirds of the drugs it manufactures (UNAIDS 
2008). With the launch of its first generic drug in 2001, Cipla (an Indian 
pharmaceutical) unleashed tremendous competition among the big 
pharmaceutical industries, resulting in a dramatic drop in the price of the drug 
globally (Liu and Lu 2010). Although, the export and manufacture of generics 
in India is termed as a turning point for universalising HIV treatment for 
resource-poor settings (ART being exported to sub Saharan Africa and other 
regions), it was not until 2004 that the people with HIV and AIDS in India 
were able to benefit from this development. Prior to that, the treatment was 
available at unaffordable cost in the private sector (speciality clinics and 
hospitals) and, on case to case basis, through charitable trusts and NGOs.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
In this chapter I set out the background for the thesis engaging briefly with 
the different domains that are the focus of this research: the discursive 
understanding and practice of public private partnerships, the Global Fund to 
fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and the HIV and AIDS programme in India. 
Besides clarifying the concepts and the inherent ambiguities, I examine the 
discourse and ideas shaping the PPP phenomenon and the historical 
developments that act as precursor to the set up of the Fund. 
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Chapter two starts by addressing the first of my theoretical aims which is to 
examine the different approaches of classifying and understanding PPPs. I 
argue that none of the approaches adequately account for an analysis of 
power and information asymmetries that are typical to the arrangements that 
are investigated in this research. I therefore conclude this section by 
proposing an alternative classification framework to assess public private 
arrangements across different analytical dimensions. Next, the literature on 
PPPs is reviewed and the theoretical approaches embedded in different 
disciplines are examined in order to understand the ideas establishing the 
inevitability of PPPs and legitimising its practice at both global and country 
level. An outcome of this exercise is a realisation that there is no grand 
theory on PPP. The lens of network governance is therefore adopted given 
its utility in understanding the organisational form that partnerships represent. 
The third section in this chapter is dedicated to clarifying the various 
conceptualisations of power. Here, particular emphasis is laid on the 
structural and ideational (ideas and discourse) dimensions of power and a 
conceptual framework is proposed to explain the third objective within my 
theoretical aim.  I conclude with identifying four broad themes to be further 
explored in the subsequent chapters.   
 
Chapter three describes the framework adopted for the research design and 
levels of analysis and substantiates my methodological and epistemic 
choices. I situate my research design in the four elements of the framework 
proposed by Michel Crotty (1998): epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
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methodology, and methods. Crucial to this research is the information 
generation process and my journey as a researcher. I outline the study sites, 
the selection criteria and the enablers and disablers in my journey. This 
chapter is concluded with a discussion on the quality of data, and ethical 
considerations made.  
 
Chapters four, five, and six are structured mainly around the substantive 
element of my thesis. Drawing on the primary and secondary sources, these 
chapters reveal the hidden transcript of the Fund, addressing objectives 2.1, 
2.2, and 2.3. In chapter four, I discuss the practice of public private 
partnerships facilitated by the Fund mechanisms as a departure from the 
monotheism (discursive notion) of the Fund, and more generally, health PPP. 
Drawing on the case of the national AIDS programme I focus on two inter-
related aspects. Firstly, I examine the governmentality of the Fund and the 
contingencies of practice i.e. how new alliances produce structures and how 
these compete with their private and public counterparts to sustain in an 
environment characterised by power asymmetries and resource constraints 
(Objective 2.1). Secondly, I seek to understand the plurality of perspectives 
of the Fund actors and the challenges they face in mediating the different 
worlds of the global discourse and local practices (Objective 2.2). The first 
aspect examines how „partnerships‟ are established, negotiated, maintained 
and challenged. The second aspect is explained through two case studies 
focusing on the public sector „partnership‟ arrangements with a civil society 
consortia and a corporate member.  
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In chapter five, I seek to understand and illustrate the disciplining regime of 
the Fund i.e. how the Fund governance reconstitutes the non-state actors at 
all levels. Drawing on the case of the network of people with AIDS, I engage 
more deeply with objective 2.2, focusing on a sub-section of the Fund 
„brokers‟ i.e. the actors comprising the „civil society‟, and explicate their role 
in reproducing the discursive construction of the Fund and development. 
Here, the life of a project cycle and the interpretive communities it creates in 
the process are the object of analysis. An underlying aim of this chapter is to 
deconstruct the conceptual understanding of the term civil society and 
present an analysis of the AIDS „industry‟, its constitution, the diversity of 
interests and power relations operating within, and seek to understand the 
processes with which claims are made and credibility established. 
 
Chapter six focuses on the knowledge-power links, illustrating the process 
and tools through which the stabilisation of the Fund programme occurs. 
Following the paper trails and documentation necessary for this exercise, I 
discuss how the disjuncture between theory and practice, as presented in 
earlier chapters, is weaved into consensus and success stories. I argue that 
the system is stabilised and its hegemony maintained through a constant 
cycle of interpretation - translation of the project rationale into different 
institutional languages through acts of brokerage and sensitisation of 
„beneficiaries into „activist experts‟- and demonstration of success in order to 
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legitimise the roles of the Fund brokers and make further claims through 
production of “facts”. 
 
In chapter seven, I summarise the findings and conclude the thesis by 
reflecting on the theoretical and substantive aim of the thesis. While the 
theme of system and programme wide effects (Objective 2.3: implications for 
HIV management) is recurrent in chapters four, five and six, it is further 
teased out in this chapter in pursuit of a discussion on the implication of the 
Fund for equity of human resources, treatment, and care.    
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Considerations on Public Private 
Partnerships and Power 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Building on the description and clarification of Public Private Partnerships 
presented in the previous chapter, I now analyse the phenomenon in greater 
depth. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines 
the different approaches used to clarify and classify the phenomenon of PPP, 
the global and local dichotomy in the nature of these arrangements, and 
concludes with a framework proposed to assess the phenomenon across 
different analytical dimensions. Here, I also summarise the main critique and 
concerns around PPPs in the public health domain and its implications for 
governance. The second section examines the theoretical underpinnings of 
the phenomenon where I view PPPs through the lens of network governance 
drawing on the theoretical perspectives of public sector management, 
organisational studies and political science theory. The central argument is 
that issues of power and accountability are central to the governance of 
PPPs, which are often used as a descriptor of network arrangements. These 
are examined in the third section through an in-depth review of the literature 
on power. Situated in the structural, post-structural, and constructivist 
paradigm, the discussion argues for striking a balance in the analysis of 
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power in global health governance by addressing the role of both hegemonic 
institutions including control over resources (structure) and, ideas and 
discourse (ideation). I conclude with clarifying the arrangements that are the 
primary focus of my research and identifying themes for further exploration in 
the chapters. 
 
2.1Understanding Public private partnerships 
 
2.1.1 Different approaches/ typologies of PPPs 
Different types of partnership are distinguished, based on their purpose, 
outcomes, partners involved, nature of partnership, and geographical spread 
(Nishtar 2004, Widdus 2005 and 2001). The various attempts at classifying 
PPP‟s can be broadly categorised under: i) Purpose or goal oriented ii) Role 
oriented and organisational form of arrangements.  
 
2.1.1.1 Purpose oriented  
Buse and Walt (2000b) categorise health partnerships into broad categories 
developed around the goal of the partnership: product-based including drug 
donation programmes aimed at increasing the demand for a particular drug, 
mostly initiated by a pharmaceutical; product development based which is 
generally initiated by the public sector for research, development and 
commercialisation of drugs which are not considered lucrative enough by the 
industry; and issues/systems based. The latter is a more eclectic group 
comprising of partnerships that seek to harmonize approaches of various 
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actors on a single disease or raise its profile on the global policy agenda, 
complement government efforts, and tap non-medical private resources for 
disease control (ibid). 
 
In a similar attempt, Lob-Levyt (2001) identifies three main foci of PPPs in 
health – products, outcomes, and activities. Product-oriented partnerships 
seek to increase investments in research and development of new drugs and 
vaccines particularly for diseases that „disproportionately affect the poor‟. 
These arrangements legitimise the involvement of pharmaceutical industry 
along with philanthropic foundations and public sector institution. The Global 
Alliance for TB drug development, involving Glaxo Smith Kline and other 
partners, is a case in point. Outcome-oriented partnerships are regarded as 
those initiatives that aim to eradicate or mitigate poverty related conditions 
such as polio or guinea worm. The global programme to eliminate lymphatic 
filariasis and „Global 2000‟ (an initiative of Jimmy Carter, the former US 
President) are two examples with focus on outcomes. Finally, activity 
oriented partnership is argued as a broad conceptualisation including 
arrangements that employ private sector mechanisms in the delivery of 
goods, for example, social marketing of bed nets and condoms (Asante and 
Zwi 2007).  
 
While these categorisations served an initial analytic purpose, they do not 
take into account a plethora of PPP arrangements whose description or 
positioning does not fit into the above categories. For example, the inventory 
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of global partnerships developed by the Geneva based Initiative on PPPs for 
Health classified nearly hundred partnerships based onthe following broad 
„approaches‟ (categories): 
- Product Development (discovery and development of new drugs, 
vaccines or other health products) 
- Improving access to health products (including distribution, donation, 
subsidising or negotiating prices) 
- Global coordination mechanism (for coordinating multiple efforts to 
ensure success of approaches and health goals), and reporting 
mechanisms 
- Health Services Strengthening 
- Public Advocacy, Education and Research 
- Regulation and Quality Assurance 
 
This listing revealed the broad remit of health partnerships set up globally to 
tackle „priority‟ health issues. A list of major global health partnerships 
categorised on the basis of the purpose they serve is given in table 3. These 
could be housed or owned by the public sector (GAVI, GPEI), orchestrated 
by companies (Action TB) or by a civil society organisation (Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative, Mectizan donation programme) (Reich 2002). 
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However, like the previous attempts, this tabulation is not only simplistic but 
primarily based on the purpose with which the arrangements were entered 
into. Hence, while the purpose oriented classifications are a useful (and most 
commonly cited) reference point, the conceptually weak framework for 
analysis precludes the possibility of a critical engagement with substantive 
issues related to the interactions inherent in the relationship: transnational 
and complex nature of arrangements, inter-organisational dependencies and 
their incentives, geographical/ spatial arrangement, and the institutional 
environment generated in the recipient country. Each of these aspects, as 
the discussion will reveal, has implications for power play and accountability.  
 
2.1.1.2 Organisational form and role of partners 
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A second category of classification emphasises the role of the potential 
participants and the types of cooperation sought. For example, Gentry and 
Fernandez (1998) identify three roles: provisioning of services, financing 
(public, out of pocket or insurance, and services provided by the corporate 
sector), and regulation and monitoring required to achieve a “minimum 
outcome”. This classification also called for an examination of incentives that 
each partner constituency has in performing these roles (Jutting 1999). In a 
similar discussion, Robinson and White (1997) identify three main processes: 
determination, financing, and production, which underlie various types of 
partnership arrangements between government and civic organisations in 
provision of social goods and services. 
 
An important contribution to this debate is made by Mitchell-Weaver and 
Manning (1992) who categorise PPPs on the basis of their organizational 
form differentiating institutional models in relation to the degree to which 
private interests participate in “strategic decision making in the public 
interest”. These are : the elite model which entails negotiations among 
relatively equal partners who then exert influence on their respective 
organisations to achieve partnership objectives through network association; 
the NGO model wherein the state provides the material, financial and 
organisational resources and delegates the private sector (mostly NGOs) to 
carry out the programme; and the quasi-public authority model in which the 
state sets up a hybrid organisation possessing both public and private 
attributes which then provides services and goods or enables the private 
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sector to enter the market. Buse and Walt (2000) suggest that, in effect, this 
model creates a favourable environment for private enterprise to provide 
services which are publicly mandated.  
 
While this classification is critical for understanding the institutional 
relationships especially with regards to the role of the private sector, it does 
not cover the range of partnerships that are emerging where either the 
private „for-profit‟ sector is a dominant partner or a hybrid of these diverse 
organisational forms are in operation. The newer forms of public- private mix 
arrangements, for example, have „coupling‟ as a defining element of 
partnerships (Bannerman et.al 2005). This masks the strategic role that the 
private sector actors might have in the interactions. Spatially, a partnership 
may involve horizontal coupling, i.e. an activity around a function that is 
common to the interests of all stakeholders (drafting the proposal for the 
Fund grant or joint development of a new programme) or it may involve 
vertical linkages whereby, the actors fulfil one or more roles in the value or 
supply chain (such as the delivery of anti-retroviral therapy in the treatment 
and care programme). Alternatively, as is the focus of my investigation, a 
public private mix might entail a combination of horizontal and vertical 
coupling of tasks for which private sector involvement is invoked. 
 
Most typologies are based primarily on the substantive content of 
development activities and use the activity or purpose of the PPPs or form of 
arrangements as its distinguishing feature. This misses important questions 
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about the institutional structures and governance mechanisms and fails to 
distinguish relationships on the basis of process outcomes such as 
accountability. Sen and Davala (2002) adapt Robinson and White‟s 3x3 
matrix to incorporate the element of accountability defined across three 
elements: rights and access to information, role in monitoring, review and 
evaluation, and role in key decisions. The typology includes three case 
scenarios depending on whether the government, the NGO, or both are the 
producers (ibid). Notwithstanding the significance of examining accountability 
for the analysis of power, I argue that the plural and complex nature of public 
private interface arrangements demands a framework with multiple layers of 
analysis.   
 
2.1.2 Global vs. Country level plurality in the types of PPPs 
At the global level one mostly finds complex arrangements of multiple actors 
including multilateral development organisations like the United Nations, the 
WHO and the World Bank; bi-laterals like the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), the United States agency for International 
Development (USAID); philanthropic foundations like the Bill and Melinda 
Gates, Carter, Clinton Foundation;  pharmaceutical companies like Merck, 
Smith-Kline Beecham; International non-governmental organisations (iNGOs) 
and faith-based groups.  
 
At the country level still greater plurality exists since the global actors are 
joined by multiple stakeholders in formal and informal interactions.  In India, 
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for example, collaborations between the State and the private sector in 
health-care date back at least to the post independence era and can be 
traced through its national health programmes and five year plans (Baru and 
Nundy 2008, Das 2007, Jeffery 1988). Most of these collaborations saw 
NGOs in a supportive role for community mobilisation and education along 
with limited service provisioning. Subsequently, these collaborations 
extended to the for-profit sector. However, the PPPs of the 1990s can be 
distinguished from the earlier forms of collaboration in two respects: firstly, 
while earlier initiatives saw the role of non-state players as peripheral to the 
programme, the recent ones appear to conceptualise both partners as „equal‟ 
and are arbitrated through a formalised agreement, often a memorandum of 
understanding (Baru and Nundy 2008). Secondly, with the emergence of 
global partnerships or initiatives and their vertical interface with state and 
non-state actors, the older forms are transformed into newer and complex 
patterns of arrangements. The complexity arises from the transnational 
nature of these relationships and multiple layers of accountability (Nundy 
2005) which emerges as the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of care 
are vertically integrated between the global, national, state, and local levels. 
 
2.1.3 Evolution of public private interface arrangements in India 
Since the inception of the first five year plan (1951-1956), the government 
elicited support from the „for-profit‟ and „non-profit‟ sectors in specific vertical 
disease control programmes. In an analysis of the shifts in forms of 
collaboration in the subsequent five year plans, Baru and Nundy (2008) 
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highlight that the private sector involvement largely restricted to community 
mobilisation and awareness generation in order to create a demand for 
services and thereby, complement government efforts. These collaborations 
were primarily observed in family planning, maternal and child health, leprosy 
and few other disease control programmes where the role of the non state 
actors restricted to distributing condoms and providing nutrition supplements. 
A very small proportion of the private providers were involved in providing 
contraception and abortion services with state subsidies in the form of 
monetary incentives and devices. It was only in the mid 1980s, following the 
global endorsements which underpinned the discourse on reforms, that the 
concept of PPPs was explicitly introduced in the Reproductive Child Health 
(RCH) policy and some disease control programmes through the seventh five 
year plan (1985-90). These programmes were externally funded, mainly from 
the World Bank, and laid out the basic guidelines for initiating partnerships. 
The active involvement of the for-profit sector is a post 1990 development 
where PPP was outlined as a distinct approach under the aegis of health 
sector reforms introduced in the early 1990s. The reform process in India has 
been piecemeal and incremental (Baru 2002) undertaken through the eighth, 
ninth and tenth five year plans.  The plans themselves mirrored the wider 
shift in the organisation, structure and delivery of health care: from integrated 
primary health care to primary level care and an extensive preoccupation 
with single purpose driven programmes (Nundy 2005).  
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An analysis of PPPs across regions in India indicates a varied experience in 
terms of both design and outcomes (Annigeri et al. 2004, Venkataraman and 
Bjorkman 2006, World Bank 2006). Within the health sector, the literature on 
PPP suggests that the first model of partnership adopted was „contracting 
out‟: outsourcing of a service run by the public sector to the private sector. 
Substituting hierarchical management structures with contractual 
relationships between purchasers and providers was believed to enhance 
transparency of prices, quantity and quality, and competition that will lead to 
gain in efficiency (WHO 1998). The simplest and most common forms 
include contracting out of services at the primary level for health education, 
demand generation through social marketing and limited curative care, and 
at the secondary and tertiary level for para clinical services like diagnostic 
and laboratory facilities and dietetics.  
 
A second more complex form of PPP includes arrangements such as social 
franchising and joint ventures. Social franchising combines elements of 
contracting out and an extensive system of public subsidies in the form of 
land, diagnostic kits, equipment and devices. One of the pioneering models 
of this kind is „Janani‟. Initially set up to address the gap in general services 
at primary level health care, it now focuses on reproductive and child health 
services. Evaluation of this programme reveals equity concerns since the 
programme targets only the middle and low income segments that can afford 
partial payment. The poorest segment is reliant on subsidies or discounted 
prices, neither of which is built into the model (Annigeri et al. 2004:24). 
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Currently, social marketing is another strategy used for supply of condoms, 
emergency contraceptives, IUDs and other unspecified new contraceptives, 
STD drugs, tubal ligation and non scalpel vasectomy, bed nets, Iron folic acid 
tablets, along with other „socially beneficial health products‟. The main 
arguments put forward in favour of social marketing as a partnership model 
include its potential to: i) reach out to un-served or under-served population 
ii) improve coverage and availability by reducing costs, and iii) encourage 
socially beneficial behaviour (GOI 2001). However, it has been argued that 
the National Strategy for Social Marketing by the Government of India (GOI) 
takes the focus away from ensuring equity and minimum standards of quality 
services (Qadeer unpublished) by proposing „differential quality and on-
payment provision of services‟. 
 
A third stage in the evolution of public private partnership arrangements 
involves private providers in co-provisioning of services in public hospitals. In 
some cases, the private sector‟s involvement is restricted to services like 
diagnostics and drug supply, while in others the entire management and 
operation of primary health centres has been given to non-governmental 
organisations (Das 2007). The complexities arise from involvement of several 
actors and intermediaries across constituencies with multiple and 
overlapping roles. These arrangements are very dynamic as they continue to 
evolve to meet changing interests, donor commitments, and commitments of 
private practitioners, NGOs, and national or state programmes.   
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Yet another stage of the evolution has involved creating autonomous 
structures which directly interact with the donors and NGOs for provision of 
services. Prakash and Singh (2007) refer to this growth of intermediaries as 
agencification. The term implies the “carving out of independent agencies 
from the state, either through corporatisation or the formation of societies at 
the state levels” (ibid: 4). These autonomous agencies are registered as a 
society or trust, which allows them legal and financial independence from the 
parent body and greater operational flexibility with regards to recruitment, 
funding, payment systems, and outsourcing services. This trend is argued to 
result in “diffusion of power and authority” (Baru and Nundy 2008: 66), 
potentially fragment services, and has implications for the relationships 
between the State and non-state actors thereby posing a challenge to 
accountability. 
 
In recent years, literature is beginning to emerge on the experience of 
simple/linear and complex PPPs that are operational in primary, secondary 
and tertiary care in India, mainly restricted to the reproductive and child 
health (RCH) and the revised national Tuberculosis programmes (RNTCP). 
An analysis of these arrangements reveals that their content and design are 
largely derived from the guidelines and the strategy documents of the 
multilateral and bi-lateral agencies, and that the plurality of actors and their 
roles often results in diffusion of authority and power across the various 
actors (Baru and Nundy 2006). A closer examination of RNTCP reveals that 
while it successfully increased demand through active case-detection, the 
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division of role and responsibilities between the market (private providers) 
and the state led to a fragmentation of the programme thus affecting its 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness. Dewan et al. (2006:4) call for the 
importance of a strong public sector programme (national control) as a 
critical condition for sustaining partnerships with the private sector and 
ensuring success. Likewise, Kumar et al. (2005) in their study of a PPP in a 
district in Kerala attributed its success in improving case detection of TB 
patients to “a strong local government TB programme with adequate staffing, 
medication and capacity to monitor the partnership while continuing routine 
diagnostic and treatment services for most patients” (ibid: 873).   
 
To summarise, there is greater plurality in the forms of public private 
interactions at country level. Often the evidence and literature fails to account 
for the variations that exists in the designs across states and rural/ urban 
areas, process building of these partnerships, and the nature of services for 
which they were set up (Kumar et al. 2005, Dewan et al. 2006, Uplekar et al. 
2001). Evidence, though limited, underscores the need for careful 
assessment of these arrangements, the role of the partner organisations in 
relation to the State, and the power and equity implications for health system 
and programmes. 
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2.1.4 An alternative view on partnerships: multi-dimensional power 
analysis 
Given the increasing complexity and varied impacts of the public-private 
interactions, a rigid, flat and linear typification takes the attention away from 
the full spectrum of arrangements and relationships that are legitimized as 
partnerships. Moreover, the discursive conceptualisation of public-private 
interactions within the health sector mostly takes into account large 
transnational/ global initiatives and leaves out a plethora of arrangements in 
operation as „partnership‟ at the country level.  
 
An alternative view must therefore regard public private interface 
arrangements across multiple dimensions that may be defined 
geographically, temporally, spatially, and functionally, with divergent axes of 
accountability, formality of arrangements, purpose and specific role of the 
State or other actors in provision, production, procurement, and financing.  I 
propose a preliminary framework for classification which builds on the 
existing attempts at conceptualising PPPs (Bovaird 2004, Sen and Davala 
2002, Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1992). Central to this framework, is the 
recognition that power plays a key role in the playing out of public private 
interactions. I present five dimensions along which a public-private interface 
arrangement may be defined and assessed. The dimensions are: 
 
1. Geographical and spatial arrangement: pertains to the local or 
transnational nature of relationships and actors involved. It seeks an 
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examination of where (the region and the institution) the partnership is 
housed (physical location of the headquarters and the administration) 
vis-a-vis where it operates to identify the locus of decision making, 
agenda setting, governance of structures, and implementation. An 
important distinction, and an object of analysis, here lies between self-
organising, bottom-up partnerships and those externally mandated by 
a central agency and/or driven by fund flows and top-down formation. 
This, as suggested, has implications for local ownership and the 
ideology and interests shaping the policy content. 
2. Nature and scope of arrangements: determines the flow of funding, 
information and accountability and therefore has implications for the 
power wielded and the ownership developed among various actors. 
Are the multiple actors vertically integrated, horizontally integrated or 
defined by mixed arrangements? Horizontal arrangements imply a 
function which generates interest and invokes participation of multiple 
stakeholders, for example, joint development of proposal or policy. On 
the other hand, vertical linkages suggest that the actors fulfil one or 
more roles in the brokerage chain. Examples of the latter are sub-
contracting NGOs to deliver antiretroviral therapy and provide 
adherence counselling within the HIV and AIDS treatment care 
programme. 
3. Nature of inter-organisational relationships and the partnership 
environment can be traced on the competition – control continuum 
proposed by Green and Matthias (1997). The continuum, which is 
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characterised by decreasing autonomy and intensifying 
communication, can be a useful tool to assess the different forms 
taken by organisational relationships and the proposed outcomes. 
4. Role of actors and representation of constituency: A deconstruction 
and assessment of the type of actor organisations involved in the 
arrangements is essential as it defines the organisational ideology, its 
structures and relative authority with which they function within the 
partnership. This determines their relative bargaining position across 
the three elements identified by Sen and Davala (2002): access to 
information (knowledge), role in decision making, and role in 
monitoring, review and evaluation (and arbitration). This demands a 
distinction between the constituencies and analysis of each of the 
actors within the „public‟, quasi-public, „private for profit‟ (business and 
corporate houses, pharmaceutical companies, independent providers/ 
practitioners) and, the „private not-for profit‟ (international NGOs or 
local movements and NGOs, bilateral or multi lateral donor agencies).  
5. Rationale and purpose of the partnership: is particularly useful to 
assess the congruence between the stated and unstated objectives of 
the state and non-state partner agencies. Each partnership, as 
Bovaird (2004) suggests, will have a different rationale and policy 
objective(s). The objectives could be diverse: improving access to 
treatment or services, monitoring and evaluating a programme, 
implementation and delivery, empowering the affected, tackling social 
inclusion and financial gain. However, often a disjuncture between the 
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rationale, practice and outcome can be observed. Comparison of the 
programme outcomes evaluated against the policy rationale gives 
insights into the often contradictory pathways of policy formulation and 
implementation. For example, as the subsequent chapters reveal, 
private sector participation is often invoked on the cited grounds of 
„complementarity of roles and services‟ whereas the project activities 
result in duplication and competition. An assessment of the success or 
failure of a partnership must therefore account for these differences 
and the inherent paradoxes in the rationale. These paradoxes are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
Making these distinctions and mapping out the partnership along each of the 
above axes has implications for the analysis of power and accountability 
since each dimension has particular relevance for the analysis of the 
structural and ideational sources and characteristics of power: material, 
resource, ideas and discourse. Such analysis, it is hoped, will also make 
evident the paradoxes in the discursive understanding of the PPP model.  
 
One such paradox is highlighted in partnerships that focus on a single issue 
or programme or disease. Within the public sector, a key rationale for 
partnerships is to set up an organisation which will focus on a specific, often 
„neglected‟, issue to avoid the problems of diffused focus which is typical of 
public sector agencies. The rationale around setting up of the Fund, for 
instance, is argued to be an increase in resources and efforts to fight three 
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major communicable diseases, particularly HIV and AIDS, which 
disproportionately affect low-income countries. However, as Bovaird (2004) 
points out, merging services across sectors to meet the holistic needs of the 
infected and affected (in this case treatment, care, and support services) may 
often drive in the opposite direction, i.e. might lead to further fragmentation 
given the multiple needs and agendas.  
 
Another paradox in the rationale underlying the shift to a partnership 
approach to public issues is the need for improving transparency and 
accountability in policy processes. However, it has been suggested that the 
heterogeneity that is both a characteristic and the very rationale of a 
partnership approach brings fragmentation of structures and processes, 
which in turn leads to blurring of responsibilities and of accountability (Loffler 
1999, Wettenhall 2001, Baru and Nundy 2008). As illustrated in the 
subsequent chapters, the diffusion of authority and blurring of roles became 
a challenge for arbitration and for ensuring transparency among actors. 
  
2.1.5 The public-private arrangements under investigation 
The public private partnerships that are the focus of my investigation and of 
interest to this thesis refer to: formal, task oriented and time bound 
institutional and working arrangements which are invoked by a global 
initiative, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (the Fund). Among 
the three diseases that the Fund addresses, I trace the arrangements in the 
context of HIV management in India focusing on the national AIDS 
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programme. Using the descriptive elements of the five dimensions of the 
proposed classification framework (Section 2.1.4), I define these as:   
Transnational arrangements whose country relationships involve a 
public sector organisation, the National AIDS Control Organisation or 
its state divisions, and one or more organisations outside the public 
domain. The latter includes international and national NGOs, the 
„beneficiaries‟ represented by a network of people with AIDS and the 
corporate sector represented by business houses and industry led and 
industry managed non profit entities. While the overarching 
arrangements are predominantly between the State and actors in the 
private sector, I also examine sub-arrangements between two or more 
private sector organisations (as members of civil society consortia). 
These arrangements are governed at multiple levels: global, where 
the Secretariat and the Board in Geneva takes key decisions on who, 
what, and where to fund; the national and sub-national operations are 
managed through a coordinating body and governance structures that 
bridge the national to global. Besides a contract between the Fund 
and national recipients, and Fund guidelines that define the overall 
partnership structure, the multiple alliances at the country level are not 
bound by any single legal document that captures the terms and the 
diverse commitments and motivations. The majority of these alliances, 
particularly those at the national level, are governed by a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a tripartite agreement that 
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sets out very minimal terms including a statement on conflict of 
interests. 
 
2.1.6 Concerns and critiques of PPPs 
Since PPPs originally came into prominence around three decades ago, the 
concept has been contested (Bovaird 1986, Gibelman and Demone 1983) 
and a subject of „intensely fuelled debate‟ (Nishtar 2004). The debates 
highlight diverse issues related to i) the merits and demerits of PPPs, ii) 
governance structures and functions of global PPP and their representative 
legitimacy and accountability, and iii) the processes and the “side” effects or 
impact on service delivery, sustainability and national priorities (Hanefeld 
2008, GAO 2004, Widdus 2005, Brugha et al. 2004, Brugha and Walt 2001, 
Bennett and Fairbank 2003, Taylor 1997). The debates are summarised 
below.  
 
PPPs have opened up new spaces and possibilities for the private sector to 
exercise power and influence in not only delivering care but also establishing 
norms and guidelines, domains traditionally the mandate of public sector. In 
the course of generating new resources within the global health arena, PPPs 
are argued to alter the relative distribution of power among organisations, 
between public and private sectors, and between the agencies of the global 
North and the global South (Buse and Harmer 2004). For example, sceptics 
have expressed concern over the skewed balance between global partners 
and local beneficiaries since very few global partnerships include 
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representation from low income countries, where most partnerships operate 
(Nishtar 2004). The conventional literature on Public Administration suspects 
PPPs, particularly interactions in which the pharmaceutical industry 
participates, to dilute political control over decision making and infiltration of 
for-profit interests (Dukes 2002, Henry and Lexchin 2002, Montaner et al. 
2001, Angell 2000).  
 
At a macro level the implications of this power imbalance can be seen with 
respect to the choice of health problem or country of focus which does not 
always correspond to the disease burden experienced by the poor, resulting 
in inequities within the society (Buse and Walt 2000a). Rather, it magnifies 
the negative effects and elements of aid regimes by distorting national 
priorities and policies. This observation echoes with the literature on global 
governance. The Fund, for example, proposes to be an innovative 
„architecture for aid‟, a new form of financing and governance mechanism 
having the commercial sector as active agents at all levels of policy 
formulation and translation. This, as argued by Buse and Walt (2000b), may 
result in pluralisation of decision making bodies and in reshaping relations of 
power, authority, and legitimacy. 
 
It was also considered that partnerships increased planning burden with time 
consuming reporting and financial management systems. Few evaluations 
revealed the procedural burden on the staff that is already overstretched in 
managing the demands of multiple vertical and externally driven initiatives 
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(Biesma et.al. 2009, Hanefeld 2009). On the other hand, a more positive 
conceptualisation of the shift from purely and quasi government to 
partnerships has been articulated as the opening up of decision making 
spaces to civil society organisations and previously marginalised groups 
(Buse and Harmer 2004). 
 
While some examples illustrate the potential of creating a powerful 
mechanism to address difficult problems by harnessing strengths of different 
partners, others bring to light complex issues that emerge from different and 
often conflicting interests and objectives working within different governance 
structures. Salamon (1995) identifies key implications for the public and non 
profit sectors in terms of governance. These are: 
1. For the non profit sector – potential loss of independence, dilution or 
distortion of their advocacy role in pursuit of available funds, and the 
resulting loss in flexibility and local accountability traditionally seen as 
the greatest asset of the voluntary sector (ibid). 
2. For the government / public sector- in a context where decision 
making is widely dispersed among organisations with diverse set of 
interests and independent authority and support systems, partnerships 
pose a challenge for the government in ensuring accountability, 
exercising supervision, and coordination (ibid). These are argued to 
have enabled the flow of state resources to private enterprise.  
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This indicates the potential for partnerships to transform existing 
relationships, induce conflict, and blur existing boundaries and distinctions. 
Drawing attention to the “well demonstrated reluctance of the private sector 
to grow in backward areas”, Baru (1993:965) suggests that the notion of 
PPPs serving as a mechanism to enhance equity (ensure adequate 
population coverage) is an „eye-wash‟. Ferlie et al. (1996) regard the shift 
from public and private provision to public-private provision as part of the 
pervasive neo-liberal ideology in health care, an ideological move to a 
system based on private sector models and markets. This explains the 
inherently political nature of partnerships.  
 
If power relations are to serve as the locus of analysis of public private 
interface arrangements, an area that demands careful examination is 
whether the values of the weaker and marginalised actors are co-opted by 
the more powerful partner. This has been explored in some depth, although 
insufficiently, within the debates on global PPPs. For example, questions 
have been raised regarding suitability of partnering with the pharmaceutical 
industry particularly for health promotion (Hancock 1998). Recognising the 
need for discretion, WHO and UNICEF note the need to exercise caution 
over the selection of private sector partners (Kickbusch and Quick 1998, 
Bellamy 1999) and have proposed guidelines that single out other players 
like the tobacco industry and the arms manufacturers. The debate on country 
level health partnerships demands a similar analysis and discretion.  
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2.2 Theoretical underpinnings of PPPs 
While no single grand theory on partnership exists (Addicott 2006), 
theoretical perspectives from multiple disciplines have been employed to 
understand various elements of partnership and shape its meaning. The 
roots of the ongoing debates on the role of PPP in the development and 
health process can be traced to the discussions of welfare reforms proposed 
in the industrialised countries towards the end of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Around this time a pessimistic view of the post war „welfare State‟ became 
dominant. The new era of administrative and structural reforms proposed by 
the government of Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom was characterised by de-regulation, privatisation and budget cuts 
and led to a strategic retreat of the public sector and the introduction of the 
discourse on new „managerialism‟ towards lowering costs and functioning 
effectively (Jutting 1999, Kickert et al. 1997). This re-evaluation of the 
structure and function of government in relation to delivery of public services 
is largely guided by the theoretical foundations of „new public management‟ 
(Hood 1991, Moore 1996). Argued as arising from the disenchantment with 
the performance of traditional public sector bureaucracy, the new public 
management discourse was considered to have at its core – a cutback of 
public sector expenditure, delegation of services and tasks to the private for-
profit sector, and the engagement of the voluntary sector in provision of 
public goods (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1992).  
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The new thinking, primarily guided by classical economic principles, was 
concerned with injecting „business like practices‟6 into public sector agencies 
(Shaw 1999) based on the assumption that hierarchical bureaucracy, the 
organisational form of the public delivery system is inefficient and 
introduction of market mechanisms can substantially enhance its efficiency 
(Mills 1995). This inefficiency has been attributed largely to public choice 
theory, which proposes that bureaucrats and politicians are more likely to 
serve their own interests or those of powerful interest groups and do not 
always act in the public interests (Walsh 1995).  
 
A central theme of this neoliberal thinking regards the State as an enabler 
rather than direct provider of services except in specific identifiable 
circumstances (Moore 1996, Vining and Weimer 1990). In accordance with 
this, private sector involvement was sought in view of the benefits of the 
managerial mode of coordination in a multi provider system (Robinson and 
White 1997) i.e. managing the institutional and managerial consequences of 
the mixed economy of care in social sectors like health and education. Over 
time, the role of the private sector expanded from contracted services and 
voluntary participation of citizens in the production and provision of public 
goods and services by local governments to a broader conception involving a 
range of actors from civic organisations and private sector firms (Warren 
                                                 
6
       R. Paul Shaw (2004) outlines five features while defining the approach of „business like 
practice‟ which centres around „costs‟ of producing the good/service and linking it with 
expected outcomes in pursuit of „value for money‟; ensuring accountability to stakeholders 
through rigorous monitoring and evaluation, explicit TOR and incentives linked to 
performance; and taking regular stock of client needs and satisfaction. 
 
 80 
cited in Jutting 1999). As a result emphasis was laid on joint action and 
mutually outlined goals with a potential for economies of scale or economies 
of scope. Meanwhile, currents in the management and political science 
perspectives were emphasising the importance of participatory and 
collaborative working as opposed to competitive behaviour.   
 
The development of the term „partnership‟ can be located in the literature on 
„networks‟ which has been explored in detail through management and 
organisational studies (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000b, Nohria 1992, Thompson 
2003, Benson 1975, Aldrich 1979) and, political and policy science literature 
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Kickert et al. 1999). The following section presents 
the main discussion on network governance, as a separate mode of 
governance emerging in response to the dichotomous view of centralised 
rule (bureaucracy) and multi-actor perspective. In particular, I elaborate on 
the „policy network‟ approach and contextualise it to the focus of the study: 
public private partnerships in HIV management in India.  
 
2.2.1 Examining key characteristics of different modes of governance: 
hierarchies, markets, and networks 
In his classic article on the nature of firm, Ronald Coase (1937) proposed 
„firm‟ as an alternative governance structure to „markets‟ for organising 
similar kinds of transactions. This work was revisited only in the 1970s when 
Oliver Williamson (1975) used the lens of transaction cost economics to 
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distinguish exchanges in hierarchically organised firms as oppose to market 
interfaces (Powell 1990).  
 
According to this view, market conditions could take any form with monopoly 
at one end of the spectrum through to perfect competition at the other 
extreme with the presence of a large number of buyers and sellers, none of 
which were large enough to have direct control over the market price. 
Alternatively, hierarchies are organised under a structured regime of 
command driven by a set of overt organisational rules and procedures. 
Bureaucratic hierarchies in particular operate through pyramidal organisation 
with increasing task specification and decreasing (gradation of) power and 
autonomy as one moves from the top to the bottom of the organisation 
(Mitchell 1991 cited in Thompson et. al. 1991). Given the high levels of 
formalisation and routinisation, hierarchies exhibit less flexibility than markets 
and are believed to destroy innovation and creativity (Lowndes and Skelcher 
1998). 
 
This dichotomous view of markets and hierarchies has been subjected to a 
great deal of scrutiny given its failure to capture the complex realities of 
exchange across traditional and established boundaries. Scholars instead 
argued that economic exchanges can be organised across a continuum, with 
discrete market transactions on one end and centralised firms on the other 
and various intermediate or hybrid organisational forms scattered in between 
(Powell 1990). Literature from organisational studies and management 
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research highlight that in response to the search by both public and private 
sector organisations for novel methods of coordinating services across pre-
existing boundaries, networks or network-based organisations emerged as 
an innovative organisational form (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000b) based on a 
decentralised coordinating style, and have since been adopted in the health 
care sector in both low or middle, and high income countries (an example of 
the latter being the NHS primary health networks). Indeed, networks have 
long existed as an organisational form without being explicitly acknowledged 
as such, both when health systems were primarily hierarchical and quasi-
market (post 90 development). As Nohria (1992) suggests, organisations are 
influenced by their environment which should be viewed as a network of 
other organisations and the behaviours of actors can be best explained by 
their position in this network of relationships. 
 
Both the dichotomous and continuum view of markets-networks-hierarchies 
remains contested. First, critics challenge the myth of „agentless 
bueraucracies‟ and „pure and perfect market place‟ (Latour 1993) since firms 
are increasingly engaging in forms of collaboration that are distinct from the 
familiar alternative of market contracting as well as the formal ideal of vertical 
integration (Powell 1990). Second, the continuum view of economic 
exchange also remains insufficient, as Powell suggests “too quiescent and 
mechanical” (ibid: 299), and deflects our attention from an array of 
organisational forms characteristic of global governance today. Neither 
markets can be viewed as the starting point of exchange giving rise to other 
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models nor do hierarchies represent an end point (on the continuum) of 
economic development (Powel 1991: 268). 
 
Thompson and Mitchell (1991) propose network as a flat organisational form 
where typically „equal‟ partners enter into informal relationships that are 
socially rather than legally binding and are required to adapt administratively, 
financially, technically and logistically. An ideal network is conceived as one 
in which formal structures, such as position, geographical location, and 
market focus, are not significant barriers (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000b). Like 
partnerships, no single grand theory of network or third party governance 
exists (Addicott 2006). Definitions, however, focus on informal 
communication between diverse organisations to coordinate the flow of 
goods and services, which is achieved from sharing of resources and 
expertise. This sharing and commonality of resources is believed to reduce 
uncertainty and enable greater flexibility, capacity, and access to resources 
and skills that might be external to the organisation (Miles and Snow 1992; 
Thompson et al. 1991).  
 
Network development may entail entering into newer relationships and the 
potential breaking of existing relationships. Networks take a variety of forms: 
centralised or devolved; formalised or loosely structured; utilising existing 
structures and resources or stimulating newer initiatives (Abbott et al. 2006). 
While markets are governed by price mechanisms and bureaucracies 
operate on command, networks predominantly function in an environment 
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based on relationships.  Networks are regarded as more egalitarian, flexible 
and inclusive although, as Addicott (2006) points out, there can be central 
and peripheral stakeholders within a network, with variable power. It is 
argued that in comparison to hierarchies, network arrangements are more 
suitable for rapidly changing and highly complex environments (Thompson et 
al. 1991, Pettigrew and Fenton 2000b) since they are more dynamic and 
responsive as a result of which, new information or knowledge can be easily 
disseminated, interpreted and acted upon. Literature suggests that the 
defining characteristics of a network model are: its access to diverse 
information sources, particularly professional and technical knowledge which 
is tacit (Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996), the opportunity for knowledge generation 
and reciprocal learning through sharing and exchange , and team-work and 
collaboration leading to reduced duplication and diffusion of expertise (Kewell 
et al. 2002).  
 
2.2.2 Networks in the private and public sector 
Pettigrew and Fenton (2000a: 279) suggest that the main driver for network 
based organisational forms in the private sector is high competition in lieu of 
which traditional hierarchical structures become redundant, thus prompting 
“new organisational practices characterised by flexibility, knowledge 
transferability and horizontal collaboration”.  
 
Emerged as an outcome of the political discourse around government 
failures, the conventional literature on networks (barring the work of Rogers 
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and Whetten 1982, Gage and Mandell 1990) has largely ignored the potential 
of government steering within an existing network of inter organisational 
relations. The conventional account of networks mostly considers them in the 
private domain (Marsh and Rhodes 1992) regarding them as „political 
oligarchies‟ that shut out the public (ibid: 265). Fox and Miller (1995) argue 
for pluralism of discourses and regard policy networks as „nascent forms of 
publicly interested discourse in which all affected work together to determine 
possibilities for next action‟. 
 
2.2.3 Networks in the public sector: Policy network 
Kickert et al. (1997) define policy networks as „more or less stable patterns of 
social relations between interdependent actors which form around policy 
problems and or programmes‟. Interdependency, based on the distribution of 
resources among various actors, goals they pursue, and their perceptions of 
their dependency, is the key defining characteristic. Frequent repetition of 
these interactions, it is argued, enables institutionalisation and formalisation 
of these processes and rules, the structural features of which then influence 
future policy process (ibid). Policy networks typically involve a large number 
of inter-dependent actors - public, semi-public and private- from a particular 
policy field coming together (or competing) for influence over policy (Rhodes 
1997, Kickert et al. 1999a).  The government, though passive, may 
undertake the steering role (Rhodes and Marsh 1992) while the participating 
actors and organisations are connected through resource dependencies.   
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The literature on policy network draws together insights from: i) policy 
science, which analyses public policy processes as complex interactions and 
ambiguous processes resulting from multiple goals and strategies, and 
uncertainty of information and outcomes (Cohen et al. 1972, Marin and 
Mayentz 1991), and ii) political science and organisational theory for the 
analysis of distribution of power and dependencies in inter-organisational 
relations (Benson 1978, Rhodes 1996, Kickert et al. 1999, Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992). 
 
2.2.4 A critical view on Network governance 
In this section, the discussion on network governance is summarised and 
critically reflected upon in order to contextualise it to the focus of the 
research.  
 
Firstly, networks are proposed as a novel and distinct style of governance in 
contrast with markets and hierarchies. Given the ambiguities within the 
distinction, I argue against any stylized models of exchange or coordination. 
Concurring to the scepticism around the novelty of network (as a third 
category of organisation form), I argue that both hierarchies and market 
transactions can have multiple nodes similar to a network whereas network 
transactions can be managed through firm or market mechanisms. The Fund 
grant and the public-private arrangements under investigation are cases in 
point. While the national AIDS programme is located within a bureaucratic 
structure of governance (the NACO housed within the Ministry of Health), it 
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represents a mixed form of governance with emerging policy networks for 
raising funds, monitoring and delivery, and an extensive use of market 
mechanisms (contracts, compensation, performance based payments, and 
other exchanges). Moreover, the wider health care context in which the 
national AIDS programme is situated continues to be dominated by market 
forces with 82 percent of treatment occurring in the private sector (Das 
1997). Here, the transactions occur through a mix of discrete exchanges, 
administrative fiat, and through networks of individuals or inter and intra 
organisational relationships among donor and recipient constituencies.  
 
 Secondly, the defining characteristics of network arrangements are: 
reciprocity and interdependence among actors, notion of shared burden and 
benefits, and access to resources including information and expertise. 
Kickert et al. (1999) draw our attention to the fact that network management 
is a departure from the classical management approach where management 
is seen as a top down activity based on a clear unilateral authority structure. 
Rather, it entails initiating and facilitating interaction processes between 
actors, creating and changing network arrangements for better coordination 
(Scharpf 1978, Rogers and Whetten 1982). It is however, inaccurate to 
conceive of networks solely in terms of collaboration and harmony. The 
involvement of multiple stakeholders in common tasks has resulted in the 
problem of „multiple hands‟ rendering the task of defining responsibilities and 
arbitration difficult (Hondeghem 1998). A body of literature highlights 
conditions under which networks fail. Some attribute its failure to the design 
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stage wherein, cultural compatibility is often ignored (Child and Faulkner 
1998) while others call attention to managerial faults in its operation leading 
to ineffectiveness (Miles and Snow 1992). Another group of sceptics suggest 
that cooperation and reciprocity do not „insulate practitioners from 
considerations of power‟ and each point of contact in a network could be a 
potential source of conflict as well as harmony (Keohane cited in Powell 
1990). Koliba et al. (2009) propose that asymmetrical allocations of material 
and immaterial resources and power among network actors will influence the 
structure of administrative authority of the network.  
 
If the „partnership‟ model is regarded as a descriptor of the network 
phenomena, and there is ample evidence to do so, the above necessitates 
an in depth analysis of power and resource dependencies among various 
actors engaged in public-private interface arrangements. In order to do this, I 
first outline the structuralist and critical approaches to power and examine 
important concepts that shape the generation and utilisation of power. These 
approaches are complemented by drawing on current perspective in 
anthropology of health to analyse power and resource sharing in the PPP 
policy model.  
 
2.3 Theoretical perspectives in the analysis of Power 
Within the wealth of literature on power, three distinctive broad theories 
emerge: pluralism, structuralism and post-structuralism. Each of these broad 
perspectives or schools of thought comprises differing conceptualisations of 
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power and views to understand power relations. Within the structuralist 
framework, for instance, some theories are underpinned by orthodox or neo-
Marxist analyses (Navarro 1998b, 2004) which focus on importance of class 
analysis in explaining health inequality (Navarro 2000b) or the propagation of 
neo-liberal ideology through international organisations (Banerji 2002, 
Berlinguer 1999). Other approaches as applied to health care organisations 
examine power in relation to conflict, which they suggest arises from 
professional dominance (Freidson 1994).  
 
However, this chapter does not engage with the three broad „categories of 
theories‟. It instead focuses on the key characteristics of the debate that can 
be drawn from the literature on power: a thematic distinction between „power 
over‟ and „power to‟ characterised by an overwhelming focus on the 
conceptual, theoretical and political explication of the former (Stewart 2001). 
This section considers the main arguments central to discussions of „power 
over‟ in social sciences in the recent decades: Parsons‟ authoritative political 
power model (1967a), Gidden‟s structuration theory (1976, 1979), Foucault‟s 
elaboration of disciplinary power and association with domination (Foucault 
and Gordon 1980, Rabinow ed. 1985), and, Mann‟s analysis of the sources 
of social power (1986, 1993), to tease out and provide a more operational 
account of elements derived from these theoretical perspectives. 
Subsequently, I discuss the nature of power relations in networks, particularly 
those relevant to the study, and the prevalence of professional dominance 
and expertise in the modern world.  
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2.3.1 Various conceptualisations of power 
Parsons (1963, 1967a) conceptualisation of power lays emphasis on the 
pursuit of collective goals (and mobilisation driven by consensus) as 
„facilitative‟ and seen distinct from „distributive‟ approaches that highlight the 
“hierarchical character of power, and the divisions of interest which are 
frequently consequent upon it” (Giddens 1997:341), i.e. power by A over B, 
in relation to the coercive and sectional pursuit of goals. Giddens elaborates 
on two aspects of power: in the broad sense, power can be seen as the 
„transformative capacity of human agency‟ which refers to the capability of 
the actor to intervene in a series of events to change their course. In the 
narrow sense, power is „relational‟ and may be defined as „the capability to 
secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends on the 
agency of others‟ (Giddens 1976) and can be understood as power „over‟ 
others or power as „domination‟ (ibid). The relational aspect of power is 
further explicated by Lee (1999: 246) who likens power to electricity as “it has 
the possibility of existence everywhere but can only be identified as it flows 
from one thing to another”.  
 
Explaining the source of power, Giddens argues that in any given social 
interaction use of power can be understood in terms of “resources and 
facilities which participants bring to and mobilise…so as to influence or 
control the conduct of others party to that interaction” (1976:112). In his 
formulation of the „structuration theory‟ Giddens proposes that “power…is 
generated in and through the reproduction of structures of domination. These 
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structures are constituted by resources of two sorts- allocative and 
authoritative” (1984:258). While Giddens in his analysis of social power lays 
emphasis on structural domination and dependency, he argues that “…actors 
in subordinate positions are never wholly dependent, and often adept at 
converting whatever resources they possess into some degree of control 
over the conditions of reproduction of the system…there exists a dialectic of 
control, continually shifting balances of resources, altering the overall 
distribution of power” (Giddens 1982b: 32). 
 
Michael Mann in his study of „The Sources of Social Power‟ (1986) gives 
valuable insights to the analysis of how power is wielded or acquired 
(Stewart 2001). Mann‟s social analysis departs from the totalitarian view of 
societies. He instead proposes a conception of societies as “multiple 
overlapping and intersecting power networks” and can be best accounted in 
terms of “the interrelations of four sources of power: economic, military, 
ideological and political relationships” (Mann 1986).  These sources of social 
power, he argues, are organisations‟ institutional means of social control for 
attaining human goals. Thus Mann‟s strategic perspective on power is “the 
ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one‟s environment” (ibid: 
6). He explores this ability through two aspects of social power: distributive, 
that being exercised over other individuals, and collective, whereby persons 
cooperate to enhance their joint power over third parties (ibid). The latter of 
Mann‟s proposition clarifies the development of interdependent relationships, 
which may transcend national, international and transnational boundaries as 
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is the case with global public private arrangements. However, referring to it 
as „cooperation‟ could be misleading.  
 
A central argument here is: most social interactions and relations have both 
aspects of power, distributive and collective, exploitative and functional, 
intertwined and operational. Mann (1986) explains this through his central 
concept of „organisational power‟ stressing the extent to which 
implementation of collective goals requires the organisation and division of 
function, thus subjecting it to „distributive power‟. Drawing parallels with the 
classic elite theory, he proposes that organisational power (and the inherent 
dominant relations) gains stability as those at the top ensure compliance by 
exercising control through laws and norms as well as through organisational 
outflanking of the masses at the bottom. The latter are unable to resist or 
collectively organise because they are embedded within collective and 
distributive power organisations controlled by others (ibid). In this 
organisational perspective on power, Mann attributes outflanking to diffused 
power (distinct from authoritative power), which spreads spontaneously and 
unconsciously through a social group, resulting in “social practices that 
embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded” (ibid: 7).Thus, a 
central feature of diffused power is „normalisation‟ owing to which the 
„outflanked‟ subordinates do not deem resistance necessary.   
 
The process of normalisation can be better understood in terms of Foucault‟s 
concept of „disciplinary power‟. Foucault delineates distinct modern forms of 
 93 
domination as those of „disciplinary power‟ and „bio-power‟ (See Foucault 
1980). While the classical „sovereign‟ model of power proposed that power 
may direct, coerce or even repress those subject to it, disciplinary power 
constructs the subjectivity necessary for the successful operation of a 
particular regime of power/knowledge. It is this „subjectivisation‟ that lies at 
the heart of the disciplinary model and identifies a distinctively modern power 
configuration: one which subjugates (to someone else by control and 
dependence) and makes subject to (tied to identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge) (Foucault 1982). Unlike the sovereignty model where domination 
is expressed through prohibition or punishment of the censured action, in the 
disciplinary model it inculcates the required action by making it the desired 
action within the framework of political rationalities and technologies of power 
(Stewart 2001). Foucault‟s conceptualisation of power has come under 
criticism for its denial of normativity of political engagement and resistance 
(ibid: 20) and failure to acknowledge that collective disciplines can function 
both as structures of domination and as elements of agentic power (See 
Habermas 1990b, Fraser 1989a). This omission according to Taylor 
(1986:93) “precludes the possibility of an emancipatory conception of power 
as human agency”.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, the perspective on normalisation of 
power and practices is crucial for analysing social power relations in 
networks and in effect, partnership arrangements. Angus Stewart suggests 
that this distinction enables the possibility of the existence of relationships 
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that appear as a result of “self evident common interest” but may in fact 
embody “definitive asymmetries of power” (2001:26). 
 
A separate body of work contextualises the analysis of power in terms of 
inter-dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Pfeffer 1981, Ulrich et al. 1984, 
Keohane and Nye 1989). Resource dependency theorists argue that both 
internal hierarchies and the distribution of power in external relationships 
determine resource allocation within organisations and explain behaviour and 
outcomes (Elston 2005). Developed through the work of Emerson (1962), 
this perspective proposes that organisations depend for resources on key 
stakeholders in their external environment and strive to be effective in 
meeting the goals of these powerful stakeholders. He establishes an inverse 
relationship between power and dependence by positing that the power of A 
over B is derived from the dependence of B on A. Hence, dependence on 
other individuals or organisations will create power in those external 
resources. This interdependence between actors, although regarded as a 
key driver for effectiveness (Gulati and Sytch 2007), can lead to conflict and 
uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). If we assume knowledge or access 
to information and ideas is power, uncertainty or lack of access to information 
suggests a lack of power.  
 
This perspective is particularly relevant to the analysis of power in public 
private arrangements, which characterise relationships of high dependencies 
between potentially unequal partners with varying degree of control over 
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resources. I posit that access to and control over resources not only 
determines power balance within interactions but also determines the very 
need (appropriateness of these arrangements) and nature of these 
relationships.  The resource dependency theory can thus help us 
understand: i) who (organisational actors) is sought out for such 
arrangements and who becomes an asset or a liability in partnership and, ii) 
the shifting power balance between the different players and their planning, 
implementing, monitoring roles within partnership arrangements. It can also 
help us explain the conflict and tensions in network or partnership 
development, i.e. the factors determining formation of newer relationships 
and the breaking of existing relationships in successive Global fund rounds. 
The resource dependency perspective has been critiqued for focusing 
exclusively on official hierarchies and their functioning and thus denying the 
existence of informal, less obvious power structures. I acknowledge the 
limitations of this theoretical perspective and concur that resource 
dependency theory is too simplistic an explanation for describing a complex 
phenomena like public-private interactions. Hence, I do not restrict my 
analysis of power to resources. Instead, I regard resources as one of the 
many structural factors (others include rules, guidelines and norms) that 
constitute social practices. Besides, I adopt Lukes (1974) third dimension of 
power i.e. values, norms and ideologies exercised through all social 
interactions or the notion of “discourse” to complement my analysis of power 
and explain the „disciplinary regime of the Fund‟.   
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Summarising some of these debates, I posit that: power can be conceived in 
the terms of the ability of an actor (or an institution) to get others to do 
something by not only controlling material resources and possessing 
capabilities, but also determining “shared meanings and the creation of inter-
subjectivities” that constitute interests and practices (Adler 1997:336). This 
conceptualisation can be explained by: i) the hierarchical nature of 
organisational relations as embodied in the rules and norms, and the 
differential control over organisational resources within hegemonic structures 
wherein, the goals are heteronymously determined, and ii) normalisation of 
power and practices. This explanation entails both the coercive and 
consensus elements of Gramsci‟s analysis. Through his concept of „cultural 
hegemony‟ in ideology, Antonio Gramsci (1992) gave valuable insights to 
how power gets normalised. Explaining the absence of a proletariat 
revolution in Western European countries, he posited that the workers were 
made to believe that their interests coincided with those of the capitalist class 
and so, did not revolt.  
 
Thus, a more nuanced analysis of power focuses on both „hard‟ and „soft‟ 
power. While hard power is essentially coercive, Joseph Nye (cited in 
Harmer 2005) argues that soft power refers to “cultural, ideological and 
institutional forces”, central to which are the “beliefs and values that set the 
agenda and the framework of debate” (ibid). If we are to apply the above 
conceptualisation of power to public private interactions, it is important to 
examine the ways in which these subjectivities are created and the role 
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discourse and ideas play in “socialising states and other social actors (in the 
chain of brokerage) into accepting certain practices and models through their 
interaction with international actors” (Wendt 1992, Hall 1993).  
 
2.3.2 Role of ideas and discourse 
More recent approaches in the analysis of power are increasingly adopting a 
constructivist analysis which underscores an emphasis on the relational and 
ideational characteristics of power. This focus on ideas and discourses is not 
new and rather derives from Foucault‟s knowledge-power analysis and 
Gramsci‟s ideological hegemony (Hopf 1998). Furthering the diffuse 
conception of power which is also central to constructivists‟ analysis, Hopf 
argues that “power is everywhere...and social practices reproduce underlying 
power relations” (1998:185). He refers to the “power of social practice” which 
lies in the capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute 
social structures and actors alike (ibid: 178).  
 
Proposing the two dimensions of her framework on discourse, Vivian 
Schmidt (2002) suggests that discourse can be understood as “an ideational 
and interactive component” of public policy making which enables policy and 
social practice. Discourse is not only a function of transnational economic 
power (that is arising from hegemonic structure) but one that can bring about 
“change in the ideas and values of the polity” (ibid: 16). This suggests the 
transformative potential of discourse.  
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The ideational dimension of Schmidt‟s framework (2002) pertains to ideas 
and values which i) justify (the need for) a particular policy model or 
programme (the cognitive function) and, ii) legitimise practices/ actions and 
the policy model (normative). For instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, the 
creation of the Fund was underlined by a combination of discourses: 
economic, around the need for a „war chest‟, and technical and globalisation 
around the global threat posed by the three infectious diseases. Likewise, in 
the case of the Global Fund arrangements in India, the involvement of 
corporate actors was invoked and justified by an economic imperative i.e. 
cost-effective means to provision of treatment as well as an ethical and moral 
responsibility of corporations towards their employees. The focus area and 
intervention (treatment, prevention, or other) within each round of proposal 
demands a similar justification.  
 
Establishing the logic of necessity, however, is not sufficient for the success 
of a policy model. It must also appeal to the ideologies and interests of 
various stakeholders. As Schmidt argues, discourse must also show “how 
the policy serves to build on long standing values and identity while creating 
something new...more appropriate than the old „public‟ philosophy” (ibid: 
221). Through its normative function, discourse establishes the logic of 
appropriateness by making references to particular principles (development 
jargons) adhered to by the State or non-state actors such as sustainability, 
corporate social responsibility, sector-wide approaches and others.   
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The interactive dimension of the framework focuses on the coordination and 
communication of ideas in order to translate the policy objective into the 
multiple interests of the stakeholders. Through co-ordination, it provides a 
“common language and overarching framework for the construction of the 
programme” (ibid: 210) where the actors representing specific epistemic 
communities can put forward, debate and come to consensus on the content 
and implementation. This purpose is served by the various governance 
structures instituted through fund arrangements such as the CCM and other 
close-door consultative workshops and meetings.  The communicative 
function pertains to translating the policy/ programme objectives into different 
meanings and perspectives to attain the policy goals. Policy actors play a 
crucial role in this process of sensitisation, communicating back and forth the 
policy content and outcomes.  Long (1992:23) articulates that effective 
agency, or governance, requires strategic manipulation of actors within 
different discourses as they become “partly enrolled in the project of some 
other person/s”. David Mosse (2005) in his seminal work on ethnography of 
development rightly argues that the success of a policy relies not on the 
content alone but on interpretive communities and supporting actors who 
continually recruit support of other actors. There lies a constant need for 
translating one set of interests into another. Project managers, consultants, 
and others are able to influence because their instructions can be translated 
into others‟ goals and ambitions.  Subjectivities are thus being produced in 
the complex interactions of discourse, nation states and other material 
agents (protocols, statistics, health professionals, drugs), all of which 
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participate in stabilising the system and establishing order (Harper 2005) as 
though “its representations were reality” (Sayer 1994 cited in Li 1999:298-
99). For the purpose of this thesis, I refer these actors or active agents as 
„brokers‟ (more aptly, the „Fund brokers‟), a terminology proposed by Mosse 
and Lewis (2008). The study of development brokers emerges from actor 
oriented approaches applied to brokerage, a long standing theme in political 
anthropology. Works of Bierschenk (1988, 2002), for example, on this theme 
examines the ways in which actors function as agents actively building 
social, political, and economic roles rather than blindly conforming to 
normative scripts. Brokers are seen as intermediaries between development 
institutions and beneficiary communities, having particular competencies, 
strategies and careers (Mosse and Lewis 2006). This study views brokers as 
the interpretive communities who realise development projects through a 
constant act of tying in supporters and sustaining interpretations (Latour 
1996, Mosse 2005a). For the purpose of this thesis, these include the Fund 
bureaucrats, aid recipients, project managers and workers, and any 
peripheral actors linked to the process. 
 
The analytical framework proposed by Schmidt (2002) can be a useful tool in 
examining different pathways in which discourse operates and constitutes 
practices. Chapters five and six, discuss these dimensions of discourse in 
further detail particularly with reference to how power is exercised in the 
operation of Fund arrangements.  
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2.3.3 Power analysis in global health policy and outcomes 
While undertaking an analysis of power relations in the formation of health 
policy, Alford (1975) proposed the structural interest group theory, a model 
useful for understanding the structural distribution of power in health care 
organisations. It suggests that health care organisations must be viewed in 
relation to the “continuing struggle between major structural interests 
operating within the context of a market society” (ibid: xiv). He identified three 
major structural interest groups: “…‟professional monopolists‟ who control the 
major health resources, „corporate rationalists‟ that challenge their power and 
the „community population‟ seeking better heath care”. These categories are 
not internally homogenous. Rather, they represent different groups and 
individuals who also respect autonomy and control over their work and will 
act collectively if that autonomy is threatened. Though useful, these 
categories cannot be considered universal given the complex arrangement of 
actors and the disparate influence they possess owing to their position and 
expertise within the health policy domain, and the resources they control.  
 
Similar work was undertaken on how particular issues and interests reach 
the policy agenda. Harrison et al. (2002) argue that issues under 
investigation in health care mirror underlying power relations within the 
sector. The most dominant group, in his case the medical profession, 
determine what is analysed and evaluated, and therefore, what reaches the 
policy agenda. Lukes (1974) while elaborating on the third dimension of 
power, proposes that dominant groups/ individuals can prevent an issue from 
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even reaching the pre-decision stage by manipulating the desires and values 
of those involved. Likewise, Lewis and Considine (1999) while examining 
power and influence associated with agenda setting of health policy in 
Australia, propose that the structural interest approach interacts with the elite 
model, whereby the corporate elite within a profession are more influential as 
compared to frontline staffs who have limited influence. It can thus be argued 
that groups are more politically heterogenous and thus differentially 
influential than the structural interest group theory allows. This heterogeneity 
is the starting point for our analysis of interpersonal relationships and power 
dynamics in network arrangements.  
 
New paradigms of health policy analysis began to emerge in the 1990s with 
the work of Gill Walt (See Walt and Gilson 1994, Walt 1995) and others who 
expanded the focus from actors and interests to a multitude of factors: 
process, content, and context to examine power involved in the development 
and formulation of policy and its impact on outcomes. A review of literature in 
this field (Gilson and Raphaely 2007) shows that a very limited number of 
frameworks and theories exist, and despite the central role power plays in 
affecting change, it remains under researched. Moreover, there continues to 
be an overwhelming focus on „what‟ happens and not „why‟ (Buse and 
Dickinson 2007).  
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2.3.4 Analysis of power in PPPs 
The literature on global PPPs omits the preliminary work done on analysing 
the power implications of partnership arrangements. Much of the discussion 
on who wields power within partnership arrangements can be located on the 
traditional theoretical distinction made in the analysis of distribution of power: 
between elitist and pluralist and neo pluralist perspectives (Walt 1994, Buse 
and Harmer 2004). 
 
Elitists argue that power is wielded by an elite core of individuals across 
sectors in the society (Karliner 1999, Utting 2001, Richter 2003). Richter 
(2003:8) for instance, argues that “high level public private interactions ...are 
in fact instruments of elite governance which advance the corporate-led 
neoliberal restructuring of the world”. According to this view point 
partnerships are dominated by corporate elites and are seen as having the 
potential to subvert the public services of international organisations such as 
the United Nations who are seen as flouting their own guidelines in 
pursuance of global initiatives (ibid). 
 
In contrast, the pluralist accounts suggest that partnerships operate in an 
array of diverse and overlapping interest groups seeking influence and 
authority, while the arrangements, per se, are neutral (Held 1996). This view-
point regards the mechanism as one where power is shared and decisions 
are made through consensus (Walt 1994). Neo-pluralist accounts 
acknowledge that certain pressure groups, particularly the pharmaceutical 
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corporations have the power to influence and bias the partnership agendas 
towards their interests (Held 1996). These studies attribute partnership 
failures to loose and ill-defined governance structures which introduce 
inefficiencies in decision making, and result in lack of accountability and local 
ownership (Caines et al. 2003, Feacham et al. 2002, Buse 2003a). 
Examining power in terms of authority and legitimacy, they argue for 
amendments to the structure (hosting arrangements and representation on 
governing bodies) and delivery of partnership model in order to make them 
more accountable, transparent and equitable (Buse and Walt 2000a, Nishtar 
2004, Buse 2004). These approaches are however restrictive in their focus 
since they exclusively focus on global governance structures which are 
defined solely in terms of representation in decision making bodies. A range 
of other aspects through which power mediates these arrangements - 
structures and institutions, ideas and discourse, processes and outcomes - is 
often overlooked.  
 
As argued in chapter one (Section 1.2.1), although nascent, a third body of 
work, has begun to emerge and concerns itself with an alternative approach 
to analysing power relations in partnerships. Using constructivists 
approaches these studies seek to understand the role of ideas and discourse 
in shaping the practice of global public private partnership and explain its 
prominence in global governance debates (Harmer 2006, Buse and Harmer 
2004, Hastings 1999). My thesis contributes to this development. Schmidt 
(2002) argues that ideas informing the discourse emerge from the 
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communities: policy experts, scientists, academics, research institutions and 
other think tanks or could also be promoted through advocacy coalitions or 
individuals. While I do concur with the role of communities and actors in 
communicating ideas that inform discourse, I do not regard this as a linear 
process and instead, conceive of ideas in structurational terms. I emphasise 
the role of discourse and knowledge in communicating and diffusing the 
ideas that subsequently inform the practice of PPPs.  As I illustrate the 
structurational conception of ideas in figure 3 below, I argue that both 
discourse and ideas are deeply embedded in and interact with the 
hegemonic structures which in turn represent ideologies and values in a 
given economic, political and social context. The structure here is constituted 
by the rules, norms, and resources governing actors.   
 
Structure
Discourse Ideas
knowledge
Practices 
and Actions
Figure 3: Structurational concept of ideas and discourse
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Central to this conceptualisation is the strong links between knowledge and 
power which is highlighted in the studies on authority of private actors in 
global governance (Cutler et al. 1999a, Hall and Biersteker 2003). As a value 
laden variable, argues Adler (1997:36), knowledge frequently enters into the 
creation and reproduction of a particular “social order that benefits some at 
the expense of others”.  
 
2.3.5 Conceptual framework to understand power at the interface 
between theory and practice of public-private arrangements  
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Figure 4: Conceptual framework for analysis 
 
The above framework illustrates the interface between the theory and 
practice of PPP model. It presents an analysis of how power mediates public-
private interactions and how practices and power get normalised within 
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these. The arrows represent how the actors and their interests, and practices 
are constituted and constructed through an active process of translation and 
sensitisation. I propose that discursive ideas and the hegemonic structures 
(protocols, institutional rules, and resources) in which these are embedded 
constitute the actors and their interests. These global actors or development 
brokers, through an act of constant translation of policy objectives into 
multiple interests, enable the practice of PPPs to generate knowledge and 
material outcomes. Knowledge acts as a powerful tool in creating „order‟. It 
serves to legitimise the practices and the outcomes and as a result, 
reproduce the dominant discourse: the appropriateness and success of the 
PPP model and the role of brokers in these arrangements. In other words, 
the actions (or social practices within partnership arrangements) are 
constrained and enabled by the material (structures) and ideational factors 
which get produced and reproduced by those very actions.  
 
In this context, power operates at multiple levels. The dimensions I explore 
further in the thesis are:  
1. Power understood in terms of resources, expertise and facilities which 
actors bring to and mobilise in these complex interactions. 
2. Power generated through the reproduction of structures of domination 
(exclusion from decision making and agenda setting mechanisms) or 
that exerted through the authority of protocols and guidelines. 
3. Power of social practice which embody underlying power relations 
and, power of control over outcomes (or the capability of actors to 
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secure outcomes) and the ability to demonstrate those outcomes as 
knowledge coherent with the dominant discourse.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I outline and critically engage with the ongoing global and 
country level debates on Public Private Partnership. Highlighting the 
conceptual and terminological ambiguities inherent in the term and the 
paradoxes in the rationale, I propose an alternative framework of 
classification of „public-private interface arrangements, henceforth the term 
which I use in this thesis for the arrangements under investigation. 
 
Following from this, I examine the theoretical underpinnings of PPPs and in 
particular look at the body of literature under network governance. I do not 
regard networks as a third form of exchange, distinct from markets and 
hierarchies and concur with the view that network transactions co-exist with 
mechanisms of the market and hierarchies. Networks are primarily regarded 
as voluntary solutions based on reciprocity and sharing of resources, benefits 
and risks, devised by those working towards similar objectives (Abott et al. 
2006). Their creation therefore, by diktat, as is the case with public private 
interface arrangements triggered by global initiatives such as the Fund in 
middle and low income countries, can have significant implications for power 
play among partner organisations as they re-configure and re-invent such 
arrangements. The resulting conflict, as will be discussed in the subsequent 
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chapters, has a damaging effect on the programme outcomes as well as the 
delivery system.  
 
A central concern of this thesis therefore is to unmask the power relations 
which get reproduced in the practice of country level operations of global 
health partnerships such as the Global Fund. In doing so, I adopt the critical 
theory which was developed in direct opposition to the positivist approach 
evident in neo liberal institutional theorising (Neufeld 1995). Critical theory 
can explore how the interests of a dominant class of transnational elites 
achieve hegemonic status. It emphasises as much the importance of a 
„legitimising ideology‟ as the material and structural characteristics of power 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997).  
 
I conclude with a conceptual framework to understand the role of structure 
and discourse in constituting and constructing practices which currently 
legitimise and stabilise the PPP model. The literature led me to four broad 
themes that are identified in the framework and will be further explored in the 
thesis. These are: 
1. The role of hegemonic structures (protocols) and discourse (ideas and 
meanings) of the Fund in constituting actors and their involvement in 
public-private arrangements. 
2. The role of interpretive communities of actors in reproducing the 
discursive practices and stabilising the Fund system and the national 
AIDS programme. 
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3. The discursive practices emerging from an interaction of the three 
elements: structure, discourse and actor agency and the outcomes it 
generates. 
4. How power mediates at the interface of the different elements of the 
framework: discourse-structure, actors and their interests, social 
practices and health outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design: Conceptual and Methodological 
framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design of the study and gives a reflexive 
account my research journey. The research design presented in this chapter 
has been developed with reference to i) the nature and context of the 
phenomenon under study: health partnerships and the factors (structure and 
discourse) influencing their development and consequently, performance, 
and ii) the research objectives to be addressed. The latter have been 
outlined in the first chapter and relate to the theoretical and substantive aims 
of the proposed research.  The aim of the study is to examine the 
monotheism of discourse (ideas and meanings) and polytheism of practice 
around public private partnerships set off by the Global Fund under the 
national AIDS programme in India and to discuss its system and programme 
wide effects. 
 
This research does not intend to statistically measure the impact of the Fund 
supported programme on HIV and AIDS. Nor does it undertake a quantitative 
assessment of its performance. It instead seeks to gain an understanding of 
how the partnership model operates, the role of structure and discourse in 
shaping its practices and the implications it has for the broader health 
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system. Addressing these objectives also allows a broader reflection on 
„partnership‟ as a policy reform approach in the health sector, the rationale 
underlying its pervasiveness in the global and national health debates, and 
the implications it has for health systems: policy coordination, strengthening 
local systems, and delivering quality and equitable care.  
 
The chapter begins with outlining the approach taken to analyse the public 
private interface arrangements which are the focus of this investigation, and 
then discusses the paradigmatic choice justifying the research design and its 
key elements: epistemology, theory, methodology, and methods. A detailed 
description of the research journey follows next where I discuss the methods 
used to collect data, approach to data analysis, and the constraints faced. I 
conclude with a critical reflection on the ethical implications and the 
limitations of the study.  
 
3.2 A multi- level analysis of PPP 
From the discussion so far, it is clear that partnership arrangements under 
investigation can be viewed as a complex process of social interactions 
between individuals, organisations, and wider hierarchical global and local 
structures. Hence, an in-depth analysis of a policy approach must take into 
account the macro, meso and micro levels at which the networks operate 
and are shaped by (Marsh and Smith 2000, Evans 2001). Evans (2001) 
argues that contemporary policy making occurs within multi-layered, self-
organizing networks. These policy networks are not rigid or determinate 
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entities. In fact, they are always in a state of becoming (ibid). Their 
characteristic features: power dependency, processes of exchange, rules of 
the game, dominant coalitions and others are attributed to the process of 
social construction. As Benson (1977) argues, this calls for the need to focus 
on the process through which the network arrangements are produced, and 
the mechanisms through which it is maintained, reproduced and 
reconstructed.  
 
In order to study these attributes for global health partnership networks I 
opted to focus on the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, one of the 
largest global health initiatives and a major player in HIV management in 
India. Marsh and Smith (2000) propose a „dialectical approach‟ which 
combines macro, micro and meso levels of analysis as an explanatory model 
for policy networks and their effects on policy outcomes. The model focuses 
on the interaction between structure, underlying discursive ideas (such as 
global health, governance or the Fund), and agency (of actors operating 
within networks) in order to explain policy continuity and change. Adopting 
this model I undertook the analysis at three levels: macro level analysis of 
the entire gamut of actors in the policy arena, the intergovernmental 
structures, meso level focusing on organisations and interests grouped 
around a policy sector, and the institutional rules governing them, and micro 
level analysis to examine actor‟s perspectives and practices defined by their 
interactions, decision making and motivations. This encompassed multiple 
sites (activities and institutions in five states) to enable comparisons and 
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contrasts and rich variation in programmes. Finally, a longitudinal approach 
to data collection was adopted to examine the dynamicity of the partnership 
environment over time.  
 
Figure 5: Levels of  information gathering and analysis
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Using the framework presented in figure 5, I analyse the relationship 
between specific organisations involved in the Fund implementation (and HIV 
management), the institutional environment created by the policy discourse, 
and seek to explain the practices of organisations‟ and individuals enabled by 
these. Selected organisations represented the wide range of institutions/ 
actors: direct and indirect recipient of the grant and/ or deliverers of the 
national AIDS programme. These include: i) national government recipient - 
Ministry of Finance and the National AIDS Control Organisation, ii) national 
civil society recipients and NGO and corporate sub-recipients who as 
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members of civil society consortiums implemented programmes in specific 
grant rounds, iii) independent coordinating and monitoring agencies for the 
Fund, iv) activity sites and service providers, and v) bilateral agencies who 
are important stakeholders of the programme and its decision-making 
bodies. In addition, I also selected institutions that were not direct 
implementers of the Fund supported programmes but were active players 
with high level of influence in the HIV arena in the states that were the focus 
of investigation. This added a greater level of complexity to the study and 
enabled me to build a complete country-wide scenario. 
 
3.3 Paradigmatic approach 
The choice of a particular paradigm or “tradition of enquiry” is underpinned 
and shaped by one‟s background, beliefs and values, the nature of 
explanation sought, as well as the values espoused by that paradigm itself 
(Creswell 1998). These values shape the decisions made throughout the 
process of enquiry: while defining the research problem, developing the 
theoretical framework, information generation and analysis (Lincoln and 
Guba 2000).  
 
As the study was primarily exploratory in nature, the study design had to be 
sufficiently flexible to account for the dynamicity. A qualitative enquiry was 
chosen to meet the research objectives, given its appropriateness and 
adeptness in explaining a complex process or phenomenon from a more 
personal and subjective perspective (Denzin and Lincoln 1994).  
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3.3.1 The fundamental epistemic tension in social sciences: Positivism 
vs. Interpretativism 
The development of qualitative inquiry can be seen as counter to the 
methodologies of the positivist stance that suggests the existence of an 
overall meaning and a single explanation of reality demonstrable through 
development of comprehensive theories or grand narratives (Agger 1991) 
based on “essential truths” (Reed 1995:71). The principles of the positivist 
stance espouse objectivity based on rigorous data collection, analysis and 
interpretation to generate knowledge that must be reproducible and 
generalisable (Edwards 2002). In contrast, the relativist paradigm takes an 
interpretative stance that acknowledges the existence of multiple 
explanations of reality and actively seeks them to generate a comprehensive 
understanding of the social world and processes. Coast (1999) suggests that 
the merit of qualitative enquiry lies in its ability to “aid understanding, provide 
explanations, and explore issues that are of complex nature”. Emerging from 
postmodernist tradition, research which draws on qualitative enquiry believes 
that reality is made up of multiplicity of voices, views, and meanings and that 
each representation is context and time dependent (Agger 1991, Cheek 
1999). Consequently, it adopts an inductive approach to investigation and 
analysis rather than a deductive or reductionist approach followed by 
positivists. Buse (1999) argues that investigations that are political in nature 
must premise on explanations of behaviour. Hence, even at the very initial 
stages in the design of the research, the complexity emerging from the area 
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of investigation and the multiple layer of analysis required to examine power 
and discourse within the partnership environment made the choice of a 
relativist paradigm appropriate.  
 
3.3.2 Situating partnership literature within the two paradigms 
The literature on inter-organisational relationships and partnership networks 
can be described as falling into these two broad paradigms: Positivism or 
objectivsm, which is rooted in the modernist perspective of organisations, 
and the interpretivist or subjectivist approach to studying partnerships that 
emerges from the postmodernist tradition. The evolution of sociological 
organisational theory (or resource exchange) can be traced back to the 
positivist paradigm which views organisation as an object whose dimensions 
can be reliably measured by an independent observer (Hatch 1997). Using 
methodologies (statistical techniques and tools) shaped within the positivist 
tradition, much of the research co-related dependent and independent 
organisational attributes or variables with an outcome of interest in order to 
arrive at the „law‟ that will govern what types of organisational structure best 
suit the partnership or network model. Critics of this approach have pointed 
out that many of these studies relied on measurements of poor or unknown 
validity or reliability (Rogers 1982, Hall 1984); and failed to consider wider 
environmental influences such as the role of actors, their views and beliefs, 
and, the processes that might influence those variables (Rosenhead and 
Mingers 2001).  
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The interpretative or relativist paradigm in contrast assumes that all 
knowledge is mediated by experience. „Reality‟ thus gets defined by the 
individual‟s subjective experience, although under social and cultural 
influences (Hatch 1997). Individuals interpret their environment and act on 
the basis of this interpretation (Bryman 1988). In other words, it is this 
subjective impression that influences how they behave in a collaborative 
working environment. This thinking relates to the symbolic-interaction strand 
of interpretative perspective on organisations which considers the actor as 
the unit of analysis. It assumes that actors are embedded in a social context 
and are aware of their status within (Cuff et al. 1990). Interaction is then 
regarded as a constant cycle of interpretation and „negotiation‟ among actors 
as they re-affirm, alter, and replace the social arrangements within which 
they are bound and act (ibid; Bryman 1988). Studies adopting an 
interpretative perspective thus attempted to explore the socio-psychological 
paradigms governing perceptions, conduct and response in inter-
organisational settings using qualitative data collection tools which could 
reveal motivations, understandings and meaning assumed by actors.  
 
Within the interpretivist paradigm, however, few studies linked the 
interpretative determinants (actions, activities, meanings generated, and 
relationships) with the context of inter-organisational activity (Marsh 1998, 
Challis 1988, Halpert 1982) or explored how the network‟s „structure‟ and the 
underlying „discourse‟ might influence relations (Fleisher 1991, Reed 1992). 
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As a result, the interface between the macro, meso and micro levels 
continues to be a predominantly uncharted territory.  
 
3.4 Research design framework 
The framework for this research draws on Michael Crotty‟s (1998) framework 
founded on four elements: epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
methodology and methods. The emphasis laid by Carter and Little (2007) on 
the need for internal consistency between these elements has guided the 
conceptualisation and strategy of this research from the outset. They 
propose a framework, in particular for evaluating the quality of research, 
wherein they examine the contributions of epistemology, methodology and 
methods and their interrelationships.   
 
The four elements of the research design framework are defined in 
conflicting ways in the research literature with differing views over whether a 
particular paradigm is regarded as epistemology or a philosophical stance. I 
regard these elements not as fixed, objective categories that have to be 
adhered to in a „biblical‟ sense but as providing the researcher with a 
systematic guide to view, justify and explain their research. Hence, I feel it is 
important to clarify and explain my understanding of these elements for the 
purpose of my thesis.    
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3.4.1 Epistemology 
Epistemology relates to the study of “the nature of knowledge (Schwandt 
2001:71), its possibility, scope, and general basis” (Hamlyn 1995:242). In 
other words, it is a way of “understanding and explaining how we know what 
we know” (Crotty 1998:3) and could be embodied in several theoretical 
stances. Given the scope of the thesis that seeks to explore complex nature 
of the relationship between diverse actors, the influence of structures and 
discourse on the environment within which they act, and the power issues 
embedded within, I adopt an interpretive stand and the epistemology of 
„social constructionism‟.  
 
According to the constructionist paradigm, „truth‟ or „meaning‟ comes into 
being through our engagements with the world we interpret, and all 
knowledge is derived from and maintained by these social interactions. 
Again, constructionism is distinguished from constructivism, the latter 
focusing exclusively on “individualist construction of meaning” while the 
former pertains to “the collective generation and transmission of meaning or 
social phenomenon” (Crotty 1998: 58). This research views social 
constructionism as an overarching paradigm and ascribes to the views of 
Denzin and Lincoln (2007:33) that it assumes “relativist ontology (existence 
of multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (i.e. knower and respondent 
together generate understandings of the social phenomenon) and naturalistic 
methodological procedures”. Often, subjectivism has been treated as a third 
epistemology (distinct from objectivism and constructionism) ascribing it to 
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the structuralist, poststructuralist and postmodern schools of thought. 
Michael Crotty (1998) argues that unlike constructivism, in subjectivism 
meaning is not generated through an interaction between the object and 
subject, i.e. the object has no contribution in creating knowledge. While I 
concur that knowledge is shaped by other factors including cultural and 
religious beliefs, socio-political milieu, “primitive archetypes within our 
collective unconsciousness” and others (ibid), it is only through the 
interaction between the subject and object that these forms can be realised. 
Hence, for the purpose of my investigation, while I draw on critical theoretical 
perspective to stress on ideational and structural- material determinants and 
effects of the partnership environment, I do so within the social 
constructionist paradigm. 
 
3.4.2 Theoretical perspective 
Theory refers to the philosophical stance that acts as the researcher‟s “lens” 
to view the social world and its problems. It guides the methodology by 
grounding the logic and context of the research process (Crotty 1998). The 
guidance for this research comes from the perspectives and teachings of 
critical social theory (Neumann 1944, Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 
Habermas 1973 and 1989). This theoretical perspective is concerned with 
examining how the construction of knowledge and the organisation (and 
generation) of power in society broadly, and in institutions such as health 
care specifically, create and reproduce structures of domination and 
oppression (Reeves et al. 2008).  
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Stemming from the work of social theorists in the Western European Marxist 
tradition, also referred to as the Frankfurt School of thought, critical theory 
emerged in connection with the social movements that identified the varied 
dimensions of domination of human beings in human societies (Agger 1991). 
Particularly, it sought to explain the survival of capitalism in terms of 
deepened ideologies or domination, seen as a combination of external 
exploitation and internal disciplining. Thus, critical theory provides both a 
descriptive and normative basis for social inquiry with the objective of 
decreasing domination in all its forms.  
 
The proponents of Critical theory proposed new ways of articulating the role 
of the state and culture in advanced capitalism, which the state actively 
protects against its own contradictory nature (Agger 1991). In chapter two, I 
illustrate the political nature of networks and public private arrangements and 
discuss theories on power as both domination and agency to explicate power 
distribution in this context. The theoretical concepts discussed will be re-
visited in the subsequent chapters that discuss the findings. The choice of 
the theoretical perspective is reflected in the design of the research which 
takes into account both methodological and substantive categories proposed 
by Agger (1991). Moreover, critical theory is appropriate for the study design 
since it is not linked to a specific methodology and can be applied at all the 
three levels: the macro (society and policy context), meso (systems and 
institutions) and micro (actor). 
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3.4.3 Methodology 
In literature and practice methodology is used very loosely to mean anything 
from schools of thought to tools of data collection. However, in Kaplan‟s 
(1964:23) terms, methodology “helps us to understand, in the broadest 
possible terms, not the products of scientific enquiries but the process itself". 
For the purpose of this research, methodology is understood as the 
description and explanation of the study that guides and justifies the choice 
of its methods, clarifying their assumptions and outcomes, in other words, a 
“strategy for enquiry” (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).   
 
The strategy of enquiry for this research disapproves the notion of 
“methodological fundamentalism” (Carter and Little 2007) and believes that 
elements of more than one methodology can be combined to clarify the intent 
of enquiry and the knowledge generated. Advocates of qualitative 
methodologies stress the richness of qualitative data and arguments on the 
big picture, and how processes, chronological facts and causal links occur 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Given the range of issues to be investigated 
and the complex ways in which concepts under investigation interact with 
one another, I adopt critical ethnography and an analytic narrative style case 
study approach.  
 
Methods, the fourth element of Crotty‟s framework (1998), are discussed 
under section 3.5.4. 
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3.4.3.1 Critical ethnography 
Critical ethnography has been used to describe, analyse and reveal hidden 
agendas from public transcripts, power centres, and assumptions that 
constrain and repress (Thomas 1993). Informed by the writings of Foucault, 
critical perspectives in development studies analyse the development 
discourse as a system of knowledge, practices, technologies, and power that 
orders action within it. This perspective has been evident in the works of 
James Scott (1990) on the „hidden-public transcripts‟; Escobar‟s (1995) 
analysis of the rise of development discourse and practices as instruments of 
western capitalism to dominate the “third world”; and Fergusson‟s (1994) 
ethnographic analysis of a development project in Lesotho in an attempt to 
understand how the dominant discourse produces depoliticised knowledge, 
and technical solutions to development problems. Mosse (2005), Lewis (in 
Lewis and Mosse 2006), and others regard the critical and deconstructive 
approaches as offering a “diabolic image of the development world” and 
paying little attention to the “incoherence, uncertainties, and contradictions” 
(Oliver de Sardan 2004:5).  While not abandoning these approaches, they 
focus on making them methodical rather than ideological in order to analyse 
the interface of ideas and relationships in the development arena (Olivier de 
Sardan 2004, Mosse 2005). This view is critical to the thesis as it builds on 
(but does not replace) the post-structuralist analysis to examine the 
complexity of the policy of public-private partnership as “institutional 
practice”, the social life of projects and organisations, and the diverse 
discourses and interests shaping policy models (Mosse 2004:644). 
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The study is based on the premise that a critical approach to the „partnership‟ 
model can provide policy makers and managers with valuable insights into 
the operations and effectiveness of the complex set of “local, national and 
cross cultural social interactions” (Mosse and Lewis 2006) which can no 
longer be examined in isolation from the state system, civil society, or wider 
national and international political, economic, and administrative practices. 
The Fund arrangements investigated in this research involve interactions 
between actors of different statuses, goals, and varying resources. Recent 
works on development draw attention to the meso and micro looking at actor 
perspectives, practices and concepts, strategies, and contextual constraints 
that highlight the macro i.e. the broader national and political economy 
(Bierschenk et al. 2002).   
 
Olivier de Sardan (2005) argues that this multiplicity of interactions gives 
anthropology (as the discipline) and ethnography (as its methodology) a 
“privileged empirical pathway” into social reality. This is primarily because 
contrary to narrow culturalist approaches, this discipline attends to the social 
processes and negotiations of meaning and identity in heterogeneous social 
arenas. Development anthropology is increasingly becoming the study of “the 
global” that is concerned with new forms of transnational connection between 
“people, information and ideas” in the realm of „stretching the organisations” 
beyond the nation-state. The choice of critical ethnography is thus 
appropriate for the context my study is located in.  
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3.4.3.2 Case study 
A case study approach has been regarded as a useful methodology to 
evaluate organisations and complex, real world developments, “with the 
„case‟ providing a source of explanations for wider developments” (Keen and 
Packwood 1995). This approach has been increasingly applied to investigate 
the nature of public-private interactions, particularly contractual 
arrangements in the health sector (Palmer 2001, Allen 2000). An 
investigation of the issues and concepts outlined in chapter one and the 
themes identified in chapter two, required an in-depth analysis of a variety of 
aspects (and concepts) related to partnerships such as, the dynamicity and 
complex nature of arrangements, structural and ideational drivers of the 
practices, the interplay of power and, the impact of these on the process of 
partnership development. The partnership agenda (and the arrangements 
under investigation) was still developing at the time the field studies were 
undertaken: new partnerships were being forged for forthcoming rounds 
while a few older ones disintegrated and others continued to operate. A case 
study strategy was particularly useful as it was able to cope with the evolving 
context in which partnerships developed, new grant rounds unfolded, and 
more variables of interest than data points existed (Allen 2000).  The analytic 
narrative approach to case-studies was considered appropriate as it allows 
an engagement with political actors. This approach has been previously 
applied to evaluate effective aid arrangements (Oliveira-Cruz 2007) and to 
seek an understanding on “actors perceptions, preferences, their evaluations 
of alternatives, the information they possess…the strategies they adopt and 
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the constraints they face” (Bates et al. 1998: 11). In the context of aid 
mechanisms, Zinnes and Bolaky (2002) argue that a narrative approach not 
only enables an evaluation of the obstacles to effective mechanisms but also 
provides a guidance to design the right mechanisms to prevent the 
opportunism that risk its effectiveness.  
 
A multiple and embedded case study design was applied as it allows 
theoretical propositions to emerge and be tested across sites for greater 
refinement of analytic generalisations (Miles and Huberman 1994, Keen and 
Packwood 1995), thus adding an overall robustness to the study (Yin 1994). 
As Rossi (2004) points out, an embedded case study combines insights into 
the wider historical, political and socio-economic context with a “thick 
description” of local developments. This is applicable to the way I use the 
case study methodology in this thesis, focusing on the Fund and drawing on 
different partnerships, interventions, and settings. 
 
3.5 Information Generation Process 
This research involved an intensive period of field studies, approximately 
nine months, adopting a layered approach to investigation, covering the 
country context of national AIDS policy before examining individual 
programmes operational through the different Fund rounds. As indicated in 
figure 6, this period was broken down into three phases in an attempt to 
narrow down the focus of the study and deepen my understanding of the 
processes. Although the information was generated in three distinct phases, 
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it was not linear since a linear research plan would have been inappropriate 
for a research where meaning and practices are constantly evolving. Thus, I 
adhered to an iterative process of praxis, emphasising critical reflection and 
subsequent action based on this reflection. Writing and reporting were part of 
the analytic process and contributed to developing my thinking and 
interpretation (Richardson 2000). 
Preliminary information gathering: website, 
emails, reports, interaction with key informants
On the spot analysis
Second round of information gathering: 
observation, consultation, interviews
On the spot analysis
Final round: clarifying interviews,
emails
Narrowing focus, 
deepening 
understanding of 
the process and 
knowledge 
Final Analysis
 
Source: Guijt, I. (1998). 
Figure 6: The process of information generation and analysis 
 
The first phase in Edinburgh focused on retrieving background information on 
the Global Fund programmes and public-private arrangements set up under 
the HIV and AIDS programme in India, and establishing appropriate points of 
contact. This was undertaken largely through: organisation websites, email 
communications and, documentary analysis of fund reports and evaluations 
available on the internet. This exercise enabled me to develop my study tools 
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such as a semi-structured guide for in-depth interviews, consent forms and to 
choose techniques such as mapping and SWOT analysis along with 
interviews. The second phase comprised the bulk of the fieldwork and was 
carried out between June and December 2007. During this period I was 
based in Delhi and made frequent visits to the „field‟ in different states. The 
final round of information generation was undertaken through a follow up visit 
to India in November 2008 - January 2009. The second visit allowed me to 
revisit some of the interview participants and take stock of the rapidly 
changing environment. During this time I was also able to follow up with 
actors who were crucial to the Fund scenario but were difficult to access in 
the previous visit.  
 
3.5.1 Study sites and selection strategy 
The research adopts purposive sampling undertaken at three levels- 
national, state and district. The choice of this strategy was in tandem with the 
methodological approach of the study. Unlike methodologies framed under 
the positivist paradigm, qualitative enquiry in general, and ethnography in 
particular, does not aspire for a representative sample arrived at statistically 
but instead considers the quality of information supplied by thick description 
of concepts under investigation. The following section describes the selection 
process and criteria.  
 
At the outset, I undertook a consultative mapping exercise in order to define 
and clarify the structure of the Fund arrangements in India and the various 
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associations and interactions taking place along the chain at the three tiers. 
The exercise involved several visits to the nodal agencies (principal 
recipients of the ongoing grant round of the Fund) and informal meetings with 
multiple stakeholders of the programme. I also continued to consult and re-
visit the web resources (websites of the Fund, its governance structures, the 
principal and sub-recipient agencies, and the NACO) to clarify the structure 
and process of grant making and the Fund operations in India. This exercise 
revealed different activities that the civil consortia and the government 
agencies (NACO) were engaged in through the ongoing grant rounds and 
their corresponding state implementation agencies. This served as the basis 
for „sampling‟ for the investigations at the state and district level.  
 
An unanticipated outcome of this exercise was that it laid bare the complexity 
and multi-layered environment that the Fund arrangements were located in 
and needed to be accounted for in the study. When the field studies 
commenced in 2007, the first four rounds of funding (approved for India) 
were in operation, round six had just commenced, and the proposal for round 
seven was being reviewed by the Fund board (For more details on the 
rounds, refer to table 5: section 4.3.1). Initially, only one round was identified 
as the focus of enquiry because for the first time in the history of international 
aid in India, a non state actor (leading a civil society consortium) became a 
national recipient of the Fund grant alongside the government. The fund has 
an annual cycle of grant making i.e. new rounds, if approved commence 
each year while previous rounds continue to be in operation for five years or 
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more. As a result, the policy environment is very dynamic comprising: visible 
tensions between earlier collaborations, discontinuing intervention models 
that were perceived as a source of conflict, cutback of funds/ budgets, 
emergence of newer arrangements for subsequent rounds, and 
(re)negotiation of the proposed activities. In fact, from the time I developed 
my research tools to the time I commenced field work, newer „partners‟ had 
joined the consortia and talks were ongoing to disband some of the ongoing 
activities. Given this development and constant evolution of „partnership‟ 
arrangements, I modified my strategy to examine the activities of one round 
but expand the focus to understand the ongoing processes (and 
negotiations) for the subsequent rounds.  
 
3.5.2 Selection criteria 
Subsequent to the consultative mapping exercise, I adopted a two stage 
sampling process. At the first stage, sampling was undertaken with 
organisation as the unit of analysis.  Of all the organisations involved in the 
partnership programme (including the principal recipient, sub recipients and 
the frontline implementing organisations), a few were purposively identified 
based on the following criteria- 
 Role in the partnership – organisations performing key roles and 
responsibilities at each stage of the policy cycle: proposal 
development, priority setting, implementation, monitoring and 
appraisal, as well as entities that served the bridging role between the 
country mechanism and the global secretariat. 
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 Constituency representation – organisations across the three 
constituencies: public (state agencies), corporate sector, and the not-
for-profit NGO community including international donor agencies. 
 
The HIV and AIDS component of the Fund programme in India was 
implemented in a phased manner, coinciding with the phase-wise 
introduction of antiretroviral in the public programme. In the initial rounds, the 
Fund programme and its corresponding interventions were restricted to six 
states - Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Manipur and 
Nagaland - corresponding to the „high prevalence‟ category established by 
the surveillance system, and Delhi. In subsequent rounds, some of these 
interventions were scaled up to districts with high prevalence in states which 
were classified as „moderate prevalence‟. However, these interventions (and 
their corresponding districts) were not included in the study since the nascent 
stage of their development would not reveal implementation related 
challenges and the dynamics among partners and among project staff.  
 
Among the high prevalence states, I restricted my selection frame to the four 
southern states – Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. 
The two north-eastern states (Manipur and Nagaland) were not included 
because the regional and cultural context and epidemiology of HIV and AIDS 
in the North-east differs significantly from the southern states. Moreover, the 
costs of travelling to the north-east and between the different sites were 
impractical given the limited funds available for the research.     
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To ensure insights from different contexts and sites of implementation, the 
field studies were carried out in five states of India, four of which fit the „high 
prevalence‟ category legitimising concentrated presence of donors, and the 
fourth, Delhi, which houses all ministries, donor agencies and the 
governance structures  of the Fund such as the Secretariat, India country 
coordinating mechanism and the LFA (Refer map). 
 
 
The highlighted states in green represent the high prevalent states where Fund programmes were 
initially implemented. The orange dots represent the districts where intervention centres were visited 
and the field study was carried out.  
Map of India depicting the study sites 
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Subsequently, I held consultations with key representatives of these 
organisations and networks at national and sub national level to analyse the 
structures, arrangements, institutional environment, and actions/practices 
generated at their interface. Attention was also given to governing bodies 
and coordinating structures established at different levels in order to 
understand the translation of the Fund mechanisms from the global to the 
local. Consultations with main stakeholders enabled me to better understand 
the coordination, integration, and harmonisation of efforts. These were 
representatives of the national recipient and sub recipient agencies, 
members of the Fund governance structures such as the country 
coordinating mechanism, the Secretariat and the LFA, and other governing 
structures (such as the project advisory board and management unit) set up 
by NACO and the civil society consortia for the implementation of the Fund 
grant. 
 
In the second stage, I short listed a few intervention models from an 
extensive list of services provided at the state, district and taluk (block) level. 
Among the continuum of services provided under the HIV and AIDS 
programme, I chose treatment and care-support activities in the five states as 
the focus of enquiry. The criteria for selection of service type were such that: 
i) enabled comparison across state and non-state services, ii) were crucial to 
understand the dynamics of meso level inter-organisational relations and 
micro level implementation of the partnership, and iii) generated rich 
information and comparison for the purpose of an in-depth case study. For 
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example, counselling centres run by both public sector agency as well as the 
civil society consortia, government run ART centre and corporate ART centre 
were among the service types examined. The choice for some intervention 
sites was straightforward as there were only a small number (for example, 
two care and support centres established in two states). Selection of services 
(and corresponding intervention site) for investigation was based on the 
following criteria- 
 Diversity and nature of arrangements: this criterion related to the type of 
organisations involved in providing the service, the constituencies they 
represent, and the nature of their association with the State. Arrangements 
that represented a wide range and variation of these attributes were 
identified. For example, direct and indirect recipient NGOs and corporate 
partners, NACO and its state divisions, network of people with HIV and AIDS 
were the constituencies included.  This enabled an examination of different 
structures of provisioning and institutional environment specific to a 
constituency, and the distribution of power within inter-organisational 
relationships.  
 History, performance, and geographical location: These criteria enabled the 
generation of information along multiple axes in order to capture the 
changing contexts, regional variations, and dynamics of relationships based 
on the performance of partner organisations. Results of national 
assessments and appraisals served as an important sampling frame. For 
example, having access to the results of a national assessment of care and 
support interventions enabled the selection of both high and poor performing 
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centres/ organisations to reveal the implication of the Fund governance for 
service provision. Inclusion of intervention sites that were more recent in the 
partnership history and those that had been operational for over a year gave 
insights into the changing mechanisms and different stages of partnership 
development. I regarded these aspects significant to examine the monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms and understand the impact of the structures on 
aid organisation and the „partnership‟ environment. 
 
3.5.3 Research journey: the enablers and the disablers 
Before undertaking this research my experience in the health and 
development sector in India, specifically at the grassroots and policy level, 
shaped the questions that I (and the organisation7 I worked with) sought to 
answer through action research in health systems. The findings fed back and 
informed policy advocacy and groundwork. This experience has had a 
significant bearing on my positioning as a researcher, as it informed my 
philosophical stance and underpinned the research design, language, the 
process and the context in which the participants were engaged.  
 
The „sampling‟ frame was both a familiar and an unfamiliar terrain, making 
me both an “insider” as well as an “outsider” to the context. Given my subject 
positioning as a gender and health activist and the multiple roles I performed 
as a trainer, researcher, and advocate in all the regions (and most states) in 
                                                 
7
 I have worked in the capacity of Programme Co-ordinator with a development organisation called 
Sama. It is a gender and health resource centre based in Delhi and implementing training, research and 
advocacy programmes across different regions in India.   
 137 
India, I was familiar with: the geo-political context of the area where the study 
was situated, the nature of organisations under examination, and the 
bureaucratic hurdles and power relations I could expect to encounter. This 
took care of the practical aspects of carrying out the field research such as, 
travel, knowledge of the structure and functioning of health system and the 
bureaucratic procedures (/permissions) among others. Although each state 
has its own official language and script, which I do not have proficiency in, 
most health care providers (barring two respondents) were able to 
communicate in English or Hindi.  At these two occasions while interacting 
with frontline staff (network for people with HIV), I was assisted with 
translations by other members of staff present. Additionally, my credibility 
within the health and women‟s movements in India enabled me to reach out 
to the members of the civil society who were either directly or indirectly linked 
with the fund processes. 
 
My work, however, had previously never exclusively focused on HIV and 
AIDS and this contributed to the unfamiliarity which I mention above.  The 
AIDS landscape, as I elaborate in chapter six, is unique. It involves a wide 
range of players – governments, international development agencies, 
academics and researchers, and NGOs and CBOs - working with, or 
representing specific marginalised groups. The vertical nature of the AIDS 
programme renders „penetration‟ into this industry difficult. Moreover, the 
critical voice and momentum in India is building up through processes like 
the People‟s Health Movement and people‟s tribunals, and legislations such 
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as the Right to Information act (2005). The latter attempted to strengthen 
citizens‟ voice and influence service provision through more rapid but still 
formal legal channels.  An unanticipated outcome of this is a higher sense of 
threat (and vulnerability) among the national and local authorities, which has 
resulted in greater censorship of information.  However, the movement of 
many institutions, which earlier worked on general or reproductive health 
services, into the AIDS industry worked to my advantage. Taking the familiar 
leads, I embarked on my research journey, which entailed a constant 
negotiation of my positioning between the multiple identities: that of a 
researcher and of an activist. In the course of interactions with the senior 
bureaucrats at the state division of NACO and corporate representatives, 
overplaying my research links, institutional affiliation (with an international 
University), and links with senior member of NACO came handy. On the 
other hand, having a critical understanding of the politics of health care 
delivery and grassroots experience enabled me to connect with the sub–
recipient NGOs and networks of people with HIV.     
 
Through professional and personal8 contacts within the civil society consortia 
and the nodal AIDS agency in Delhi, I got in touch with partner institutions 
and their respective state divisions/ teams. A letter of support from two 
influential authorities (at government and a non-government agency) at the 
centre implied full cooperation at the state level, and often, assistance with 
translations, arranging my stay, and facilitating visits to the centres. This was 
                                                 
8
 My father is the former Director of a key government institution on health. His close ties with some 
officials in the Ministry were particularly useful to make an entry into the national AIDS agency.   
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immensely useful for making roads into the civil society component of the 
Fund programme, particularly the more exclusive corporate sector and the 
people with HIV. With the State divisions of NACO, however, due caution 
was necessary. Authorities in these agencies were occasionally in conflict 
with the Centre over issues ranging from corruption to “under-performance” 
and “under utilisation” of funds. These, thus insisted in pre-mediating and 
facilitating my visits to the interventions sites and sub-recipient NGOs. I was 
aware of the information bias this might result in, given the authority that the 
bureaucratic state divisions commanded from non state actors. Hence, a 
flexible approach was required that involved carrying out interviews and 
observations in a range of formal and informal or unplanned settings. 
However, due care was taken to protect their confidentiality. This aspect is 
further discussed under the Ethics section of this chapter.  
 
3.5.4 Information sources and methods 
Qualitative research is often multi-method in focus (Flick 2002). The 
combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials and 
observations in a single study adds rigour, complexity and richness to any 
inquiry (ibid: 229). However the purpose of using multiple methods and 
triangulation of these is to secure in depth understanding of the phenomenon 
under examination, rather than to prove its accuracy. 
 
Information sources included: documents, minutes of meetings, field notes of 
visits and observation, mapping of the Fund arrangements: structure and 
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functions, and individuals.  Each of these sources was valuable and 
contributed to the development of the narrative presented in the following 
chapters. I classify these diverse sources under three categories of methods: 
Documentary analysis, Observation, and Interviews. A detailed account of 
these methods is given below - 
 
3.5.4.1 Documentary analysis 
Institutionally generated information as a data source can be very effective in 
revealing the culture and operation of institutions (Miller 1997). Documentary 
analysis has been used in a number of studies on health partnerships (Green 
1998, Cooksey and Krieg 1996). In the context of this research, given the 
Fund focus on performance based grant-making, documentation and 
reporting had a particular significance as it served as a crucial mechanism to 
converge the gap between the public and hidden transcript. Collection of 
documentary evidence is particularly useful as it allows for a broad coverage 
and analysis in terms of time period (previous as well as current processes), 
range of events, and contexts (Yin 2003) in an unobtrusive manner.  
 
In line with the analytic approach, a range of information was gathered 
through various media to examine the:  macro historical and political context 
and discourse underlying the introduction of the Fund, launch of 
antiretroviral, national AIDS policy, and national guidelines for provision of 
care, treatment and support; meso level institutional guidelines and 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/ contract agreements, proposals, 
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minutes of meetings, project reports and budgets; and micro level 
performance oriented records, registers, health cards maintained at the 
implementation sites.  These mostly related to the development of the 
„partnership‟ agenda and the functioning of partnership.  
 
A majority of documents and reports used for the research was collected 
through personal interaction with participants at various institutions and 
institutional websites such as, the India Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM), the Global Fund website, National AIDS Control Organisation 
(NACO) and others. Documents mentioned by a research participant during 
an interview or a meeting were requested from the relevant persons within 
the institution.  
 
Obtaining access to these documents was not an easy process. Documents 
such as MoUs, proceedings of the CCM were regarded sensitive in nature 
and not shared. The Director General of NACO, for example, declined to 
share any internal documents and directed me to the official website. At the 
state coordination units and local intervention sites, while most participants 
were open to sharing the contents of registers, they were hesitant to give a 
copy for my records. This restricted the collection of centre specific records 
(of enrolments and targets) from all centres and thus hindered a comparative 
analysis of the programme outcomes. However, to the extent possible, I 
recorded this data verbatim as it was shared at the intervention site, and was 
able to develop an understanding of the comparative work-load specific to 
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centres, adequacy of human resources, and other substantive issues that 
have a bearing on the quality of service provision.  
 
Documentary analysis has its fair share of criticisms, to the extent that some 
researchers challenge its acceptance as a method (Platt 1981 in May 
1997:158). Others raise concern around the lack of rigour in justifying its 
contribution to the research findings, and challenge the myth that documents 
are a reflection of social reality (Silvermann 1993, May 1997, Miller 1997). I 
acknowledge that the content of documents/records can be generated 
through a controlled or manipulative process where the final product is 
shaped by decisions related to the social, political, and economic 
environment (Miller 1997). This was also evident from the minutes of the 
CCM meetings that I obtained from the website, wherein contested issues 
and disagreements, divulged during the interviews, were omitted. Since a 
bulk of the documents reviewed were official publications by the NACO as 
well as the civil society consortia produced in line with the Fund 
requirements, they carried the bias of containing misleading and unverifiable 
information. I therefore do not regard these as neutral artefacts but treat 
them as official views and a construction of the phenomenon which enriched 
the study by contributing to the understanding of hidden and public 
transcripts. Of course, this critique applies to all sorts of information including 
objective and „hard‟ data. This aspect has been covered to some extent in 
chapter six where the protocols and records are examined for their potential 
to reproduce the policy rationale.  
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Bearing these limitations in mind I undertook the documentary analysis 
throughout the research period in an iterative manner as and when 
documents were accessed. I adopted Atkinson and Coffey‟s (1997) approach 
towards documentary analysis which suggests that documents should be 
analysed for what they are and what they are used to accomplish, giving 
careful attention to: their status in organisational settings, values attached to 
them (ibid) and, interpretative factors such as who they are developed by and 
for which audience, for what purpose, and what expertise/ knowledge was 
required to interpret them (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). For example, 
the proposal to the Fund for round four appeared comprehensive on paper 
with clear articulation of roles and responsibilities for each partner. It became 
evident that this was not clearly a „true‟ reflection of the „partnership‟ or its 
practice, which significantly varied from the policies contained in the 
proposal. However, since it was „the‟ official document required by the Fund 
to generate the contract endorsed by the signatures of all parties, its contents 
were likely to be shaped by what was desired at the global level and the 
pressures acting at national and local levels. This process was adopted to 
analyse the various documents to examine how they relate to (and generate) 
the themes addressed in the study and to corroborate the findings obtained 
from other methods.  
 
3.5.4.2 Observations 
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Yin (2003) suggests the broad scope of observation as a research method in 
qualitative enquiry. It could range from a „field‟ visit (which might be 
undertaken to study a community or institution) to more structured and formal 
activities such as meetings and consultation. Observation could be direct or 
indirect, and participant or non-participant.  
For the purpose of the study, participant and direct as well as indirect 
observation was carried out. Participant observation has been defined as one 
in which “you are not merely a passive observer. Instead, you may assume a 
variety of roles within a case study situation and participate in the events 
being studied” (ibid).  
 
Before commencing the visits to the field, I undertook a consultancy with one 
of the national recipient organisations to develop a concept note for an 
Operational Research (OR), one of the deliverables of the Fund grant. In 
order to develop this, I along with three other staff (two from the head office, 
one from the state office), visited the intervention sites in two Southern states 
that were also part of my research enquiry. The intervention sites were 
district level networks run by people with HIV. This exercise gave me the 
opportunity to understand the interventions proposed through the Fund 
grants, get familiar with network members and also visit the network national 
head office. It also revealed the operational and programmatic difficulties 
faced by the network members, which subsequently became an issue for 
further investigation.  
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At the national level I had the opportunity to attend both formal and informal 
meetings that were held to discuss and review programmatic aspects of the 
national programme. These mostly related to interactions between the NACO 
and the civil society actors concerned with policy matters related to the Fund 
arrangements and activities, as well as the areas established as “priorities” 
within the national AIDS programme. Sometimes the focus was on review of 
procedures and developing guidelines, and other times on the harmonisation 
efforts with donor agencies. These meetings enabled me to – 
 
 Map out the organisations involved in the field and familiarise myself 
with the formal structures and processes (Allen 2000) within the 
national AIDS programme in general and fund arrangements in 
particular. 
 Clarify the roles, rules and relationships, the nature and processes of 
interaction of the different partners, and their views on the 
performance of other partners and events. 
 Get useful insights and documents related to the progress of individual 
activities, and familiarity with internal issues related to conflict of 
interests among partners. 
 Identify participants to be interviewed, meet them in both informal and 
formal settings and thus establish a rapport with them. The rapport 
building was facilitated by the legitimacy gained through my presence 
in such closed door meetings with senior officials of the organisation. 
This in turn facilitated their willingness to be part of the study. 
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This rich information generated through regular interactions with individuals 
contributed to the development of my interview guide as I tried to further 
investigate the issues that emerged in these meetings.  
 
At the micro level, observation was undertaken at the implementation sites. I 
visited public hospitals that housed the counselling and treatment (ART) 
centre, sub contracted NGOs running care centres, state coordination units 
(offices) of individual partner organisations and, state and district level 
networks of people with HIV. Observations at this level served a different 
purpose for the study. By observing the routine functioning of the centres, I 
was able to identify the discrepancies between what people say or claim and 
what they do or is happening (Mays and Pope 1995). Observation methods 
are thus particularly suited to study organisational culture, shared norms and 
values, and functions of the employees (Elston 2005) as they uncover 
behaviour or routines of which participants might themselves be unaware of 
(Mays and Pope 1995). For example, the visits to the intervention sites 
revealed: the excessive burden of reporting and its effect on quality of 
services provided, competition between local networks to assume 
counselling role at the public hospitals, and prevalent stigma among the care 
givers. These issues had not emerged during my interactions at the national 
level and had to be probed in the interviews.  
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Detailed notes of the meetings and any informal discussions before or after 
were taken and written up at the earliest possible. Notes were taken and 
maintained in a separate notebook along with other details such as date, 
time and location (Silverman 1998) as well as contentious opinions, 
important actors to be followed up, and the overall impression of the event. 
Besides the formal meetings where the content and flow of discussions were 
taken verbatim, I recorded all the formal and informal interactions using a 
voice recorder. Subsequent transcription enabled me to verify any missing 
information in the notes.  
 
Observation as a research method has been criticised on two accounts: i) 
concerns around validity since observers rely exclusively on their perceptions 
thus influencing the findings (Adler and Adler 1998) and, ii) involvement of 
the researcher/ observer might alter the behaviour of the actors (Patton 
2002, Allen 2000) or the very nature of relationship under study (Elston 
2005). The first criticism, though important, did not have a significant impact 
on the study since the research is not primarily observational. Observation 
was in stead combined with other methods of generating information and its 
main purpose was to generate insights to inform the interviews and examine 
the contradictions. Moreover, similar issues (and description of events) 
emerged or were recounted back by the participants during the interview, 
thus verifying the observations and my reflections. Regarding the second 
concern related to the influence of the observer, it is not entirely possible to 
know the extent to which my presence altered the proceedings or content of 
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the event/meeting. Since on most occasions (government meeting on 
guidelines, the Fund seminar, informal group meetings), I was invited by the 
organising body, the members either seemed oblivious to my presence or 
engaged with me in the discussions. The nature of issues that emerged from 
the meetings seems to suggest that my presence did not make an impact on 
the few meetings I attended. However, at the implementation level, the 
presence of another person (especially from a partner organisation with 
greater authority) did seem to affect the content and the openness with which 
discussions were held. In such cases, additional methods such as SWOT 
analysis were used and care was taken to re-visit the institution or gain 
further clarity through phone or email communications.  
 
3.5.4.3 In-depth interviews 
As stated earlier in chapter one and two, a partnership culture or 
environment is defined by the interaction of structure, the discourse, and 
processes constituted by interactions among the participating actors. 
Interviews are a useful tool to investigate reasons for human actions, 
perceptions and motivations as they yield rich insights into people‟s 
experience, feelings and attitude (May 1997), their interpretation of events 
(Fontana and Frey 2007) and the significance they attach to their own 
actions. Legard et al. (2003) emphasise the flexible and interactive nature of 
interviews which enables them to achieve depth, and the likelihood of 
creation of new knowledge and thoughts at some point in the research 
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process. For these reasons, Interviews acted as the primary source of 
information used to develop the case narratives.  
 
For the purpose of this study, 70 in-depth interviews with a total of 94 
participants were carried out. A few interviews, especially those held at the 
service delivery (or intervention) site, were in groups of two or more. Of the 
70, four interviewees were key informants. As Patton (2002: 321) defines, 
“Key informants are individuals who are particularly knowledgeable about the 
inquiry setting, and whose insights can prove useful in enabling the 
investigator to understand what is happening and why”. The four key 
informants represented the civil society and the government (two from each 
sector) and were not directly part of the HIV component of the Fund 
arrangements. However, they were important players in the HIV and AIDS 
industry (and potential partners for the subsequent grants) or were 
associated with other components (TB and Malaria) of the Fund grant 
through the MoH. They provided crucial insights into the history of the Fund 
operations in India, the functioning of governing bodies, and the relationships 
between different actors and parties. Moreover, I found KIs particularly useful 
to verify conflicting claims of other respondents (such as their role in steering 
the Fund processes in India, performance gaps, and others) and seek 
information that was sensitive in nature.  
 
Providing a list of all institutions contacted for interviews, organisational 
affiliations of interviewees‟ and their role in the partnership (sub-recipient/ 
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principal recipient, advisory or implementing) was difficult given the multiple 
levels of analysis, diverse roles played by the actors in the chain of policy 
process and their multiple institutional affiliations. For example, a CCM civil 
society member could also be a sub-recipient of NACO for one round and a 
sub-recipient of the civil society consortium (GO-NGO partnership) for 
another. Hence, table 4 presents a broad categorisation of the constituency 
the interviewee represents and their role in the programme. A limitation of 
this seemed apparent at the time of substantiating the findings with people‟s 
opinions/ quotes. Hence, while presenting quotes of research participants, I 
only present their role or organisational affiliation relevant to the discussion.  
 
Governing 
body 
members 
(CCM/PR)
Directors 
and Senior 
managers 
(PR and 
SR)
Project officers 
(PRs and SRs)
Managers 
of service 
delivery 
points
Front line 
providers TOTAL
GO 3 2 6 5 (6) 5 (7) 21 (24)
NGO 6 7 (10) 6 (7) 11 (16) 5 (14) 35 (53)
Corporate 0 2 3 2 (3) 2 (4) 9 (12)
Other 3 2 5
70 (94)  
GO - Government Organisation; NGO includes the people with HIV; Other- refers primarily to i) Fund 
bureaucrats (i.e. employees of the institutions set up for the governance of the Fund) and ii) Key 
informants.  
The numbers outside the parentheses are the interviews held while those in parentheses are the 
number of individuals interviewed. The difference is because on some occasions, interviews were held 
in groups of two or more.  
 
Table 4: Description of research participants 
 
The pre-testing stage for the interview guide indicated a length of 
approximately 60 minutes, although the majority of the interactions lasted 
between 60–90 minutes duration while the longest carried on for 150 
minutes. Participants engaging in lengthy interactions often provided the 
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historical and political context of their work (which added to the richness of 
information), before focusing on the Fund arrangements. 
 
Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were carried out. A semi-
structured interview is characterised by “predetermined questions” whose 
order and content can be modified according to the investigator‟s perception 
of appropriateness (Robson 2002).  This format gives flexibility to both the 
interviewee (to elaborate on answers and themes they consider relevant) and 
the interviewer (to clarify responses, and omit or add additional questions). 
These interviews were held with the help of an interview guide that was 
developed prior to commencing the second phase of field studies and 
subsequently modified with each round of interviews taken. The draft guide is 
included as annexure in appendix 1. The questions were open ended to 
avoid limiting the field of enquiry and enable respondents to answer at length 
and in detail. Since the nature and scope of the research was very broad, 
analysing the „partnership‟ culture at three levels, a diverse range of actors 
were interviewed. Hence, the interview guide only served the purpose of 
suggesting broad themes of interaction and its contents were modified 
according to the constituency the respondents represented and their 
involvement with the Fund arrangements. In addition, on many instances 
(particularly at the intervention sites) I had informal discussions with the 
respondents, often in groups of two or three.  These unstructured interviews 
were relevant since the nature of enquiry not only focused on the national or 
state level partnership arrangements but also the intervention: its history, 
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operational issues, infrastructure and institutional mechanisms, targets, 
tensions, reporting and monitoring, and other issues that the respondents 
wanted to flag. Robson (2002) describes the unstructured approach as an 
informal interaction where “the interviewer has a general area of interest and 
concern but allows for the conversation to develop” and issues to emerge. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the interviewees were identified using a purposive 
approach and snowball technique. Purposive sampling refers to a process by 
which respondents are intentionally selected with the purpose of generating 
information that is relevant to the outlined aims and objectives (Green and 
Thorogood 2004). It entails selecting respondents for known characteristics 
(May 1997) such as the sector they represent, the level of seniority and so 
on. Unlike the sampling strategies adopted in quantitative enquiry embedded 
in the positivist paradigm, these are not determined by statistical 
representativeness (Britten 1995). The research aimed at capturing a broad 
range of perspectives on the practices of partnerships and also how different 
constituencies (government, non-government, and corporate) viewed these 
arrangements and their role in developing them.  In order to generate this 
information from multiple perspectives, respondents (who were often not 
known to me) from across these sectors had to be interviewed. Hence, the 
snowball technique where key informants or other respondents suggested 
other key stakeholders who were crucial to the development or functioning of 
the public-private arrangements (of the Fund) in India was used. The choice 
of interviewees was guided by two aspects: First, at the macro and meso 
 153 
level the main unit of analysis was organisations that were part of these 
arrangements (as national recipients or sub recipients, members of civil 
society consortia and others). Hence, the interviewees were often the senior 
members of the organisation and the programme team. In most cases, a 
separate team (comprising of managers, officers and coordinators) and 
project office was dedicated to the Global Fund rounds. These acted as the 
interview site. Second, actors (within organisations or independent) who had 
a significant role to play in how the partnership processes developed or 
unfolded were individually pursued. Often these names emerged in the 
interviews and informal discussions held with respondents. Respondents 
identified through these two techniques were directly involved with the Fund 
arrangements and/ or some stage of the „partnership‟ cycle: its development, 
execution, or review.  
 
The interviews were conducted face to face, in person, either individually or 
in groups of two or three. The first few interviewees were people I had 
contact with through my work prior to starting PhD. Among these, two 
interviewees (each representing the government and the non-government 
sector) were immensely useful in putting me in contact with key stakeholders. 
These interactions provided important background information and policy 
developments that shaped my ideas. They were kept informed on my 
progress through emails as I further developed the research idea. As 
mentioned in the research journey (section 3.5.3), they also facilitated the 
interview process at the sub-national level by issuing a letter to the 
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respective State authorities requesting (or rather commanding) support for 
my research. Hence, conducting the initial interviews was an easy and 
insightful process.   
 
All the interviewees were contacted through email (and phone calls) and sent 
the relevant information on the research beforehand (See section 3.6 for a 
discussion on Ethics). In some cases, as and when requested, the interview 
guide and concept note was also sent. The response rate of those contacted 
was extremely good. Only one person in the government, the Director 
General of NACO explicitly refused to meet or be interviewed in spite of 
several emails and phone calls. All other potential respondents agreed to an 
interview. On few occasions, while the potential participants agreed for an 
interview in principle, it did not materialise due to time constraints on their 
side. This was particularly the case for the bilateral and multi lateral partners 
given their travel schedules. 
 
3.5.5 Information management and analysis 
Interviews were recorded through a voice recorder. Permission for recording 
was sought in the introductory letter, consent form, as well as prior to the 
interview. I explained to the interviewees that the sole purpose of recording 
was to ensure reliability and minimise information loss. In some contexts, 
particularly at the intervention sites, I did not consider recording appropriate 
since the interviewees (health providers) were carrying out their routine jobs 
which included counselling and other routine check-ups. Recording these 
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interactions did not seem ethical as it involved vulnerable individuals who 
were outside the remit of the study. Here, I took detailed notes in the register. 
Some local units / centres (such as network of people with AIDS) had 
maintained internal safeguards with regards to information sharing and 
disclosure. There was a sense of scepticism and insecurity on how the 
information regarding the project outcomes (that was obtained through their 
records) could be misused.   
 
After each interview, I read through my notes (which I took irrespective of 
whether or not the interview was recorded) and marked issues that required 
further probing and my impressions of how the interview process had gone. 
Subsequently, I personally transcribed all the recorded interviews. This was a 
very time consuming process since majority of the interviews were longer 
than an hour. Hence, selective transcription i.e. transcription relevant to the 
themes of analysis and development of the narrative was undertaken to save 
time.  
 
Like in most qualitative research, the analytical process began during data 
collection wherein the information gathered is analysed and shapes the tools 
and subsequent collection process (Pope et al. 2000). The process of 
“sequential and interim analysis” (Miles and Huberman 1984) has already 
been indicated in the illustration under the earlier section on Information 
generation (page 18). This strategy has the advantage of allowing the 
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investigator to re-visit and refine questions and pursue emerging areas of 
inquiry in greater depth (Pope et al. 2000).   
 
This research adopts an inductive (constructionist) approach to analysis. 
According to this approach, analytic categories used to describe and explain 
the social phenomena under study emerge from the data rather than being 
defined a priori through a framework approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Charmaz 2006). However, the broad themes included in the interview guide 
were informed by theoretical perspectives on power and literature on 
networks and partnership arrangements, thus introducing a deductive 
element to the study design. Coast (1999) argues for a combination of these 
two approaches to obtain in-depth insights as one complements the other. 
The format and the content of the interview guide were broad enough to 
accommodate unfamiliar terms, themes, and ideas. 
 
The analytical process involved the following steps: familiarisation with the 
data, development of themes and categories, mapping of the range and 
nature of phenomena, analytic induction i.e. iterative testing and re-testing of 
theoretical ideas on the data (Bloor 1978), and development of narratives. 
 
First, information generated both formally (transcripts and field notes) and 
informally (surroundings, policy debates, other media) was assimilated and 
gone over several times to identify the main thematic categories. For 
example, a recurrent theme identified was: the tensions (and competition) 
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between the government and non-government intervention sites that were 
meant to operate in collaboration. The interviews were then mapped for the 
relevant information around the theme. A narrative approach was adopted 
wherein the emerging theme formed the description of the narratives that 
were written as „emerging stories‟. These stories centred on particular 
incidents or themes such as types of behaviour or nature of relations 
between the partners, and were particularly useful in making „sense‟ of the 
information. Using constant comparison method (Charmaz 2006) I continued 
to examine the narratives for additional links, commonalities and contrasting 
perspectives and account for those in the final case studies. By adopting this 
approach I was attempting to develop a coherent interpretation or picture of 
the whole „story‟ by bringing together and understanding the different 
narratives scattered across the information assembled. The final process of 
writing up the narrative also brought together (triangulated) different 
information sources, and adopted an iterative process of testing and retesting 
of theoretical ideas and assumptions (analytic induction) and making general 
inferences. These narratives were subsequently used to present the 
research findings in the later chapters. 
 
3.5.6 Quality 
Evaluating rigour and quality in qualitative research and the most appropriate 
means to do so has been a pressing issue by the evidence-based medicine 
movement (Carter and Little 2007) and within the social science research 
community. The issue of „reproducability‟ i.e. the extent to which the findings 
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or the explanations of the “truth” can be reproduced in another setting (or by 
another researcher) has been crucial to qualitative research (Green and 
Thorogood 2004). The case study approach in particular has been criticised 
for its “microscopic” view and inability to generate findings that can be 
generalised to other settings, given the small number of „cases‟ it deals with. 
Moreover, as Pawson and Tilley (1997) suggest, as the descriptive baselines 
of a case increase, its „representativeness‟ reduces. This, as argued, further 
affects the possibility of generalising the findings to other situations. 
 
Harrison et al. (2001) on the other hand argue that some of these concerns 
can be dispelled by a conscientious collection of data about the case, its 
context, processes, and an adequate analysis. Likewise, Yin (1994) 
proposes that general applicability arises from the methodological qualities of 
the case and the rigour with which the case is constructed. He further points 
out that in a case study methodology, generalisation of results is made to 
theory (analytical generalisation) and not to populations (statistical 
generalisation) (ibid). In line with this view, this study seeks to achieve 
conceptual or theoretical generalisability for a similar set of arrangements 
and structures in operation.  
 
In order to establish the “domain to which a study‟s findings can be 
generalised” (Yin 2003: 34), and ensure dependability, transferability, and 
credibility, which according to Denzin and Lincoln (2007) and Lincoln and 
Guba (2000) substitute reliability and internal or external validity in qualitative 
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research, I pursued some of the actions suggested by Yin (2003) and 
Silverman (1998). A conscious effort was made to transcend checklists and 
be systematic in planning, implementing and reviewing the research process. 
The process has endeavoured to be inclusive, reflective and flexible to 
encompass the diversity that exists in qualitative research practice. Possible 
regional differences were taken into account by selecting cases in different 
states and urban/ rural districts among those demarcated as high 
prevalence.   
 
The constructionist epistemology significantly shaped the methodology 
adopted in the study and, thus the analysis of the information generated. I 
maintained a comprehensive account of the information generated and the 
analytical process followed. Multiple sources of information were used and 
triangulated to develop analytic case narratives. In line with this, detailed 
records of my experience in the field, observation of meetings were 
maintained and used as important data source in analysis. Concurrently, 
combining data generated from observations, in-depth interviews, group 
interviews and participants‟ reflections on their transcript has served dual 
purpose- enriching information and checking for accuracy. 
 
3.6. Ethical considerations 
A policy or systems focussed research is perceived to have less severe 
consequences posed to individuals as compared to bio-medical research 
undertaken with patients or end users. However, there are important issues 
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of power and control that may impact on individual‟s dignity (Cassell 1980) 
and professional conduct. This research demanded particular attention to 
ethics not only for its potential impact, direct or indirect, for the well-being of 
individuals but also the process related issues arising from interactions 
between the researcher and the researched. 
 
The work of feminists and other critical ethnographers have been crucial in 
highlighting the ways in which various identities- professional (work 
experience) and personal (with respect to gender, ethnicity and race) - might 
influence and shape research encounters, processes, and outcomes (Gould 
2004, Mohammad 2001). In section 3.5.3 where I describe the enablers and 
disablers of my research process, I briefly engage with my position as an 
activist-researcher (from my earlier leanings) and the merits and demerits of 
being an „outsider‟ in the organisation of the Fund, the object of analysis. 
These aspects had a significant role in how I, as „the‟ researcher, was read 
and interpreted by the research participants and therefore, a subject of 
ethical consideration that required reflection throughout the research 
process. This ongoing negotiation of ethics which, as Harper (2007) 
suggests, involves moving between a number of sites and subject positions, 
of the researcher and the researched, in practice is a clear disjuncture from 
the tick-box approach adopted by research ethics committees. Rooted in 
strict bio-medical and bio-ethics perspective, the latter is argued to underplay 
i) the significance of researcher‟s life experiences, ideological affiliations, and 
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complex identities (Hopkins 2007) and ii) the lived experience of 
phenomenon in specific contexts. 
 
In line with this view, a careful consideration of ethical issues was made prior 
to the primary research based on which, approval was sought from the 
Research Ethics Committee of the Queen Margaret University. Working 
towards an ethical approval, however, demanded a stated allegiance to the 
four basic primafacie tenets upheld in health research: Autonomy (ensured 
by informed consent and confidentiality and avoiding deceit on the purpose 
of the research); Beneficence and non-maleficence (the objective being to 
improve interventions and minimise harm to the vulnerable populations); and 
Justice. Standard research protocols were followed to provide information on 
the purpose of the research (Refer appendix 2), and ensure consent and 
confidentiality for all respondents (Refer appendix 3). These protocols are 
expected to reduce the possibility of harm arising from comments, opinions 
and criticisms of senior colleagues, partner organisations and others. The 
process of collection of information, its analysis and write up, however 
revealed several ethical moments divorced from these ideals of research.  
 
Firstly, the extent of honesty and transparency regarding research objectives 
as implied through the information sheet to participants is questionable given 
the changing nature of inquiry during the research process. Such a practice 
assumes that the researcher, especially in ethnographic research, knows 
precisely the potential direction or outcome of the research process (Harper 
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2007, Kelly 2003). Despite their limitations in mirroring the research content, 
these protocols served an important purpose in the project initiation phase. 
Given the exposure of the Fund bureaucrats and brokers to the technical and 
bio-medical perspectives in which ethical debates are grounded, most of the 
research participants in both public and private sector agencies demanded 
the “information sheet” or “concept note” prior to the meeting. 
 
Secondly, these protocols are restricted to the researched. Conducting 
observations and interviews in health care (clinical) settings often implied the 
providers were interviewed while they undertook their routine clinical and 
administrative duties such as counselling, consulting or diagnosing patients, 
and administering drugs. Interviews were often held in informal settings often 
in the presence of the beneficiaries i.e. people with HIV or other staff who 
were not part of the study. Given the nature of the provider-user interactions 
and the chaos at the public hospitals, ensuring an informed consent of these 
passive research participants (who were not directly related to the research) 
was not possible. Here, care was taken to reduce the potential harm (and 
maintain the autonomy of this group) by not digitally recording the interviews, 
taking photographs of the interaction or by informally sharing the broad 
perspective on the study, which was still in the process of getting defined. 
Another ethical moment emerged during the interactions with the people with 
HIV, not as beneficiaries but as providers of a service and sub-recipients of 
the Fund grant. These active members of the Fund organisation, which has 
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various forms of denials built into its structure (Cohen 2001), fear inquiry into 
the everyday practice of political expediency.  
 
Thirdly, as with traditional ethnography, access by an „outsider‟ in health care 
research is heavily dependent on researcher‟s prior relations with the host 
case study (Pettigrew 1997), the degree of trust established, and the 
participant‟s status and authority. In other words, contacts with influential 
insiders shaped the staff readiness to give time simply because they wished 
to please their superiors. Often, this resulted in discontent within junior staff 
who were deputed to accompany me at the expense of their duties and 
workload. In order not to add to their workload and without undermining the 
senior officer‟s authority, on suitable occasions, I would relieve the junior staff 
ensuring that the seniors remained unaware of the arrangement.    
 
Fourthly, the main concern with regards to ethics emerged during the writing 
stage. Ethical codes and guidelines seem insufficient with respect to 
questions around where the researcher‟s primary obligation lies while the 
researcher grapples with the potential harm caused to the people if 
information is suppressed vis-a-vis the damage to the careers of certain 
individuals. Although attempts were made throughout to ensure 
confidentiality, the scale of interventions, and the nature and area of 
investigation (the Fund programmes implemented in partnership between the 
government and the civil society) renders it difficult to invisibilise the 
organisations/ players involved. Names of respondents have not been used 
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when presenting their quotes. However, a good understanding of the Fund 
organisation in India and the actors involved might reveal the identities of 
certain research participants and individuals who have been crucial when 
negotiating access with gatekeepers and making arrangements to interview. 
A conscious decision was also made to identify the few senior bureaucrats 
who did not agree to be interviewed since it provided insights into important 
dimensions of the research and enabled an analysis of authority in 
hierarchies. 
3.7 Literature review 
A systematic and iterative approach was taken to review the literature related 
to the main concepts presented and discussed in the thesis: Public private 
partnerships and global health initiatives, GFATM, and power.  
 
The purpose of the review was to enable a critical understanding on i) the 
historical shifts in health care delivery and financing and the evolution of 
public private partnerships ii) the discourses (and the theoretical foundations 
backing them) on the basis of which current partnership approaches/models 
are designed, and iii) different theoretical approaches and explanations of 
power and the extent to which power is examined in the analysis of health 
policy and reforms. Finally, the review was also undertaken to present and 
discuss the current debates on PPP at both global and local level, 
summarise the key issues emerging from the country level experience of the 
Global Fund, and identify public and hidden transcripts from the published 
and unpublished literature.   
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In order to meet these objectives, a comprehensive review of the literature 
was carried out. First, an initial search for the historical beginnings and 
trends of „partnership‟ was made so that the theoretical foundations upon 
which it emerged could be identified. Here terms such as “public private”, 
“partnership”, “mix”, “collaboration” and “interactions” were used to identify 
relevant material. Next, text book literature on these different disciplines was 
reviewed. The searching strategy involved: consulting of new institutional 
economics, organisational studies, public administration and health 
governance literature through text books and papers; following up of relevant 
material in reference lists of books and papers reviewed; consulting with 
experts in the area; and consulting of some internet sources (WHO – 
www.who.int and the World Bank – www.worldbank.org). A similar exercise 
was undertaken to get familiar with the literature on “power” and its analysis 
in health policy.   
 
The first step for the review was the QMU library catalogue and e-journal 
database, following which, SCOPUS, PubMed and other databases were 
used. These databases were searched for refereed journals, books and 
chapters, manuscripts, and conference papers. Published articles that were 
deemed to be opinion pieces, editorials, and reviews were also included.  
The unpublished or grey literature was accessed using search engines such 
as Google and visiting websites of global health initiatives and other 
organisations/ newsletters such as Avert, ODI and Global Fund Observer, 
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which monitor their progress. eTheses and EThOS were other repositories 
accessed (and found useful) for PhD thesis produced by students at QMU as 
well as other institutions in UK.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In order to meet the objectives set out in the introductory chapter, this 
research combines the methodological approach of critical ethnography and 
an analytic narrative style case study. In this chapter I justify the research 
design and engage with its key elements: epistemology, theory, 
methodology, and methods while presenting a reflective account of the 
research journey followed to undertake a multi-level analysis of PPPs. The 
subsequent chapters discuss the findings of the research.  
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Chapter 4 
Understanding the contingencies of practice and 
plurality of perspectives 
 
“There is no such thing as equal partners. In any partnership, not just with 
government, even with others, we are always made to feel as the „dalit‟ [the 
untouchable]” – a „partner‟ NGO 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters I discuss the different theoretical perspectives on 
partnerships and network arrangements and clarify my methodological 
approach to the research. I argue that the literature on partnerships gives 
little attention to the tensions between the global discourse and local 
practices of PPP and the role of structure and discourse in shaping the 
practice of these arrangements. Chapter 3 highlights the deficit in the 
evidence base on policy approach, which ignores the interface between the 
macro, meso and micro levels. Drawing on the primary research, the 
following three chapters address this gap by focusing on the interaction 
between global institutions and structures, policy environment and processes 
and their local outcomes. The findings are presented as an “embedded” tale 
(Rossi 2004) that reflects on the wider historical, political, and socio-
economic context while presenting a “thick description” of local 
developments. 
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This chapter engages with the country level processes and polytheism of 
practices resulting from the Fund grant and briefly discusses its possible 
implications for local management of the HIV and AIDS programme. Two 
inter-related aspects are examined: Firstly, the “contingencies of practice” of 
Fund arrangements (and public private interactions), i.e. how alliances are 
formed and how new structures are produced and sustained in an intensely 
competitive environment, and secondly, the emerging disjuncture between 
the global discourse and social reality. Amidst disjuncture, I seek to address 
the “plurality of perspectives” (Mosse 2004b:80): the current challenges 
faced by the actors and the rationalising narratives generated around them.   
 
Corresponding to the above objectives, the chapter is divided into two main 
sections: first, I examine partnership formation and management i.e. the 
processes and purpose with which organisations come together, the kind of 
arrangements they enter into and the structures they create. Here, I describe 
in detail the governmentality of the Fund (objective 2.1). Coined by Michel 
Foucault, the term governmentality - „deliberations, strategies, tactics, and 
devices employed by authorities for acting upon a population to ensure good‟ 
- has been variously interpreted. As argued by Rose (1996: 328), there is an 
emergence of “a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to govern... 
through regulated choices made by autonomous actors in the context of their 
particular commitments to families and communities”. Taking a broad view, I 
refer to governmentatlity as the organised practices (rationalities, ideologies, 
techniques, protocols) through which subjects are governed. Hence, the 
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object of analysis in this chapter is: the structures and institutions set up for 
the Fund, their constitution and functioning, and the practices enabled by 
these structures. I also discuss the role of the intermediary actors or the 
“Fund brokers” in mediating the different worlds of the global discourse and 
local contexts (objective 2.2). The second section of this chapter relates to 
partnership dynamics and disruption. Here, I analyse the lives of the 
structures and the textures and tensions of their operation through two case 
studies which capture the power dynamics between different stakeholders, 
the resulting friction at the implementation sites, and the structural factors 
underpinning these phenomena. The two case studies elucidate two different 
sets of public private interactions: between government and non-profit NGO 
constituency, and between the government and the business or corporate 
sector. 
 
4.2 Partnership Formation and Management 
4.2.1 Description of application and grant making process 
The Board of the Fund holds a funding „round‟ every nine to twelve months. 
The round begins with a call to invite countries to submit a grant proposal for 
the three focal diseases. This annual bidding process presents itself as an 
opportunity for various stakeholders to enter into new relationships, form new 
entities and participate in the national level policy processes. It also facilitates 
movement of leading international organisations into India and large national 
organisations from other fields into the HIV and AIDS industry.  Stakeholders 
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representing diverse constituencies (and organisations) come together into 
arrangements referred to as „partnerships‟. The entire process of bidding, 
identifying projects and partners, putting together a country proposal and 
subsequently submission to the Fund is coordinated by the country 
coordinating mechanism (CCM), which as described in chapter one (section 
1.3.4), is responsible for overseeing the application process and progress 
during the implementation phase (GFATM 2007a).  
 
The country proposal is often developed by paid consultants, individuals who 
are believed to have the ability and expertise to work effectively in the 
context of extensive and complex application procedures. These individuals 
are sought out and much of the grant preparation process is turned over to 
them. The resulting proposal passes through several rounds of closed door 
and informal negotiations that bypass formal structures and channels like the 
CCM. In the process, certain intermediary actors or „brokers‟ become key to 
successful bids and applications. Similar to the observation made by 
Bierschenk and colleagues, these actors (individuals and organisations) who 
specialise in “the acquisition, control, and re-distribution of funds”, play a 
crucial role in the “irresistible hunt for projects” and in managing the diverse 
interests (Bierschenk et al. 2002:4). The final country proposal is then ratified 
by the CCM, often within hours, and usually handed in person in order to 
meet the deadline to the Global Fund secretariat in Geneva (Interview notes).  
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The country proposals are reviewed and assessed by the Technical Review 
Panel of the Fund and a decision is made. Once the country proposal is 
approved, the grant is given to the principal recipient/s (PR), the institution 
legally and primarily responsible for receiving, distributing, and monitoring the 
funds to implement programmes. The PR is often a government department 
or agency although increasingly a private organisation (an NGO) is taking up 
that role. In India, until Round four, the Ministry of Finance was the main PR 
with NACO9 as the operating PR. In the subsequent rounds, NGOs and 
educational institutes have played a similar role along with NACO. A list of 
PRs for the Fund rounds is provided in table 5 in section 3.1 of this chapter. 
Each grant is approved for an initial period of two years, following which a 
rigorous assessment of the progress is made. Based on a satisfactory report 
and recommendation by the assessor, the grant is renewed for a further 
three years.  
 
4.2.2 Governmentality of the Fund 
The governance model adopted by the Fund for its country operations 
includes: i) the board or the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), 
generally comprised of a broad range of stakeholders who represent diverse 
constituencies. These include the centre and state government, civil society 
including faith based organisations and people affected with the disease, 
development partners- bilateral/ multilaterals, private business sector and 
                                                 
9
 As described in Chapter 1, NACO is an acronym for National AIDS Control Organisation, a division 
of the MoHFW and the nodal agency for formulation and implementation of HIV and AIDS policy in 
India. It operates through 35 state specific HIV/AIDS prevention and control societies. 
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medical associations, and academic/ research institutions, ii) the Secretariat 
responsible for the management, and iii) the Local Fund Agent (LFA), 
usually a private agency, assigned as an independent auditor to oversee 
progress and verify information submitted by the grantees on the basis of 
which, grant is renewed. Consulting firms such as Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, KPMG and institutions like the Bank and UNOPS have served as 
LFA in different recipient countries. The role and experience of the LFA is 
further examined in chapter six. An interaction of the above structures, as 
depicted by the India CCM is shown in figure 7. 
 
 
Source: India CCM website 
Figure 7: Governmentality of the Fund (Structures and relationships) 
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4.2.2.1 India CCM 
In accordance with the eligibility criteria of the Fund, the India CCM was set 
up in 2002. This was soon after the launch of the Fund at the G8 summit in 
Okinawa and the first announcement of its call for proposals in January 2002. 
A respondent who was actively involved in the initial setting up process, both 
at the global level in Geneva and in India, described the process as follows: 
 
“The closing date for the proposals was February 28, 2002. Hence, all 
proposals [at the country level] were to be in by the 22nd. In order to meet this 
deadline, the MoH [ministry of health] put together 16 names to get the CCM 
going, ...[these were] mainly friends of friends.” 
 
History, Constitution, and Representation 
The ad-hoc manner in which the CCM was initially set up and the 
arbitrariness of its ongoing proceedings was a recurrent theme of concern in 
all interactions had with non state actors. At this stage, the CCM primarily 
comprised of the NACO and representatives of central and state government 
who presided over the meetings and had voting rights. The representation of 
the civil society was minimal and tokenistic, restricted to two NGOs who were 
engaged in HIV prevention and care programmes with partial assistance 
from the government. Chaired by the health Secretary, this committee 
submitted the first India proposal to the global secretariat. 
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“We didn‟t have a clue on how we entered the CCM. But once we were in we 
felt stupid because partnership means getting other people involved. We 
were supposed to be representing all the NGOs in the drug field. So we had 
to actually start developing partnerships in order to not feel guilty about it.”  
(Former CCM member, NGO representative) 
 
The first civil society consultation was held in August 2002 on the initiative of 
an independent agency, which emerged from the „Massive Effort Campaign‟ 
launched in Switzerland in 2001. With its India office set up primarily to 
“catalyze the emergence of a global movement against AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria” (website), the agency played both communicative and 
facilitative roles in orienting or “sensitising” (Rossi 2006) the different 
stakeholders to the Fund processes and enabling negotiations between 
them. For this purpose, a series of workshops was organised with assistance 
from the Global Fund regional directors, one of which focused on the role, 
structure, and function of the CCM. However, as a key informant reported, 
“the GOI and its related departments for HIV and TB were absent in all these 
consultations”. The informant attributed their absence to either the “we know 
enough, others need to be oriented” attitude prevalent among the 
government bureaucrats or a sense of threat they had begun to face with the 
increased involvement of the civil society.  
 
Several such orientations, at national and sub-national levels, were held at 
the behest of international agencies to enhance familiarity with the fund 
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processes and criteria, encourage participation of the corporate sector and 
NGOs, and ensure successful country level applications. These meetings 
acted as sites for “sensitisation” of the senior management of predominantly 
the non state actors into the prevailing discourse on the Fund (establishing 
the relevance of the global crisis and the partnership mode of working), 
encouraging them to “express their problems in conformity” with it 
(Bierschenk 1988). These orientations also emerged as an opportunity for 
the national NGOs and networks to mobilise and form alliances to lobby for 
greater representation in the CCM and to receive direct funds from the Fund 
as co-principal recipient to the government.  
 
In early 2004, following an evaluation of the CCM commissioned by the 
Global Fund, the Fund brokers and bureaucrats10 were quick to translate the 
findings into the „policy need-of-the-hour‟ to enable a more formalised and 
„representative‟ constitution. By this time significant mobilisation had 
occurred among the non-state actors. International organisations had set up 
their operations in India, a few large national organisations working on 
general or reproductive health had begun to chart the AIDS landscape, and 
there was a growing interest of local champions in the Fund processes. The 
sensitisation set off at the CCM or national level was being reproduced at 
sub-national levels and as a result, network formations of people with HIV, 
facilitated by their international counterparts, were demanding a stake in the 
                                                 
10
 The term Fund bureaucrat is used for the employees of the structures/institutions set up exclusively 
for the execution of the Global Fund grant in India. These structures – the CCM, the CCM secretariat 
and the Local Fund Agents- are discussed in section 4.2.2. Although these actors are also regarded as 
Fund brokers, the latter is an eclectic group comprising implementers and those affecting the 
governance of the Fund from outside.  
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process and challenging the legitimacy of the existing members. This led to 
friction among non-state actors as apparent in the quote below. 
 
“Because we were chosen [as a CCM member], there was a great problem. 
There were many rivalries...Somewhere in 2004 AIDS alliance formed an 
entire group of NGOs and started challenging… At a meeting [they asked] 
„How did you guys enter the CCM? How can one NGO in Delhi represent the 
entire country? Now we must choose from different regions, zones.‟ There 
was no thought given to the process at all.” (Former CCM member, NGO 
representative) 
 
However, the Fund‟s emphasis on greater involvement of the civil society 
and an expanding lobby of “sensitised” government and non-government 
bureaucrats stimulated three subsequent meetings that were hosted by the 
government in 2003 and 2004. The informal meetings revealed two 
noteworthy developments with regards to the grant making process in India. 
Firstly, when the CCM was reconstituted in early 2004, the president of a 
prominent network of people with HIV was elected as the vice-chair of the 
CCM. Secondly, for the first time a NGO was nominated as the second 
principal recipient (alongside NACO, the government recipient) for the 
national AIDS component of the Fund grant. The civil society representation 
however, still fell short of the Fund mandate. 
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In 2006 the Global Fund launched its guidelines for CCM. The board required 
the CCM to have: i) a balanced composition ensuring adequate 
representation of stakeholders, and ii) formal documentation of the process 
to ensure transparency in the selection of non-government representation. A 
restructuring plan for the India CCM was developed with a view to ensuring 
compliance to the board requirements (CCM Secretariat 2006). According to 
the Secretariat coordinator, a “sophisticated process of web based selection” 
was employed under the guidance of a CCM sub-committee, comprising 
mainly of government and donor representatives. The official rationale for 
this process was that members be selected by their own constituency, 
although the rule applied only to the NGO constituency, whereas the 
induction of other members continued in a non-transparent manner. The 
process involves formation of an electorate by inviting NGOs, which meet the 
criteria set out in the Fund guidelines, to register online. Once the documents 
are verified and an electorate formed, the members are asked to self 
nominate as representatives to the CCM. This is followed by an online voting 
procedure to identify the civil society representative on the CCM.  
 
This selection process is facilitated by an external agency (Global Policy 
Alliance for the first reconstitution and UNAIDS for the second) in 
coordination with the CCM Secretariat. Although the model was designed to 
ensure democratic nomination/election of members, the process was fraught 
with problems. The medium of electronic voting was reported to exclude local 
and community based organisations working with people with HIV in remote 
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districts. Organisations operating locally or with small funding were 
particularly excluded since they did not meet the criteria of structure and 
scale, measured primarily through the turnover. Although the research 
participants interviewed regarded the system of nominations necessary, 
many were unaware of the modalities while some also referred to incidents of 
proxy voting.   
 
 “Eight NGOs were identified and 122 were to elect them… I think the 122 
are not members, nor are they on the board….I like the concept [online 
voting] very much. You apply for membership. Once you are approved, then 
your name will be put up for selection, I don‟t know by who or how”. (An 
elected member) 
 
“I think it was a very democratic process although it was a little surprising that 
somebody had already cast a vote on our behalf. My vote was already there, 
even before I logged in”. (An elected member) 
 
A second round of restructuring was held in 2007 since only four out of eight 
seats allocated for the civil society were filled on completion of the earlier 
round. However, this time the process was facilitated by UNAIDS which, at 
this point, also hosted (and was responsible for the functioning of) the 
Secretariat of the India CCM. The shift, as shared by a key informant, was in 
the light of the arbitrariness of the previous voting exercise. This attempt also 
failed to fill up the vacant posts. A key informant attributed this failure to poor 
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management of the process and the proximity of the Secretariat to the 
conducting agency. Commenting on the process the informant observed 
“There was no arbitrator, the conductor became the judge. As a result, there 
was significant time gap between the announcement, election, and final 
results.” 
 
Despite two failed attempts to fill the eight civil society seats in the CCM, 
narratives of the Fund bureaucrats unequivocally upheld the democratic and 
inclusive nature of the selection process crediting the Fund for “enabling civil 
society participation at such a prominent scale at the national level” (Notes 
from informal discussions).  
 
Decision-making and information asymmetries 
Despite the growing numbers of the civil society members, the national AIDS 
agency or NACO was regarded as having a dominating role and presence in 
the CCM. The figure below presents a constituency-wise breakdown of the 
CCM in 2007. Given the constant restructuring of the CCM and the censoring 
of information on the minutes of the proceedings available online, compilation 
of this information was difficult. The exercise, however, revealed the loose 
configuration and high turnover of membership, particularly within the public 
sector since bureaucrats were either represented by their subordinates or 
their successor (on two years tenure). The impact of the frequent turnover of 
the public sector employees is discussed further in section 7.4.3. 
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Source: Compiled from minutes of the CCM meeting 
Figure 8: Composition of India CCM 
 
Figure 8 reflects an imbalanced representation among the constituencies. 
Due to a reported conflict between two powerful business foundations (for a 
membership in the CCM), the corporate/ industry seats were vacant. 
However, senior management of Price Waterhouse Coopers were among the 
invited members who did not have voting rights.  
 
In view of the skewed representation, clear information asymmetries were 
reported. The inclusion of NGO members in the CCM did not transpire into 
treating them at par with other members given the well-defined authority of 
„expertise‟ within the CCM. Reflecting on the lop-sided constitution of the 
governing board and consequently the decision making processes, a 
respondent observed: 
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“If you take the two principles: one vote per entity and conflict of interest into 
account, decision making is clearly lopsided. Government occupies 18 of 34 
seats through its various entities. Academia is also represented by 
government owned institutions. So, people who are voting and leading 
discussions are the government…The NGOs have strings attached to them 
as majority receive funds from the government. The externals like UN 
agencies, WHO, and bilateral could balance but among them there is clear 
dissonance between what is said at the headquarter level and actions by 
their counterparts at the country level.” (Senior Fund bureaucrat) 
 
Clear information asymmetries were observed with respect to notifying dates 
of meetings, selecting members, identifying proposals and defining 
programme priorities. Most NGO respondents reported the arbitrariness and 
non-transparency within these procedures. Independent technical review 
committees set up for reviewing applications and proposals were reported as 
dominated by bilateral/multilateral organisations like the USAID, DFID, the 
Bank and the UN agencies, leaving little scope for participation of NGOs.  
 
“It [call for proposals] is very erratic. Earlier it was advertised around the 
deadline for submission. Even now the advertising is very late. They will 
suddenly say whoever wants to apply should submit and that too not 
everyone will be made aware of.”  (Sub recipient NGO, former CCM 
member) 
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Processes of agenda setting and decision making too were firmly grounded 
in these professionalized and hierarchical settings where power was wielded 
through the control of information and exclusion of the members further down 
in the chain of command.  
 
“...Conflict of interest operates differently for different groups. For instance, 
when our application was being discussed at the CCM, we were asked to 
leave the proceedings…no one questioned NACOs presence at the meeting 
although they were also bidding for the proposal.” (Senior management, 
Principal recipient) 
 
“As partners we had to start CCC [care centre]. They[NACO] want it 10 
bedded, they tell us the place where to have it, they pass a rent of 4000/- 
when in reality it is 30000/- pm. They call all the „experts‟ together, sit in air 
conditioned rooms, earn in dollars and draft something which makes no 
sense. What makes them think people will work for this? There is no such 
thing as equal partners. In any partnership, not just with government, even 
with others, we are always made to feel as the „dalit‟ [the untouchable].”  
(NGO sub-recipient, former CCM member) 
 
Most respondents representing the NGO constituency were unaware of the 
country programme focus and ongoing interventions as part of the grant. 
They expressed disconnect between the official purpose and the actual 
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functioning of the CCM, particularly in relation to its role in monitoring and 
„overseeing‟, which was regarded negligible. 
 
“I have been in the CCM for well over a year. I don‟t know the activities that 
are happening across the country. I don‟t see a consolidated picture, 
probably that could be because we haven‟t been there from the beginning.” 
(CCM member, NGO representative) 
 
“For a meeting [to ratify the proposal] at 3pm, proposals are received at 1pm. 
How do you respond? ….The document is not 30 or 40 pages. It runs into so 
many pages and there is so much of back referencing. If the proposal has to 
reach Geneva by the 2nd, CCM meeting is held on the 29th of previous month. 
Then you are told if you don‟t endorse it now, how will we submit? GFATM 
asks for 50 copies or something online and a few hard copies. So, half a day 
goes in printing. Each time a person has to be flown to Geneva to make sure 
that the 3pm deadline is met.”  (Senior Fund bureaucrat) 
 
4.2.2.2 The Secretariat  
Some of the problems with regards to the functioning of the CCM were 
attributed to a dysfunctional secretariat.  
 
In September 2005, an independent India CCM secretariat was set up. Prior 
to this it was located within NACO.  The secretariat is staffed with a 
coordinator who, under the supervision of the Joint Secretary of Health and 
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Family Welfare, is responsible for smooth management and operation of the 
CCM. The remit of the coordinator is very broad. It includes: management of 
CCM processes, technical and organisational support to the committees, 
facilitation of performance oversight by the CCM, liaison with the various 
levels of the Fund bureaucracy in India (Local fund agent, and government 
and non government PRs). Additionally, it is responsible for tracking the 
downward disbursement of funds i.e. from the Fund Secretariat to the 
principal and sub-recipients, and upward financial and physical reporting 
(CCM Secretariat, TOR 2008). The Terms of Reference also explicates the 
facilitative role of the coordinator in preparation of position and policy papers 
on key public health aspects of HIV and AIDS, TB and Malaria epidemics. 
The public transcript of the Fund bureaucracy, therefore, regards the 
secretariat as the nodal agency accountable for the management of the Fund 
bureaucratic as well as institutions in India. Given its pivotal role in the Fund 
operations, the secretariat came under critical scrutiny in the interactions with 
research participants.   
 
“It [the secretariat] is ad-hoc...used to be pretty much the baby of NACO. 
Other two diseases [malaria and tuberculosis] did not have access or control 
over it. It excluded all interactions with other stakeholders. When it came out 
of NACO into UNAIDS in 2007 it was like jumping from the frying pan to the 
fire. The situation worsened despite very efficient coordinators in place.”  
(Key Informant 4) 
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“If we adhere to the governance model of the Fund, the secretariat should do 
the business of the fund in India. But it is a goof up, the coordinator is treated 
like a clerk. They are told to get the job done: letters to be written, minutes to 
be taken, postage to be stamped. The CCM should be functioning like the 
board and supervise the Secretariat. But the members consider it as their 
baby, neither do the job nor delegate it.”  (Key Informant 3) 
 
A result of the lack of control over the secretariat‟s functioning was the high 
turnover of the national consultant or the coordinator of the secretariat was 
reported. Within the two-year span of the study, four consultants had been 
recruited, each lasting three months to a year.   
 
An analysis of the governmentality of the Fund demonstrated that both the 
cognitive and coordinative function of Schmidt‟s discourse framework were 
operational given the multi-actor system and environment generated by the 
Fund grant. It also reveals the potential of these mechanisms to act as sites 
of power, and at times contestation. Power was wielded at two levels: firstly, 
through control exercised by „direct agency‟ resulting in conflict of interests 
among the various stakeholders. Secondly, through “diffused agency” 
(Crawford 2003:145) by controlling the agenda setting and information 
around what gets discussed, proposed and implemented.  
 
The practice of Fund governmentality often resonated with the discursive 
practice of development, which Escobar (1997:87) argues, engineers “who 
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can speak with what view points, authority, and according to what criteria of 
expertise”. The professional and technical experts (the international donor 
community and few heads of international organisation and heads of disease 
control programmes) dominated the technical review committee and 
authorised interventions by a non-transparent process which valorised their 
technical skills and reinforced the difference between the „developed‟ and the 
„developing‟ worlds.  
 
As suggested by Buse and Harmer (2004: 54), this distribution of power has 
significance for perception of ownership of the partnership by the respective 
partners and consequently, determines their commitment to it.  
 
4.2.3 The ‘marriage’ of multiple stakeholders and plural interests 
 
4.2.3.1 Rationale and Motivations 
The NGO constituency involved in the Fund arrangements was articulate in 
expressing their reasons for entering into partnership arrangements with the 
government. For most, it served as a “window of opportunity” to have a say in 
country wide processes and policy decisions, expand their outreach in India 
and bring their interventions to scale, establish their credibility in the AIDS 
industry, and ensure sustainability of their organisational work. While 
reflecting on the collaborations with the corporate sector, the NGO 
constituency reproduced the Fund discourse on „industry participation‟ 
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making frequent references to the enhanced role of the business 
associations in health partnerships globally. 
 
The public sector bureaucrats involved with the Fund governance 
unequivocally regarded partnerships with the corporate sector as an 
opportunity to ensure “additional funds and manoeuvrability in reaching out to 
people” (Notes from interviews and meetings). However, collaborations with 
the NGO sector at the national level were not considered desirable. Unlike 
the earlier public private interactions where NGOs were funded (contracted 
out for specific services) by the state, the government representatives felt 
that the new PPP model, only provided more power to these unaccountable 
entities and was not conducive to effective functioning.  
 
“There is definitely a need for PPPs at the grassroots or implementation 
level. Also, in planning, monitoring, evaluation research, technical expertise 
like TRG set ups, we need to involve individuals or organisations. But I am 
not in favour of PR level GO-NGO partnership…you have organisation 
conflicts, duplicate administrative costs, and makes foreign contribution 
essential.”  (Senior public sector bureaucrat, Principal recipient) 
 
Despite power imbalance within the Fund governmentality, and friction at the 
implementation site, the actors expressed views consistent with the dominant 
development discourse (and the rationale underpinning official policy 
decision) on the Fund and public-private partnerships. All the narratives 
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echoed the dominant discourse discussed in chapter one upholding the 
technocratic and managerial discourses establishing, in the process, inter-
sectoral working (public and private) as „necessary‟ and external finance 
mechanism such as the Global Fund („war chest‟) as an inevitable solution. 
The non-government Fund bureaucrats in addition maintained that the 
problems with the functioning could be attributed to “poor governance which 
they equated with corruption, leadership, and autocratic mode of public 
sector functioning”. 
 
4.2.3.2 Reconciling various interests: Developing the country proposal 
 
Below are three separate accounts of the preparatory phase of the country 
proposal prior to submission to the Global Fund secretariat. These accounts 
highlight the varied experiences of stakeholders in negotiating respective 
programmes and budgetary allocations.  
 
“The initial expression of interest was for 30 million, for 30 partners to work in 
ten states- some for technical support but mostly for implementation. It was 
cut down to 20 million and we lost all states except three. Then the work 
really started with NACO. We had some random meetings with other PRs 
and government sub-recipients for the grant where the head of NACO 
delegated areas for each. The other recipient‟s proposal was completely 
changed and they were given some partners who were ours. It was all very 
messy, nothing was done in writing.”  (Non-government Principal recipient 1) 
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“..The [Consortium‟s] current proposal was accepted by the technical group. 
When it came to the CCM, main issue was over the PRship [NGO becoming 
a principal recipient]. On the budget, the CCM felt it was impossible to give a 
sum of 54 million to an NGO. Instead, NACO demanded the sum to purchase 
ARV drugs.10 million was what they suggested for our work. We negotiated 
since it was impossible to carry out all the tasks in so little. In 5 hours time 
this was brought to 18.2 million as the deadline for it to go to Geneva was the 
following day.”  (Non-government Principal Recipient 2) 
 
I don‟t understand the process through which the CCM puts together the 
country proposal. For Round 7, 141 proposals were received for HIV and 
AIDS component alone. A consortium down south [India] had put up a 
proposal on the theme of workplace policy. It was very unique and the 
technical committee had selected it. But it was dropped from the final list [that 
was circulated for ratification]. I don‟t know the background but it said 
workplace topic was removed because the corporate sector and Ministry of 
Labour didn‟t give the proposal on time.  (CCM NGO representative) 
 
The above accounts highlight the arbitrary and authoritarian manner in which 
the final country proposal is put together: in informal and closed door settings 
where public sector agency, mainly the NACO, is seen overtly dominant. It 
also reflects token participation of different constituencies in the coordinating 
mechanism which is often bypassed when taking crucial decisions. The 
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underlying authority of NACO was prominent in all non government 
narratives even though they were aware that much of the decision making 
took place in technical committees where the deliberations were dominated 
by development agencies and NACO had little or no role.  
 
Negotiating the bureaucratic hurdles is common to all the above accounts. 
They differ, however, in their relative bargaining position within the 
hierarchical organisation of the Fund. The legitimacy derived from this 
bargaining position, as the quotes below suggest, was a determinant of the 
organisation‟s success in the “negotiations”. The first account is of an 
international NGO operating at the country level. The international status and 
visibility, and representation in the Global Fund board (in Geneva) gave it a 
competitive advantage over other stakeholders in the bidding and 
subsequent negotiations. While describing the preparatory phase, the 
respondent gave insights on these privileges and how these facilitated the 
formation of partnership.  
 
“With a member of staff sitting on the board of the Global Fund, our advocacy 
profile within India increased substantially. We get to play both our national 
and international card. Though international, our FCRA11 status allows us to 
raise funds from foreign sources. Global Fund came up when we were 
looking at our resource mobilisation strategy. With previous experience of 
                                                 
11
 Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, enacted in 1976 in India, regulates the acceptance and 
utilisation of foreign contribution by associations. Voluntary organisations in particular are mandated 
to have FCRA status in order to receive funds from foreign agencies/ sources. The registration is 
granted to associations with proven track record of functioning for at least three years, thorough 
security vetting of the activities and antecedents of the organization and office bearers. 
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being on the CCM of other countries, we knew of the politics but success in 
delivering the fund meant a lot of money over many years. We did an 
analysis of the previous round that India did not qualify for and got in touch 
with groups thinking they will apply again...We invited the main competitors 
to be our partners before the official call for application came out.”  
(Non government principal recipient 1) 
 
The second narrative is of a national level NGO that had support of 
prominent players in the AIDS industry in India. Although less visible at the 
international level and less familiar with the AIDS landscape, the 
organisation, with a former senior government bureaucrat as its Director, had 
good rapport with the government and a strategic presence in Delhi. Non-
government partner organisations reported this as the single most important 
criterion in selecting the organisation to represent the civil society consortia 
as the principal recipient. A contrasting experience is shared in the third 
narrative of a CCM member wherein, a local organisation with insufficient 
clout and connections was unsuccessful in its bid for the grant and received 
no communication about the grounds on which its application was rejected. 
 
Partnerships developed as a result of the forced marriage between unequal 
partners failed to generate consensus on the shared understanding and 
rationale for different components of the project and the role of partners. As a 
result, the approved grant invoked little ownership and participation giving 
rise to projects that were beyond the local implementation capacity of not 
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only the national agency, NACO but also other implementing partners who 
had little control on the programme. This aspect shall be explored in further 
detail in the subsequent section. 
 
4.2.3.3 Peripheral stakeholders, core actors 
Besides partnerships arising from the Fund, there is a visible trend of multiple 
structures created as partnerships between state governments and donors 
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and USAID. A 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of operation of the Fund 
necessitates an understanding of these additional power centres within the 
AIDS industry in India. Cases for discussion here are the Karnataka Health 
Promotion Trust (KHPT) and the Avert Society in Maharasthra. KHPT is a 
partnership between State AIDS Society (the state division of NACO) and 
University of Manitoba, the chief executive agency for the Gates 
Foundation‟s HIV prevention project, set up in 2003 (KHPT 2008). The Avert 
Society, referred to as “an agency of the Government of Maharashtra, funded 
and jointly administered by the state government and USAID”, was set up to 
“support the GOI to reduce the negative impact of HIV and AIDS in India” 
(Avert Society 2004). Reflecting on the genesis of these agencies while 
discarding the public script emerging in their websites, a key informant 
articulated that these structures emerged “in response to the reluctance of 
bilateral and other donors to fund governments directly” (Key informant 3). 
The reluctance was primarily attributed to bureaucratic hurdles and 
mismanagement associated with the state governments. Subsequently, 
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independent entities were registered as trusts or societies, often chaired by 
senior government bureaucrat, and served as an alternate channel of 
receiving aid. This view was confirmed in a few other interviews. 
 
“USAID was planning to come to India. They asked for bids. NACO would 
have been ideal [recipient] but it was refused, as USAID knew that it is a big 
tunnel and USAID did not want to lose control on the programme. They said 
we will give the money if you set up a trust instead. That is how KHPT was 
formed. The trust is chaired by the Principal Secretary of the State.”  (NGO 
sub recipient) 
 
The respondent also referred to the agency as being an offshoot of the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
 
“It was a project of Gates foundation. When the project was completed and 
the government refused its continuation, the entire team got sucked into 
KHPT. Because KHPT was an Indian entity it couldn‟t get the funds directly. 
So, Gates foundation routed the funds through a US based institution. 
University of Mannitoba won the bid and KHPT became the implementing 
partner.” (NGO sub recipient of the Fund) 
 
The creation of these parallel agencies, or what has earlier (section 2.1.3) 
been referred to as agencification, not only affects the channels of aid flow 
but also re-configures the skills and expertise valued in development 
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practice. It promotes the development of a cadre of brokers who, as we shall 
see in the following discussion, as active agents and skilled professionals 
aware of the funding modalities and having the required technical “expertise” 
for successful grant making, emerge as a threat to the public sector 
employees. This cadre not only includes fund recipients who act at the 
interface of the global development rationales and the local contexts and 
perspectives, but also development workers in the project chain (project 
officers, programme managers, review consultants) joined by implementers/ 
providers who Michael Lipsky (1980) refers to as “street level bureaucrats”. 
The latter category represents the local populations who “express its needs 
to the structures in charge of aid and the external financiers” (Bierschenk et 
al. 2002:4) and translate the project objectives into locally coherent 
rationales.   
 
4.2.4 The divorce… 
While the two agencies (KHPT and Avert) were initially set up with the 
patronage of the state governments, they subsequently emerged as large 
parallel organisations competing for the same resources, programmes and 
funding. Their links with international institutions, primarily educational and 
research institutions enable better access to technical expertise, global 
mechanisms, and standards of practice. With improved access to information 
regarding policy developments, technical know-how, and better ability to 
mobilize human and financial resources, they often outbid state agencies. 
One of the states experienced a crisis when in a recent move by NACO all 
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community care centres that were contracted out to NGOs, were shifted from 
the ambit of the State AIDS society to one of these agencies. Since the AIDS 
society had been implementing the programme since 1999, this move 
increased the friction between the two parties and resulted in care centres 
having no funds for several months. Concerned NGOs approached the State 
AIDS society for renewal of the grant but were refused on the grounds that 
there was no clear notification from the national body on the mechanisms of 
this shift.  
 
“March 2007 is till when we got the grant. Now we don‟t have any funds. 
State AIDS society told us that they will not be getting funds from NACO to 
run care and support programmes. We have been running on loan. Now a 
USAID project implemented by KHPT has taken care of some components. 
But we have no idea of how to move forward....We have only 33 patients 
now, we took a slow approach in the last few months as we fear we may not 
be able to continue.” (NGO running a care centre) 
 
While there was no specific rationale provided for this move, subsequent 
meetings with the stakeholders emerged as battlegrounds for shifting 
responsibility. Different accounts within KHPT and NACO suggested a 
perceived failure and redundancy of state society in managing the 
programme. However, employees of the State AIDS society reported wider 
systemic and structural issues such as severe shortage of human resources, 
and a high turnover of senior management staff resulting in negligible 
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institutional memory. Reflecting on the performance gaps, a senior officer at 
the State AIDS society highlighted the high turnover of Project Directors12 at 
the state level.  
 
“between 2006 and 2007 alone four directors changed and the present one is 
on additional charge”.  (Senior project officer, State division of NACO) 
 
This trend is not restricted to the sub-national level (states or districts) but 
also visible at the national level in the different national disease control 
programmes. 
 
“In the last 4 yrs I have worked with the 3rd Director General of NACO and 
probably the 7th head of malaria division. In a system like this how do you 
improve matters?  Lot of people tell me that DG NACO is a punishment 
posting. They are always trying to get out of it.”  (Senior Fund bureaucrat) 
 
Both government and non-government respondents were in agreement that 
this high turnover led to increased bureaucratic hurdles and delays since 
each Director had to be re-oriented to the programme intent, objective, and 
Fund requirements. On the other hand, non-governmental agencies 
particularly those with strong international ties, were regarded as being well 
resourced to meet the increasing demands of the Fund and other donors.  
 
                                                 
12
 Nodal person at the State AIDS Control Society, usually a senior Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) official appointed by the state administration. 
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“There are some advantages in having KHPT implement the programme. 
They pool in resources from several grants like USAID, Gates Foundation, 
other state and national resources... pay more to staff and have more senior 
people monitoring the programme. For implementing „Targeted Interventions‟ 
and „Care and Support‟ programmes they have 60-80 well qualified people - 
field supervisors, regional and zonal managers, team leaders, and project 
director. We have only one finance officer, one implementing officer and a 
technical support unit to monitor all the programmes. In round 2 we had 500 
counselling centres but no support staff as there was no money for 
infrastructure and human resources”. (Senior project officer at the State 
division of NACO) 
 
The structural barriers also include differential workload and salaries in the 
public health and private sector agencies, which leads to an internal drainage 
of human resource.  
 
“...There is also a funding difference. For instance, drop-in-centres supported 
by state AIDS society receive 200,000 INR per year. Through Avert they run 
on a budget of 600,000 INR per year. This is a huge difference”. (Senior 
project officer, Network of people with HIV) 
 
The impact was felt most at those implementation sites where multiple 
projects with differential incentives and work environment created a 
competitive environment and discontent among project staff. 
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“Introduction of KHPT project is almost unlawful. Careful planning should 
have been done on the impact of this on our project. Pay scales cannot be 
matched. Despite a degree and years of experience, I get …[nearly half the 
salary] that their project staff in our network draws. S/he is planning to move 
to state level, I will try to get a transfer to that post.”  (An employee of 
network of people with HIV commenting on different projects implemented in 
the district) 
 
4.3 Partnership Dynamics and Disruption 
 
4.3.1 Life and dynamics: textures and tensions within micro processes 
Ambiguity surrounding both the concept of partnership and the 
governmentality of the Fund, and the ad-hoc manner in which relationships 
were developed around the call for proposal resulted in lack of clarity and 
uncertainty around individual and partner roles. In this context, projects 
emerged as sites of contested power where, as we shall see in the following 
section, actors competed for more resources, better incentives, autonomy 
and legitimacy from different quarters.  
 
Table 5 below presents details on all grants approved for India for different 
rounds. Each round is for a period of five years implemented in two phases. 
The grant is initially given for two years and following a review, renewed or 
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extended for another three years. The rounds commence in sequence but 
run parallel, so much so that at any given time, up to five rounds are running 
simultaneously, each with a different objective, partnership arrangement and 
funding. At the time the field work was undertaken, India awaited decision on 
the eighth round of Global Fund grant while funds from the first round remain 
unutilised.  
 
Rounds  
Compone
nt  
Principal 
recipient 
agency 
Sub-recipient/ 
partner agency 
Activities 
Grant 
start 
date 
Funds 
approv
ed (in 
million 
$) 
Round 1 TB 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
       
Round 2 HIV&AIDS 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
State AIDS Societies 
(treatment) and Sub 
contracted NGOs 
(prevention and care) 
Prevention of mother 
to child; public-private 
ARV delivery 
May-04 92.7 
Round 3 HIV / TB 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
State AIDS Societies  
Reducing TB 
morbidity in PLHAs 
and preventing 
further spread of TB, 
HIV in high 
prevalence states 
Jan-05 14.82 
Round 4 HIV&AIDS 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
National AIDS 
Control Organisation 
and State AIDS 
Societies (treatment) 
ART delivery in 6 
high prevalence 
states and Delhi 
Sep-05 122.67 
Population 
Foundation of 
India (Civil 
society 
consortium 1) 
Confederation of 
Indian Industries, 
Network of people 
living with HIV, 
Freedom Foundation, 
Engender health 
society 
Access to care & 
treatment in high 
prevalence states 
Apr-05 18.2 
Round 5 Not approved for funding   
Round 6 
HIV&AID
S 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
  
Expanding access to 
ARV, testing and 
counselling  (all 
states), community 
care centres 
Oct-07 214.17 
Population 
Foundation of 
India (Civil 
society 
consortium 2) 
Catholic Bishops 
Conference of India, 
Constella Futures 
India, Network of 
people with HIV 
Promoting access to 
care and treatment 
(8 northern states) 
Jun-07 30.6 
India 
HIV/AIDS 
Alliance (NGO 
consortium 3) 
5 NGOs in Andhra 
Pradesh, Delhi and 
Tamil Nadu 
Scaling up care and 
support services for 
children  
Jun-07 14.38 
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Source: Compiled by the author using information from the Global fund website.  
The green highlighted area represents the focus of investigation in the research  
 
The Principal recipient and Activities columns illustrate the shifting allegiance 
of partners and disjointed activities. Programme components proposed in 
each round stand isolated from previous rounds. However, considerable 
overlap can be observed between activities of different partners and 
institutions created. Either new concepts of care and support were introduced 
or previously established concepts modified to demonstrate ‟innovation‟, a 
recurrent and striking feature with respect to the Fund activities in all 
narratives. A case in point is round four where an NGO led five member civil 
society consortium proposed a series of care and support interventions 
focusing on six high prevalence states. It had deliverables corresponding to 
counselling, care, follow up and network building for people with HIV. Prior to 
the Fund‟s entry, 10 bedded community care centres were being run by 
NGOs, independently or aided by the government. The consortium instead 
proposed a “more comprehensive understanding of care and support” 
through 50 bedded centres. Three such centres were to be set up in the first 
two year phase of round four.  
 
Round 7 
HIV&AID
S 
Department of 
Economic 
Affairs (GOI) 
  
Strengthening 
systems (human and 
institutional) capacity 
Jun-08 
87.8 
Tata Institute 
of Social 
Sciences 
  
Strengthening 
institutional capacity 
for counsellor 
training institutes 
  
Indian Nursing 
Council 
  
Strengthening 
institutional capacity 
for nurses training 
  
TOTAL FUNDS APPROVED FOR INDIA 
  
595.34 
Table 5: Details of GFATM grant rounds in India   
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However, once the grant was approved, the consortium faced difficulties in 
setting up these centres and in enrolling support of all stakeholders, 
particularly the NACO, for the „comprehensive care‟ model. In the 
subsequent round, therefore, while the proposal for scaling-up its activities to 
other states of India was accepted (and the NGO was re-inducted as the PR 
for the next round), the consortium, which now comprised of newer partners, 
witnessed a gross reduction of its activities. The comprehensive care model 
was abandoned and the consortium was given the responsibility for setting 
up a fixed number of care centres on the lines of the earlier 10 bedded 
government model. Meanwhile, another Delhi based international agency 
leading an independent consortium became the third recipient for that round 
with proposed focus on children. 
 
“Round 6 is different from Round 4. Although it is an expansion [of our work] 
from high prevalence states to vulnerable states, certain components have 
been changed. The TCC and comprehensive care centre are withdrawn. 
Instead, NACO‟s model of care centre is endorsed. What constitutes 
„comprehensive‟ is debatable. Our partner organisation [responsible for the 
comprehensive care component] has a fair perspective on it and plays an 
advisory role internationally but others differ in their view point”.  (Senior 
project officer, Civil society consortium) 
 
Justifying their decision to modify the interventions proposed by the NGO 
consortium, a senior public sector bureaucrat argued that multiple 
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interventions were leading to duplication and as a result, the national 
programme lacked uniformity.  
 
“If other partners are implementing a scheme which we are also 
implementing, there should be some uniformity. That is why we developed 
official guidelines for CCC which should apply to everybody. Across the 
country, CCC should receive the same level of assistance irrespective of 
which pocket the money is coming. Project is the same, so why should there 
be a difference?”  (Senior public sector bureaucrat, Principal recipient) 
 
Reflecting on the impact of having multiple interventions and providers within 
a national programme, a senior bureaucrat in the state division of NACO 
expressed, “all these separate rounds and overlaps between them lead to 
confusion and chaos at the implementation level”.  
 
While previous rounds remained open, new ones continued to be developed 
around each call for funding without generating consensus or apparent 
learning building on previous rounds. Not surprisingly though, there were 
simultaneous discussions on integrating and synergising different rounds in 
accordance with the harmonisation principle of the Fund. 
 
“Although I don‟t think there is a clear possibility there, the Fund is 
considering maximising its impact with respect to the resources going into 
the field. These are proposals which have been approved and already in 
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place. There cannot be a direct linkage between round one to the present 
because all the rounds are radically different from each other. I don‟t see how 
you can actually connect them”. (NGO, national committee member) 
 
4.3.2 Partnership rupture 
 
4.3.2.1 Issues of disengagement and disruption 
The grant from the Fund mandated the setting up of a range of different 
models and sites for service provision, often as deliverables of each phase, 
in the identified states. Round four in particular marked a significant shift in 
the fund organisation and governance at the country level. In prior rounds the 
government was the sole recipient of the grant with the NACO as the main 
implementing agency, or operational principal recipient. As described earlier, 
the Fund‟s demand for a stronger representation of the civil society in the 
India CCM compelled the endorsement of a NGO led civil society consortium 
as the second principal recipient for the grant. 
 
The public transcript for round four (evident in the proposal approved by the 
Fund) reflected a complementary effort by different stakeholders including 
the corporate sector (companies and business houses), government, NGOs 
and network of people with HIV. The government‟s mandate is to provide 
treatment while the civil society component is aimed at improving the access 
of people with HIV to treatment, providing care, and support. The 
government component included (1) ART roll out centres housed mainly in 
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select public hospitals and, (2) 10 bedded community care centres that were 
sub-contracted to NGOs. The consortium led programme included a number 
of service delivery points, trying out different models of palliative care, 
support, and adherence education. These included (1) positive living centres, 
(2) treatment counselling centres, (3), setting up district networks of people 
with HIV, (4) 50 bedded care and support centres and, (5) corporate run 
treatment centres. The first three components were the mandate of the 
network of people with HIV. The main objective was to strengthen the 
demand (by generating awareness through community based interventions) 
and supply (providing counselling, palliative care, and other support services) 
and address the gap by linking the two. 
 
However, in practice, the link between different components was very weak 
and activities developed as multiple service delivery points with little 
demarcation of roles and increasing conflict among interests. Each partner 
set up separate project offices, both nationally and in target states, with its 
staff organised into specialised “divisions” dealing with sectoral activities. The 
focus, as revealed in the discussion with the co-ordinators at the project 
offices on their perceived roles, was to „oversee‟ progress and gather support 
of the stakeholders. This enabled the project managers to gain legitimacy for 
activities by developing appropriate „professionalized‟ accounts and 
rationales for them. Different views on the project, its rationale and 
significance implied increasing disagreements on competency of partners 
and the perceived value that other components added to the programme. 
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These became constant sources of distrust and tension between government 
and non-government partners. These issues are further teased out in the 
following case study in the context of the round four activities of the Fund 
programme. 
 
Case Study 1: A tale of two centres 
An observable locus of this tension was the interface between the civil 
society consortium run treatment counselling centres (TCC) and government 
run Anti Retroviral Therapy (ART) roll out centres in public hospitals. In the 
proposal to the Fund, the TCC was envisaged to cover the gap between 
treatment centres (supply end) and communities accessing them (demand 
end). The proposed intent was to minimise dropout rate and strengthen 
treatment adherence by providing „post ART adherence‟ counselling on 
clinical and non-clinical aspects, and engaging in community outreach and 
follow up through the district level networks run by people with HIV. However, 
in the rush to hand in the proposal (which has been elaborated in section 2.1 
of this chapter) there remained several unresolved issues where a 
consensus was not reached. These included agreement on where the 
centres would be located, who the TCC staff would be accountable to, how 
the counselling undertaken at the TCC will complement (and not duplicate) 
the ongoing counselling at the ART centre, and how documentation and 
reporting burden would be shared between the two centres.  
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A strong resistance to the NGO activities was observed among the public 
sector bureaucrats, mainly the senior officers at the national and state 
divisions of NACO and providers at the public hospital where the centres 
were located. Drawing attention to the abundance of counsellors and other 
staffs at various government prevention and treatment set ups, the 
bureaucrats argued that TCC added little value to the programme.  
 
“Rather than using VCTC [voluntary counselling and testing centre] 
counsellors which are more in number, you want to depend on some TCCs 
and expect them to go to the field which they hardly do. Some places you 
have TCC counsellors, other places you don‟t. It is leading to confusion. I 
visited few centres… they just depend on our information to write reports and 
are not actually going out to do any outreach.” (Senior bureaucrat, State 
division of NACO) 
 
The general opinion of these stakeholders was that the network of people 
with HIV, the implementing agency for TCC, was interested only in 
demonstrating numbers to the fund. A senior medical officer and ART centre 
in charge claimed: 
“…these organisations were not doing anything worthwhile but are forced 
upon us. They got funding, started networks and are only interested in 
building those networks.”  
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A senior project officer at the State division of NACO reported that 
consortium activities such as treatment counselling were overburdening 
patients, mandating them to visit two or three counsellors in a single visit to 
the hospital. The respondent clarified: 
“these patients are often poor and come from distant villages. They are 
unable to complete these time consuming procedures”. 
 
The consortium members, on the other hand, highlighted the strong 
resistance that NGO initiatives faced from the public sector employees, 
mainly the front line providers and administrators. Directing to issues 
operating at the micro level, the consortium members argued that medical 
officers and counsellors at the ART roll out centre were not cooperative. On 
grounds of confidentiality, they often did not share names and records of 
patients with the project workers in TCC. Lacking the vital information 
essential to enrol patients into district level networks, the project workers (in 
this case, the employees of the district network for people with HIV) reported 
their inability to follow up patients and/or undertake counselling to ensure 
adherence to treatment. Fearing non-performance and inability to 
demonstrate impact to the Fund, they devised various strategies to increase 
enrolments. These included providing free nutrition package, accompanying 
people with HIV for testing and treatment, developing a new cadre of 
outreach workers: peer treatment educator to follow up people in the 
communities, among others.     
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“Sometimes there are ego problems with doctors but mostly counsellors. 
They don‟t give lists or information on the patients. They don‟t allow us to sit 
in the treatment centre... But we have to maintain targets. A network member 
stands outside the treatment centre and…brings them to TCC. That‟s how 
we get our clients. We cannot give individual counselling because there are 
more than 300 follow ups every day. We link them to our networks instead”. 
(A project worker and network member, Consortium led TCC) 
 
Examining the roots of disharmony: the macro factors underlying the 
textures and tensions within the micro processes 
 
Underlying the varied conflicting accounts of the description of the 
environment in which service provision occurred were issues of control and 
authority: lack of a clear chain of command, lack of clarity on roles and work 
division, and above all, the authority of the Fund protocol. The tensions 
seemed to threaten the administrative and professional legitimacy of the 
actors derived from the power and resource asymmetries between state run 
and consortium run centres.  
 
There was a growing resistance to TCC activities because the public hospital 
and ART centre staff felt that even though they were technically more 
qualified and trained than the network TCC staff, the latter were better 
rewarded in terms of salaries and enhanced working environment 
(computers, separate office and counselling space).  
 209 
 
“They started saying „we don‟t want the TCC.  They are making our lives 
miserable. Whose computer is it? Is it the doctor‟s or the counsellor‟s? If I 
don‟t have one, how can the counsellor?‟ The computer is there to manage 
and enter the data. These are petty issues but they do come up. If there is 
good mutual understanding, symbiotic relationship occurs otherwise it [the 
partnership] is a parasite”.  (Senior officer, network of people with HIV) 
 
This friction can also be attributed to the failure to address accountability and 
hierarchy issues arising from the burden of procedures and technical 
reporting. The Fund‟s reporting protocol demands a large quantum of 
information and statistics in forms such as consolidated reports, forms/ 
patient cards and documentation registers. Visits to public hospitals revealed 
that on an average, 250-300 patients visited treatment centres daily. Most 
counsellors and other support staff (social worker, pharmacist, data entry 
operator) were expected to complete this task alongside their primary 
responsibility of counselling clients individually and in groups to encourage 
treatment adherence and improved lifestyle. As a result, most provider-user 
interactions observed at the centres were restricted to information sought in 
the form. 
 
As stated earlier, commenting on the value added by the network of people 
with HIV, the public sector (NACO and its state divisions) bureaucrats 
claimed that the TCC staff was preoccupied with documentation at the cost 
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of their primary responsibility of outreach. In response to this, a state officer 
of the consortium expressed: 
 
“Of course that‟s happening…A funding agency asks how many people are 
counselled. If I‟m paid 8 or 10K per month, I have to show some work. If the 
system is not set in place and there is no coordination, I will definitely write 
up. But in some places, counselling is also happening”. 
 
The authority of the protocol, and the resulting bureaucratic burden, pre-
occupied staff at the service delivery points with record keeping, data 
entering, and report generation. At the same time, it reinforced professional 
hierarchies which regarded the people with HIV suitable for clerical work of 
maintaining records and not qualified enough for jobs like counselling. 
Evidently, the global discourse around greater involvement of people with 
AIDS (GIPA) had not penetrated the implementation level. As a result ART-
TCC interface emerged as a site where power could be exercised in order to 
legitimise one intervention over another.   
 
“Some ART centres consider the TCC staff subordinate and want to control 
and use them for their own work…assisting doctors, filling registers, 
performing menial jobs. When they do not comply they decided they will not 
let them be in the premises.” (Senior officer, Civil society consortium) 
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One of the factors most commonly mentioned was the “mindset” or “attitude” 
of the staff at the public hospital and ART centre.  
 
“It is a question of mind set. TCC is a place where we have 3 counsellors to 
support the treatment roll out. The whole issue is with the medical officer at 
the public ART centre. If his mindset is positive, things are working very well. 
Places where TCC has failed, the onus is more on medical officer than the 
counsellor. They have not tried to integrate it into the system.”  
(Senior officer, Civil Society consortium)  
 
Public ART roll out centres and network run treatment counselling centres 
that were able to arrive at some level of understanding and work 
harmoniously had reached a consensus that the ART in-charge (usually the 
head of the speciality in the public hospital to which the treatment centre is 
attached) would hold the chain of command and delegate responsibilities. 
This often implied that TCC counsellors would share the burden of 
completing register entries of patients coming to the treatment centre.  
 
The senior project officers and managers of the consortium play an important 
role in achieving the state of “harmony” or acceptance of the status quo. 
Mediating between the discursive construction of partnership and the 
differing local perspectives, they present the public sector bureaucrats and 
service providers as having a particular mindset that leads them to 
manipulate their environment in order to gain authority and serve their 
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interests. While this authority was resisted at one level, an internalisation of 
and compliance to the State‟s authority was also observed among the non-
government respondents at another level.  
 
“I don‟t blame SACS [state division of NACO] for this. The attitude of the TCC 
staff should change. Even though it is a separate entity with separate 
finances, they should not feel that they are different. You can‟t get patients if 
you don‟t work in coordination. The medical officer is the head of the centre. 
When you are placing the consortium‟s counselling centre under the 
government treatment centre, what is the problem in accepting their 
directions?”  (Project officer, Civil Society consortium) 
 
The ad-hoc marriage of arrangements between different stakeholders at the 
centre and its top-down and vertical implementation was counterproductive 
to the programme. The factors outlined above and the resulting conflict 
between the public hospital staff (medical officers and counsellors) and the 
employees of the consortium led counselling centre (TCC in-charge and 
counsellors) contributed to chaos at the antiretroviral roll out site. This had 
significant impact on the quality of counselling, follow up, and consequently 
adherence rates.  
 
Case Study 2: The business sector and HIV 
Another ambitious component of the Round 4 project proposed by the civil 
society consortium was involvement of the corporate sector, businesses and 
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industries. The corporate representative in the consortium was responsible 
for facilitating the setting up of ART roll out centres by private companies. 
Under round 4, it was given a deliverable of 10 such treatment centres. This 
raised the profile of the project and the consortium considerably with the 
Fund, and as reported was the basis on which the proposal was accepted. 
The slow progress however, became a point of contestation in the 
partnership. 
 
Initial efforts and constant dialogues with companies made little progress and 
proved resource intensive since the companies were not willing to make a 
long term investment. Hence, once the grant was received the corporate 
representative entered into negotiations with the NACO to provide 
antiretroviral free of cost to companies.  
 
“The first two years we did not have any deliverables to show. Other partners 
do not understand that it is not only the centre but the entire process behind 
it. Putting a positive person on ART increases the longevity of life. This 
implies an increase in n number of years of commitment. In order to make 
industries take up this cause we need to cut the n barrier. With such state-of-
the-art centres established and tests provided, it is not possible to also 
provide drugs.”  (Corporate representative, Civil society consortium) 
 
Eventually the terms were re-negotiated such that targets were met at a 
lower cost to companies and the resulting burden shifted to public sector 
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resources. As per the new agreement entered with the NACO, the 
government provides anti retroviral and opportunistic infection drugs13 for the 
general population while companies cater to their workforce and contributed 
to the infrastructural costs. 
 
The corporate representative‟s decision to “bring NACO on board”, as shared 
by a respondent, was based on two factors.  First, as explained above, 
reducing cost to companies, and second, to facilitate the process of setting 
up centres which required accreditation from the national body. Getting 
approval from the national AIDS organisation meant not only bypassing 
some of the bureaucratic hurdles experienced at the state level, but as 
reported by a company respondent, also resulted in treatment reaching out to 
a higher number of people. Prior to getting the NACO on board, only clients 
presenting with severe symptoms were being put on ART.  
 
“Since NACO is giving drugs, we have gone for more patients. When we 
started with our own drugs, not all were given antiretroviral. Earlier, only 
those who had less than 6 CD4 count, were immediately put on anti 
retroviral”.  (Project officer, Corporate centre) 
 
However, new „partnership‟ also meant newer issues of conflict between the 
two constituencies. Conflicting accounts emerged for the decision making 
process and the delay in achieving the deliverables by the corporate sector. 
                                                 
13
 At the time of field studies, provision of lab reagents was also being negotiated with the NACO. 
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The corporate social responsibility department and the company nodal 
officers were unaware of the negotiations that occurred in the higher 
management who, despite repeated attempts, I did not get access to. In spite 
of the lack of information (and transparency), rationalising accounts were 
subsequently developed for the decisions taken with regards to the location, 
management and other aspects of the centre. These decisions and their 
implications for the programme are discussed below. 
 
The two corporate ART centres that were operational during the study were 
stand alone i.e. not attached to company hospitals, a decision reported to be 
taken by companies to protect themselves from any repercussion of the 
programme such as compensation issues arising from an AIDS related death 
in the company hospital.  One of the centres was independently registered as 
a trust and was situated outside the compound, on the main highway. The 
other centre, functioning under the company‟s name, was set up as an 
independent unit in proximity to the company hospital.  
 
“Companies set up trust to do corporate social responsibility only because if 
they do it under Industry‟s name then in case of a health programme...if you 
gave a drug and the patient reacted and died, one has to compensate. I feel 
that industries fear a lot of things that are not likely to happen. In reality, no 
one is saying that since you started the ART centre it is your responsibility to 
compensate if someone dies because everyone knows that HIV is a disease 
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is terminal and therefore it is only a matter of longevity.” (Senior 
management, Partner Company) 
 
The human resource and management considerations were responsible for 
the initial lag phase in setting up and running the company ART centres. In 
addition, corporate representatives attributed this delay partly to the 
interference by the NACO in identification of sites, and communication gaps 
between the centre and the state divisions of NACO.  
 
“When NACO team came to do the assessment of the centre they had a big 
objection to the centre not having in-patient provision. They did not have 
clarity on how a company hospital works. It took us a lot of time to convince 
the district officials that the centre will only work on an out-patient basis and 
patients will be referred to the district hospital which has good facilities. 
Keeping the people with HIV in the hospital becomes an industrial relation 
issue.” (Corporate representative, civil society consortium) 
 
“…there is a big gap between the NACO and its state societies. NACO 
decides on a centre but the SACS are often not willing to set up, they do not 
see the need...the link is very weak” 
 
Moreover, a high level of competition was observed between the two service 
delivery points - government ART centres in public hospitals and corporate 
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ART centres - as both constituencies needed to demonstrate „numbers‟ in 
their respective programmes. 
 
“We identified a charitable trust hospital to set up a corporate centre. When 
we were about to sign the MoU, NACO rang us to tell we should not go 
ahead because they are setting up theirs in the same district. However, the 
hospital in-charge of the district said he is not interested in setting up the 
centre and did not want to get into this hassle with NACO. We went back and 
forth but till the end the district officer did not know why the centre was being 
imposed on him.”   (Corporate representative, consortium member) 
 
“The problem is that the government is due to start an ART centre in the 
district. So, numbers will definitely be a challenge. But we will focus on giving 
good quality services (lifestyle change, counselling etc.). Once we get the 
reagents from NACO, all patients will be tested here. We could use our skills 
and motivate them to come here for ART… after all that is a government 
hospital. The clients will start ART wherever there is good service.”  
(Project officer, Corporate centre) 
 
This also induced a dual system of „free‟ and „paid‟ services under the same 
programme since corporate centres charged a subsidised amount for HIV 
testing, laboratory tests and CD4 counts while at the public hospitals, this 
was free.  
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Furthermore, the new relationship with NACO also affected the ongoing 
partnership among the consortium members resulting in friction within the 
principal and sub-recipient relationship. This was primarily because, as 
shared by a consortium member, much of the negotiations were undertaken 
bypassing the principal recipient NGO and its authority.  
 
“While it was earlier agreed that antiretroviral will be procured by the 
companies, they [the corporate sector] have expressed their reluctance in 
doing so. They are negotiating with NACO directly to provide antiretroviral for 
the general population while they cater only to their workforce. Therefore the 
corporate component has been much delayed. And since it is a component 
of our programme, the non-performance is reflecting on the entire program.”  
(Senior officer, civil society consortium) 
 
As the corporate component stood at the time of the research, it seemed to 
contradict the main rationale behind involvement of the commercial sector in 
the partnership as it shifts the cost burden onto the public sector while adding 
no additional value to the programme. Firstly, while companies do invest in 
setting up and running costs (infrastructural and staff salaries) of the centre, 
this investment is tiny in comparison to the recurrent costs of drugs and 
reagents the government is expected to bear. Secondly, the observed staff to 
patient ratio in the treatment centres in public hospital and corporate sector 
was disproportionate. The centres in the public hospitals that I visited had on 
an average 1500 (and in few cases over 3000) people on ART enrolled 
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catered to by one to two medical officers, a pharmacist, a staff nurse, a 
counsellor and a lab technician. However, in most centres few posts were 
vacant, thus adding to the workload. In contrast, the corporate centres had 
adequate staffing, a beautiful infrastructure but very low patient load (Refer 
photo 1 and 2).  
 
 
Photo 1: Public ART centre 
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Photo 2: Corporate ART centre 
 
“Right now there is only one person on ART, that too on 2nd line. So, not 
getting free ART will not dismantle the programme.”  
(Project health worker, corporate centre) 
 
Moreover, the corporate centre model does not align with the model of public 
antiretroviral roll out where centres are housed in and attached to district or 
referral hospitals ensuring access to inpatient services required prior to and 
post treatment such as testing and pre test counselling. This implied that if 
the patient accessing the corporate centre was in an advanced stage and 
required treatment or admission, s/he would be referred to a private clinic or 
the government hospital despite the physical barrier to access. 
 
“We do not have ICTC [testing and counselling centre] service in ART. It is in 
a rural hospital 2 kilometres away, or at a centre 20 kilometres away, or at 
the district hospital. We don‟t intend to start it. For HIV testing we were 
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depending on these people from day one of the programme. That‟s how 
working with government was from the beginning.”  (Project worker, 
corporate centre) 
 
4.4. Discussion: Points of departure 
In the course of implementation of the Fund rounds, transition from one to 
another marked a shift in allegiance of „partners‟ as their importance and 
value to the partnership and, others‟ dependency on them grew or lessened. 
Given the performance oriented nature of the Fund, efficiency in absorbing 
funds and demonstrating results became the primary aim and was seen as a 
significant factor shaping the relationship between organisations. New 
organisations were partnered to make up for the lag phase in meeting 
deliverables for each quarter of the project period, while existing partners 
broke away to form newer and independent alliances in successive rounds. 
Of the five organisations that came together to form the NGO consortium in 
Round 4, only two continued to partner in Round 6.  
 
The shifting allegiance can be attributed to the competitive environment 
triggered by the Fund governmentality, a result of which is the emergence of 
several parallel and competing projects aspiring for the same pool of funds, 
clients and legitimacy. The evidence presented in case study 1 (under 
section 4.3.2) suggests that neither funds nor activities of each grant round 
have surety of sustenance. In this environment of uncertainty and 
competition, organisational and individual survival becomes paramount. 
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Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that one of the key determinants of 
organisational survival is its ability to acquire and maintain resources. The 
process of developing the country proposal, as described earlier, 
substantiates this argument. Organisations with better access to information 
and technical „expertise‟, greater visibility, and links outflanked local groups 
in securing grants. However, once the grant is approved, maintaining and 
acquiring further resources in order to ensure sustainability are dependent on 
the demonstration of success or effectiveness.  
 
The Fund governmentality renders an organisation effective if it is able to 
manage the demand of timely and structured reporting as well as the needs 
of the dominant partners. The decisive force directing which organisations 
continue to partner in successive rounds and which fall out, is the perceived 
value and legitimacy its activities are able to generate among the influential 
stakeholders. The network for people with HIV, for example, was a valued 
partner for the consortium in round four since it had seven of the nine 
deliverables that were the consortium‟s mandate. Hence, even though some 
of its activities (such as the TCC) were disbanded, the network was again 
partnered with in round six while others discontinued.  
 
The performance based disbursement of funds has led partners to focus 
exclusively on demonstrating their effectiveness by meeting extensive and 
rigid reporting requirements of the Fund. At the service delivery sites, which 
are characterised by high patient load, poor infrastructure and lack of human 
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resources, this exclusive focus on documentation has manifested in a lack of 
quality services such as counselling and over-stretched the capacity of 
already weakened systems. 
 
An effect of the fragile and uncertain environment presented in the case 
studies is that constituencies collaborating on one front are competing on 
other, making claims on their achievements and counter claims on the 
other‟s ability to deliver quality service. In the absence of a proper 
supervision system worked out, it further triggers an environment where all 
attempts for coordination and evaluation present themselves as 
battlegrounds for shifting responsibility for non-performance. The following 
quote by a senior programme manager explains the consequence of this lack 
of supervision, calling for more integration of services. 
 
“The question arises when the government says treatment adherence rate is 
very low. If the country has a programme with so many people and offices, 
then why is adherence so low? One counsellor or outreach worker cannot 
make all the difference. A concrete system is required. And unless the 
programme is integrated it will not be so. How long can you run a parallel 
system? Where are the community health workers from other programmes? 
Why cannot they be given the responsibility of supervision? We need 
someone closer to the population, taking care that drugs are being taken 
correctly” 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The chapter illustrates how the Fund institution (structures and processes), 
has led to creation of new and unaccountable organisations which take a life 
of their own, competing with each other for resources such as funds, 
patients, and drugs. It argues that this new and „potentially vertical financing 
mechanism‟ (Brugha et al. 2004) instils an environment where the ideas 
shaping the discursive notion of public private partnerships are subsumed by 
competition for resources and increased tensions between different 
stakeholders over individual roles, control of funds and legitimacy.  
 
Processes of decision making are increasingly situated within this complex 
and hierarchical setting. Partnership arrangements are forcibly (and centrally) 
developed and actors are brought together, in an arbitrary manner, in 
response to the yearly launch of the Fund rounds. These arrangements are 
forced upon sub national levels without clarifying the intent and addressing 
power dynamics and resource allocation among partners. As a result, in this 
context, partnership arrangements act as an instrument for expanding 
technocratic control, advancing organisational interests, co-opting critical 
discourses, and shifting, if not contradicting the purpose with which they were 
initially set up. The public transcript of the Fund, as described in chapter 1, 
abdicates its role in the country level operations. However, as observed in 
this chapter, the structures and ideas with which the Fund operates in India 
significantly regulates the environment in which the programme is „steered‟ 
thus conditioning its operation as well as effects. 
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Multiple structures or frankenstein‟s monsters14 are created in the pursuit of 
programmatic goals and deliverables.  Once created, structures break away 
and in an attempt to survive in an intensely competitive environment make 
claims on their achievements and counter claims on their partner‟s ability to 
deliver. In this state of chaos (despite fragmentation, resistance and 
compliance), the Fund brokers (including the aid recipients, Fund 
bureaucrats, project managers and workers) are constantly creating “order”. 
They construct and manage the partnership milieu by enrolling and 
juxtaposing both human actors and non human actants. The brokers build 
coherent representations by translating the protocol of the Fund, and the 
technocratic and neo-liberal discourses underlying it, into individual and 
collective objectives. The legitimacy of their own role is derived from and 
dependent upon the conformity of multiple stakeholders to the dominant 
discursive construction of the partnership phenomenon. 
 
This chapter is in agreement with Crawford‟s (2003) analysis of how 
“partnerships are permeated by relations of power” (2003:145).  It illustrates 
how power is wielded through the control exercised by direct as well as 
diffused agency. The latter operates through the creation of subjectivities by 
having exclusive governing structures, controlling agenda setting, and 
maintaining information asymmetries.  
                                                 
14
 I use this terminology in a forthcoming paper as a representation of the contingencies of the practice 
of global discourses in development. I argue that once institutions and programmes are brought to life, 
the drive for identity and sustainability overpowers the initial rationale with which they are set up, a 
case of development run amok.   
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Chapter 5 
Re-emerging and translating ‘Civil Societies’: 
Examining the interpretive communities 
 
“Big agencies want to do everything, everywhere. The small have no role. 
And there are too many overlaps.” -Project officer, State division of NACO 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discuss the contingencies of practice and plurality 
of perspectives on the public-private Fund arrangements operational at the 
country level. Despite the tensions and conflicts visible in the practice, the 
Fund, as a model of public private partnerships is gaining prominence in 
global and countrywide health financing and provisioning debates. The 
previous chapters suggest that this is due to the interaction between the 
structural and ideational factors that shape its discursive understanding and 
constitute the actors and their practices. In this chapter, I focus on the 
interpretive communities, which are described earlier as playing an important 
role in stabilising the Fund order.  
 
The Fund lays claims on transforming country level governance given its 
stipulation of greater involvement of the „civil society‟ in setting priority and 
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managing grant processes.  This decision could be partly seen as resulting 
from a growth in the scale and policy influence of the civil society globally, 
underlying which, was a growing mass resistance to an „undemocratic 
functioning of government bureaucracies‟. As discussed in chapter one, the 
setting up of the Fund was also partly legitimised by a mobilisation around 
the demand for a greater participation of the international community of 
people with HIV.  
 
Despite the shared enthusiasm for a participatory mode of governance, not 
only does „civil society‟ remain loosely defined and poorly understood, the 
evidence base examining its organisation and claims to legitimacy, continues 
to be thin. In this chapter, some of these claims and processes are examined 
in the light of a growing presence of „civil society‟ in the country level 
processes of the Fund in delivering the national AIDS programme.  
 
Unpicking this central idea around which the discursive notion of the Fund is 
built, I examine how it is used to legitimise the involvement of certain 
influential actors, and promote and obscure certain practices and interests 
within the Fund programme. Referring back to the first and second theme 
identified in chapter two (role of ideas and protocol in creating the interpretive 
communities required for stabilising the Fund system), I examine the 
constitution of actors, the diversity of interests and power relations within, 
and the processes with which claims are made and credibility established.  
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5.2 The role of the ‘civil society’ in global governance: a 
development discourse 
In recent years, civil society organisations have come to play a prominent 
role in global health governance (Loewenson 2003, Dodgson et al. 2002, 
Frenk et al. 1997). Their growing involvement in global health initiatives has 
facilitated their role in decision making, through membership in consultative 
forums and, in implementing programmes as a direct recipient of grant. Their 
increasing share within the aid market is accompanied by a growing 
legitimacy that has enabled their movement beyond support services into the 
realm of provision and financing.   
 
The AIDS „industry‟ in particular has opened up spaces for active 
participation and mobility of the non-state actors at large, and the „affected‟ 
communities specifically. The fight against HIV and AIDS mobilised 
tremendous financial and political support and also marked a shift in 
investments in health, from infrastructural support to funding disease specific 
initiatives with emergency, short-term goals, and often unsustainable results 
(Schneider and Garrett 2009). Policy papers, mission statements, guidelines 
and numerous other documents of international development and national 
government agencies unequivocally seek civil society representation and 
participation in disease control programmes.  
 
The meaning of the term civil society has always been fuzzy. Salemink 
(2006: 103) refers to it as a “heterogeneous list of institutions and practices in 
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the public arena including media, universities, labour unions, civic and 
professional associations, social movements, religious institutions and NGOs 
in all their forms”.  
 
Although the civil society remains loosely defined, the rationale for its 
involvement is built on three premises – i) wider and more democratic 
representation of people‟s voices (particularly those affected) within 
structures of global governance ii) comparative edge over the government in 
delivering services given its outreach and presence in the very „communities‟ 
the programmes target (Doyle and Patel 2008) iii) balancing out the growing 
influence of markets and reinforcing public interest roles of states (Labonte 
1998). Apparent from the above rationales is the rhetoric around the concept 
that sees civil society as essentially a „good thing‟, whose promotion can 
enable „democratic‟ and „good‟ governance. This is expected to enhance 
efficiency and accountability, balancing the power of the state and the private 
sector (Fisher 1997).  
 
A significant body of literature exists around the piecemeal attempts of policy 
models and approaches to decentralise governance and devolve power to 
the civil society. Likewise, evaluations of the Fund and other global health 
initiatives suggest that the State continues to play a dominant role in policy 
making and implementation in most developing countries. These tools and 
observations establish what Schmidt (2004) refers to as the logic of necessity 
or need for a greater involvement of civil society (Bhattacharya and Dasgupta 
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2009, Winters 2008:11) at the global and national levels. However, little 
analysis is undertaken on the type of organisation whose involvement is 
sought at the policy level, the kind of organising and expertise required from 
them, and, the processes of political action with which their claims are 
accepted or rejected. 
 
In this chapter I seek to address these gaps situating the findings within the 
broad framework (as outlined in chapter 1) that has informed the 
development of this research. Specifically, the chapter seeks to address the 
following questions.  
 
1. How does the Fund re-constitute civil society actors (i.e. specific 
formations, configurations and expertise required) in the AIDS 
„industry‟?  
2. How do the actors in turn reproduce and legitimise the rationales and 
practices?  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section the 
characteristics that define the AIDS „industry‟ are explicated with particular 
reference to the social actors that constitute the landscape. The disciplining 
regime of the Fund is discussed next by drawing on the case of a network of 
people with HIV and AIDS. The case study examines the path followed by a 
project cycle and the subjectivities and interpretive communities it creates in 
the process. In the final section, I examine the impact of the Fund 
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governmentality on the „civil-society‟ by drawing on case narratives of two 
organisations with varying degrees of power and agency within the AIDS and 
the development industry, highlighting the strategies they adopt to „negotiate‟ 
in an environment of intense competition.   
 
5.3 The nature of AIDS industry and a growing ‘civil society’ 
The term „industry‟ is increasingly used to refer to the HIV and AIDS sector. 
This is primarily based on the development of an unprecedented private-
public industrial complex around a single disease (Rennie and Mupenda 
2008) characterised by fluctuating figures (as discussed in chapter one: 
section 1.5.1), escalating prominence within donor agendas15 (MacKellar 
2005) and a disproportionate worldwide spending. Global spending on AIDS 
has witnessed a stupendous growth and was estimated at USD 19.8 billion in 
2009, twice that of the total spending in 2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2009). Another striking feature of the industry is the multitude of players 
seeking a share in these resources– national governments, international 
development agencies (multilateral and bilateral), academics and 
researchers, and non government and community based organisations 
(NGOs and CBOs) working with or representing specific „communities‟ that 
are labelled or, have begun to self identify, in the course of their interactions 
with the AIDS industry (See Khanna 2009), as “high risk” or “vulnerable 
                                                 
15
 Also see Gomo, M. (2009). HIV/AIDS- A booming industry. Gomo, an independent development 
communicator in Zimbabwe and South Africa, refers to the industry as the most lucrative and fertile 
sources of donor income. He also highlights concerns related to the size and over prioritization of the 
AIDS industry as a stand-alone “business” disconnected from the wider public health system.  
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populations”. These include, for example, Men having Sex with Men (MSM), 
Drug Users (IDUs) and Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs). The business 
sector which was earlier seen as an adversary to fair pricing of drugs 
including ARV and ensuring universal access to affordable medicines, has 
now witnessed a transition in its role: from supplier of drugs to a „partner‟ in 
expanding access to medicines, building new markets through infrastructural 
support, and prevention and treatment programmes (Caines et al. 2004, 
Kettler et al. 2003). There is yet another cadre that the industry serves: the 
cadre of „consultants‟ or brokers who circulate in the industry based on the 
„expertise‟ sought. In the previous chapter, I briefly examine and discuss the 
role of these brokers in facilitating Fund processes in India and translating 
the project rationale into different institutional language (section 4.2.2.1). I 
build this argument further in this chapter.  
 
These diverse players, as active agents in the industry, are organised in a 
particular fashion, speak the same language seen as emerging from the 
intersection of the language of the market (contracts, efficiency, performance 
indicators, and consumption) and the political language of “communities”16 
(Rose 1996:331), plagued by acronyms around interventions and services 
(TI, ICTC, VCTC, ART), governance mechanisms (CCM, TRP, TRG) and the 
„risk‟ communities (CSW, MSM, IDU). This enables their movement within 
the industry (across and/or within constituencies and nations) to more 
                                                 
16
 Nikolas Rose (1996: 331) regards the language of community as a significant (morally invested) 
thought of contemporary political rationalities exemplified through the vocabulary of community care, 
community workers or the idea of at risk „communities‟ (gay, drug users, sex workers) carrying 
particular genes. 
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influential and rewarding positions or employment opportunities. The findings 
of my research substantiate the above statement. For example, a few senior 
managers of Fund projects and other international partner institutions who 
were interviewed were former public sector bureaucrats. There were also 
instances of project staff (outreach workers, counsellors, social workers) at 
various levels in the programme chain circulating among development 
projects and organisations. 
 
Literature and field experience highlight the emergence and growth of the 
AIDS movement as one of the most distinctive features of the AIDS politics 
and industry. Historically, several movements, particularly the feminist health 
movement, have been at the forefront of challenging the bio-medical 
hegemony over patient‟s bodies, putting patient-provider interaction centre 
stage of medical ethics. The AIDS movement, however, is argued to be the 
first social movement to engage with bio-medicine in a manner that has 
transformed the affected or the “victims” into “activist experts” (Epstein 1996). 
Shaped around an identity based on the embodiment of the illness, the 
movement is highly significant for the cultural redefinition of interactions 
between medical or technical „experts‟ and patients or „lay‟ consumers. The 
AIDS movement therefore cannot be regarded as merely a “disease 
constituency” advocating for affordable treatment and more resources but, as 
Steven Epstein (ibid:8) puts it, an “alternative basis of expertise”.  
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The movement(s) itself is broad based and includes organisations or 
networks that work with and represent „communities‟ stigmatised on the basis 
of either getting tested positive (people with HIV) or engaging in practices 
defined as “high risk” in the bio-medical and epidemiological understanding 
of the epidemic. 
 
Finally, the national AIDS programme, like in many other middle and low 
income countries, is a vertical disease control programme with a separate 
organisational structure, administration and budget provisions, enjoying a 
certain functional independence from the broader public health system. The 
control lies with the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO), an agency 
of the central government, which is responsible for formulation of the national 
policy and guidelines, technical guidance, evaluation research, procurement 
of test kits, drugs, equipment such as the cd4 machines and others. As 
described in chapter one, the national policy is implemented in states by the 
State AIDS Control Societies, which enter in an agreement with the NACO 
through a Letter of Understanding (LoU). The state divisions are officiated by 
senior bureaucrats who are deputed by NACO for brief tenures.  In recent 
years, a striking feature of the national programme has been the „territorial 
divide‟ within states whereby provision is not restricted to a defined territory 
of the public sector. Instead, clear physical and geographical demarcations 
can be seen, where agencies set up with foreign aid (such as those 
described under the concept of agencification), are responsible for 
provisioning in a particular region.  
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“In Maharashtra there are three types of services [provider] and districts are 
divided between them - MSACS [Maharashtra State AIDS Society], Avert, a 
USAID collaboration, and MDACS for Mumbai district. Some districts...are 
managed by Avert and the rest are managed by MSACS. Drop in Centres 
and CCC [Community Care Centres] which is the care and support 
component is divided [among the two agencies].” (Senior bureaucrat, State 
division of NACO) 
 
“To prevent duplication, Avert and BMGF [Gates Foundation] earmarked 
districts and were told to look after the programme for seven districts each. 
BMGF has a few districts especially for targeted interventions with sex 
workers etc. Avert has nine care centres and a lot of care and support 
projects. Avert will now be a technical support unit for Maharashtra while 
MSACS will only be the implementing agency.”(Senior project officer, State 
division of NACO) 
 
These developments are an outcome of a parallel and growing trend of what 
has earlier (in chapter two) been described as „agencification‟ of state 
entities. As discussed in chapter two and four, these structures compete with 
the state and other non-state actors for the same resources (financial, human 
and other) and programmes. With better access to skills and expertise, a 
relatively small scale of operations, and greater operational flexibility, they 
tend to outbid the State agencies in receiving grants and demonstrating 
 237 
effectiveness. An outcome of this, discussed in the previous chapter, is the 
birth of multiple projects running on different pay scales within the network of 
people with HIV. This has enhanced the re-distribution and re-organisation of 
actors within the network and produced friction between the government and 
non-government agencies. Another manifestation of this divide could be 
observed among the state employees who reported a sense of loss of control 
over programmatic outcomes since the parallel agencies had a bigger 
mandate and thus wielded more power. 
 
“Big agencies want to do everything, everywhere. The small have no role. 
And there are too many overlaps. KHPT [a partnership between Gates 
Foundation and State AIDS Society] is implementing in 18 districts, State 
Society in 9 districts. So, clearly they have an upper hand. Some NGOs get 
direct funding from them, so they don‟t feel accountable to us, do not share 
reports.”  (Senior project officer, State division of NACO) 
 
Having described the AIDS industry and the trends/ developments that 
characterise it, I now discuss how the Fund governmentality mediates these 
spaces and the intersubjectivities it creates among actors in this course.   
 
5.4 The disciplining regime of the Fund 
In this section I examine one of the many non-state actors involved in the 
Fund programme whose presence has great significance for re-defining the 
role of „civil society‟ in India: the network of people with HIV. While currently 
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several independent networks of people with HIV exist in India, the focus of 
my investigation was a network that has high visibility at both national and 
international forums and is an important stakeholder in the national 
processes triggered by the Fund.  
 
Registered in 1997 on the initiative of 12 men and women tested positive, the 
network currently has a presence in 22 states and 235 districts in India and a 
membership of 129,000 people with HIV. With its president as a 
distinguished member of national consultative committees and the country 
coordinating mechanism of the Fund, the network has a strategic presence in 
different Fund rounds through partnerships with NACO (as a sub-recipient of 
its state divisions) and as a valued partner in the civil society consortium. The 
crucial role played by the network in the consortia in different Fund rounds 
(four and six) has been discussed in the previous chapter. Through these 
alliances it implements prevention programmes and undertakes outreach 
work to ensure treatment adherence and support to people with HIV. As part 
of the latter, it is mandated to set up networks for people with HIV, in a 
phased manner, in each district of the states. My field studies involved visits 
to ten network offices (four state-level and six district-level) and a few of their 
interventions across four southern states in India.  
 
A senior board member of the network described the structure and function 
of the network as depicted in figure 10 below. The Network operates at three 
levels: i) a national secretariat or country office which is responsible for 
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“effective implementation of project deliverables” (Network website accessed 
in 2009) and national and global advocacy, ii) state level coordination units 
with the mandate of network building and developing good referrals, and 
finally iii) the district and taluka (block) level units which are responsible for 
service provision to the people with HIV and for outreach work in the 
communities. The district level units are central to the network‟s claim on 
achievements and acts as the basis on which the network and its partner 
agencies establish their credibility with respect to both the funding agency as 
well as the community.  
 
 
 
5.4.1 Interventions at the District Level Network 
District level networks (DLN), as the name suggests, are set up in districts 
across India as one of the deliverables of the network‟s Fund project. These 
Networking  
Advocacy 
Service Delivery 
Figure 9: Structure and function of the Network of People with HIV 
Source: As explained by a network member 
National network 
State Network District network 
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are independent units which are meant to serve as the first point of contact 
for people with HIV and AIDS. They act as the main service delivery point for 
the network offering a range of services including counselling (primarily to 
encourage testing and ensure adherence to treatment), organising support 
meetings for people with HIV, providing nutritional supplements and making 
referrals to ART, care and support centres. The district networks are usually 
established in a busy part of the town/district, often in the vicinity of the public 
hospital where the ART centre is located. 
 
Formally registered as societies (under the Society Registration Act), each 
DLN has a separate governance and organisational structure which 
comprises of a board and project staff varying with the number of projects 
implemented. The infrastructure usually comprises of four or five rooms, 
each run as a dedicated unit, distinguished by the Funder‟s name mounted 
on a nameplate at the entrance of each room, for the respective funding 
agency whose project is being implemented (Notes from observations). The 
number of projects run by a single DLN varies depending on its rapport with 
the state division of NACO and funding agency, which impacts on its ability to 
attract funding. Typically, most DLNs I visited had on an average five to six 
projects being implemented. Of these, the Fund, with simultaneous rounds 
operating, had a prominent presence. For example, round four and six 
funding for NGO consortium led Access to Care and Treatment (ACT),round 
two funding channelled through state division of NACO for prevention of 
parent to child transmission and drop in centres. In addition, several other 
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funding agencies have directly funded the network for projects ranging from 
micro credit or income generation programmes to strengthening the 
network‟s involvement in India CCM of GFATM. These are: HIVOS, Elton 
John Foundation, Gates Foundation, US Centre for Disease Control (CDC), 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), GlaxoSmithKline Positive Action, Family 
Health International (FHI), Concern Worldwide, UNDP among others. The 
figure below gives a glimpse of the virulence17 of interventions triggered by 
the AIDS virus at one of the sites I visited.   
 
 
                                                 
17
 The term „virulence‟ has been used to demonstrate both the severity and degree of infectiousness of 
the Fund interventions and the nature of subjectivities created by it.  
Figure 10: District level network- site of multiple projects and funders 
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5.4.2 New opportunities and complex configurations: A shift from 
critical to institutional 
With the Fund‟s emphasis on inclusion of the „voices of the affected 
community‟, participation of the people with HIV in the partnership has 
become key to successful bids. The networks therefore emerged as 
convenient sites for much of the development work around HIV and AIDS. 
The Fund opened up possibilities of engaging with „beneficiaries‟ as „activist 
experts‟ and thus, gave a boost to the presence of institutions representing 
them and their activities. As a result, the network‟s outreach expanded from 
national to sub-national (state and district) level with 102 networks set up in 
the districts of select (high prevalence) states within the first two years of the 
Fund‟s operations in India. 
 
“In most states GFATM round four has been the first funded project for the 
DLNs. Before the Fund project, a few DLNs had set up their board but did not 
have any projects to run. The Fund has built the capacity of the DLN, and 
also led all other funders to focus on them. Now, even the SACS [State AIDS 
society] is sourcing outreach projects to them.”  
(State project officer, civil society consortium) 
 
The sheer number of networks established suggests a quantum leap in 
reaching out to the people with HIV and, as a result, in improving their 
access to care and support services. The outreach work undertaken by the 
network staff was also reported to provide people with HIV a point for 
 243 
redressal of grievances with respect to unavailability of drugs, quality of 
treatment and other violations of their rights. However, district networks have 
also emerged as units running multiple projects with multiple funding sources 
and significant overlaps in their activities. Table 6 below presents the 
interventions/ activities (listed in the first row) carried out through different 
projects (listed in the first column) at one district network I visited.  
Training & 
Capacity 
Building 
of 
network 
staff
Network 
building
Counsellin
g (pre-test 
& follow 
up)
Community 
awareness/ 
Support 
Group 
meetings
Outreac
h 
services
Referals Strategy 
developm
ent 
(GIPA, 
advocacy
)
Others
1. GFATM 4 – 
Population 
Foundation of India  
x x x x x
Nutritional 
support; 
children's 
education
2. GFATM- State 
AIDS Society 
(PPTCT)
x x x x
3. USAID- 
Karnataka Health 
Promotion Trust
x x x x
4. HIVOS x x x
5. BMGF+ FHI 
(Avahan ) x x
MIS 
developmen
t
6. State AIDS 
Society (Drop In 
centre)
x x x
6. CDC x x x
Micro credit 
programme
Source: Compiled from field visits and network website 
Table 6: Project activities implemented at a district network 
 
The table illustrates the escalating prominence of the network in donor 
agendas and the disproportionate funding received by projects at one 
network site. A noteworthy observation here is that most activities are linked 
with sensitising of activists into project officers or street level bureaucrats. 
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These include network building activities such as development of the 
capacities of network staff, enrolment of new members, drafting strategies for 
advocacy, infrastructural support among others. A few projects are designed 
specifically to build capacities with respect to the Fund mechanisms, for 
example, strengthening the network‟s involvement with the CCM and other 
national processes. Moreover, a clear overlap can be seen among projects 
whereby service oriented activities such as support meetings, pre and post 
test counselling, and referrals, were supported by more than one funding 
agency. A consequence of managing these multiple demands of the different 
funding agencies was that a single intervention was recorded and reported 
under different projects.  
 
“There is a lot of duplication of enrolment. Same person is enrolled in two or 
three records or under projects. Sometimes there are 2 different identities of 
the same person.”   (Senior member, network of people with HIV) 
 
Concerned with the impact of this trend on the network, a senior member of 
the network pointed out, “Project driven network units can be threatening to 
the overall objective of the programme. Somewhere in filling the forms to 
meet enrolment numbers and maintain records, the network has diverted 
from its objectives and lost its vision. Most networks are worried only about 
getting new funding.”  
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This view was expressed more strongly by a public sector bureaucrat at the 
state level while highlighting the duplication of activities the networks give 
rise to.  
“Ultimately from the programme point of view, output to society is very less. 
There is a lot of wastage of resources. For instance, trainings- same person 
gets different trainings even though it is not relevant to their task. 
(Senior officer, state division of NACO) 
 
5.4.3 Translating the discourse through the Fund brokers: Sensitisation 
of the ‘beneficiaries’ into ‘activist experts’ 
The district network acts as the site where the project „beneficiaries‟ are 
enrolled as supporters and „sensitised‟, serving both ideational and 
interactive dimension of the Schmidt (2004) framework. The need and 
appropriateness of the project were established by its ability to role out 
further projects. The objectives of the Fund programme were reinforced by 
translating them into a common language and endorsement of the 
„beneficiaries‟ through support group meetings and counselling sessions. The 
network board and the project employees- DLN officer, social worker, peer 
counsellor and others - through a series of orientation meetings, learned to 
reproduce the project rationalities (and significance of working in partnership) 
and encourage people with HIV to “express their problems in conformity with 
the prevailing discourse”, what Bierschenk (1988) refers to as “sensitisation”.  
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In accordance with the above argument, the level of awareness of project 
objectives, rationale and deliverables among the DLN project officers was 
high. Each respondent had a good understanding of the deliverables, the 
monthly and quarterly progress reports and the significance of reporting 
through computerised management information system (CMIS) for the Fund 
project as well as other projects being implemented at the district network. 
The network members were highly receptive to such knowledge and, as 
evident from the case study presented below, used it to manipulate the 
environment to achieve locally relevant outcomes and establish their 
credibility. 
 
Case Study 3 
Community outreach work undertaken through the district networks, as 
mentioned earlier, acts as the basis on which the i) network‟s involvement is 
sought and, ii) partner organisations (the civil society consortium, in this 
case) made claims on successive rounds of funding. The network carried out 
much of its care and support work through its peer education strategy 
implemented at district level.  
 
At the inception stage of the Fund round four programme in April 2005, the 
network identified master trainers from among the district network pool 
(primarily the district network officer) for further training. The master trainers 
were imparted a four to five day training by a partner organisation of the civil 
society consortium. Subsequently, people with HIV who were on ART were 
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identified and after a three day training program conducted by the Master 
trainer, qualified as Peer Treatment Educators. Each peer educator was 
allotted certain number of people with HIV, including those on ART as well as 
drop outs, to be reached with treatment education on adherence and other 
services like counselling and referrals. Other responsibilities of the peer 
treatment officer included: generating awareness in the community, and 
mobilizing people with HIV to participate in monthly support meetings at 
district network. The project had a provision for each peer educator to 
receive a monthly honorarium of INR 400/- towards travel and other 
incidental expenses in relation to their work (Quarterly Progress Reports of 
member organisations). 
 
However, the PTE model on which treatment adherence (and by default the 
entire care and support component) rested, failed to generate results. The 
project staff attributed the failure to several factors. Firstly, an adequate 
number of people with HIV taking ART could not be identified to be 
counselled or enrolled in the network. Failure to enrol was ascribed to factors 
such as conflict at the public health facilities (as described earlier in chapter 
4) and stigma and discrimination prevalent in the community. Secondly, peer 
educators were not willing to work in their own vicinity for the fear of being 
identified as positive and thus, discriminated against. These factors were 
reported as hindrance to the achievement of “optimal” performance. In view 
of this, “strategic shifts” were made to the strategy of peer treatment 
education from July 2006 (sixth quarter of Phase 1 of the programme) 
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onwards. In the revised strategy, a new cadre of Treatment Outreach Worker 
(TOW), not necessarily people with HIV, was recruited in the district 
networks, trained as master trainer and expected to further train people with 
HIV as prospective peer educators. The peer educators were no longer 
allotted people with HIV to follow. Instead, they had to conduct three to four 
sub-district/taluka level support group meetings each month under the 
supervision of outreach coordinator. Issues like treatment education, 
adherence, nutrition, and other supportive services/information were 
expected to emerge/ be discussed in these meetings. Moreover, a cost 
cutting exercise was undertaken whereby the honorarium of INR 400/- was 
withdrawn to “promote volunteerism” (PFI 2007).  
 
While the revised strategy was being implemented, the project observed a 
high turnover of the existing peer educators. As on September 2006, only 30 
percent of trained peer educators remained. In view of the shift in the 
strategy, the roles of peer educators were not clear at the service delivery 
level. Initially, each person with HIV on treatment was expected to be met at 
least once a month in order to ensure adherence to treatment regime. 
However, as per the new strategy, a monthly meeting of not more than 20 to 
25 people with HIV was expected to achieve similar results. Further, there 
was no clarity on who could be covered through the group meetings: those 
who had recently started ART or old cases (Findings of the evaluation 
exercise). 
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“We have a target of 30 enrolments per month. How do I ensure that 
number? To get peer educators for training programmes is another 
challenge. There is no per diem, so how can we motivate them to come for 
four days?”  (Project officer, district network) 
 
Realising the delay in meeting the deliverables, the network‟s partner 
organisation (also the principal recipient for the civil society consortium) was 
quick to commission a special study to “review the existing approach and 
provide inputs to strengthen it”. While I was involved in the initial stages of 
conceptualising the study, a leading social science institute was contracted 
for the purpose of carrying out the research. The institute held consultative 
workshops in each of the six high prevalence states with multiple 
stakeholders including the peer educators (functioning as well as the drop-
outs). The outcome of the consultation was an operational research study 
report, one of the deliverables of the Fund. Some of the issues that emerged 
from these are listed below.  
 
Firstly, remuneration emerged as the most critical issue for all participants. 
The field visits were both physically and financially demanding for the peer 
educator due to long distance travel and inaccessible areas. The withdrawal 
had greater significance for women peer educators, particularly those who 
had lost or were caring for their sick husbands. While several participants 
upheld the spirit of volunteerism, a few peer educators vehemently opposed 
its implementation to peer education component. A peer educator expressed, 
 250 
“Voluntary social work is meant for elites, not for us. It does not fill our 
bellies”.  
 
Secondly, the remaining peer educators were overburdened as there was a 
shortage of trained staff, lack of medicines, skills to handle complex issues 
and resources (including transportation). Their discontent was compounded 
since other NGOs and networks had a provision for fixed salary to their 
outreach staff. This resulted in frustration and de-motivation and 
consequently, low accountability and a high turnover.  
 
Thirdly, there was escalating power politics and autocracy among other 
“professional” members (i.e. the new cadre of TOW) of the network who, as 
reported, did not treat the peer educators with dignity. This not only affected 
the motivation of remaining peer educators but also the solidarity amongst 
people with HIV. Moreover, it impacted programme output (with a significant 
drop in the adherence rates) as peer educators were a crucial link between 
the network and the clients.  
 
Discussion: Reproducing rationalities 
The experience of peer educators and the rationalities developed in the 
process reveals the chain of “translation” that occurs at the interface of global 
aid mechanisms and local struggle for credibility.  
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At first sight, sensitisation takes place at the interface between the aid giver 
(in this case, the Fund) and the receiver (the consortium members) where 
the authority of the protocol and the underlying ideas is established. The 
previous chapter discusses this in greater detail referring to this interface as 
sites where alliances are forged between influential partners, 
interdependencies are established and ideas are packaged into projects and 
sold to the partner and implementing organisations as innovations. Peer 
education approach, for example, was not new. It was earlier implemented 
as „targeted intervention‟ within the national AIDS programme whereby 
individuals from vulnerable communities such as MSM or drug users were 
trained. These in turn „educated‟ their peers. Local NGOs working with these 
marginalised groups were mostly contracted by the government for this 
purpose. Responding to the „innovative‟ and „GIPA‟ stipulations of the Fund, 
the approach was re-packaged and thrust on the state and district networks 
for implementation. This was primarily to ensure treatment adherence, an 
objective around which the consortium programme was structured. However, 
unlike other “high-risk” communities, since these were not localised 
populations from which „clients‟ could be identified, the peer educators 
strategy failed to meet enrolment targets given to them. 
 
“The Peer treatment educator concept worked for „targeted interventions‟ 
because these are specific localised communities, so outreach activities can 
be undertaken. The same concept is applied to this project but to a much 
dispersed population that comes to specific service delivery points. So, most 
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of the time peer educators don‟t know how and where to meet their targets 
from.” (Project officer, Network of people with HIV) 
 
Moreover, since peer educators were the only link between the networks and 
the clients, the success of the program depended solely on how integrated 
they were in the national and state networks. The revised strategy however, 
failed to address the substantive issues:  power hierarchies within the 
network, motivations for peer educator, and the wider stigma prevalent in the 
community.  
 
The training workshops, reviews, and operational research serve as the 
second site for translation. The project officers are sensitised into their official 
or institutional role, enabling them to reproduce political rationalities even 
though it ran counter to their local experience. For example, despite the firm 
commitment to “for PLHA18 by PLHA approach”, the peer educator posts 
(similar to that of project officers) were opened to non HIV positive people, 
often the reputed members of the community. Ideas embedded in the human 
rights discourse were woven together with ideas emerging from technocratic 
programmes whereby, the peer educators must be „sensitised‟ to alter their 
mindset to work voluntarily, „speak out‟19 in the communities, and others.  
 
                                                 
18
 People living with HIV/AIDS is the common term used by the network members as well as partner 
agencies. In the thesis however, I use the phrase people with HIV instead.  The phrase „for PLHA by 
PLHA‟ is used as a strategy to involve the infected as the provider of services. 
19
 „Speak out‟ is a common term used in the AIDS industry. It refers to the practice of disclosing one‟s 
HIV status in public. Projects and interventions at the grassroots are increasingly facilitating „speak 
out‟ sessions in the community with the understanding that the person who has disclosed will act as a 
role model for other people with HIV/AIDS, thus address stigma in the community. 
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Finally, at the end of the translation chain, are the very „beneficiaries‟ the 
project seeks to empower. Peer educators, the product of a three day 
training programme, similar to other project officers of the network, were 
highly receptive to and reproduced the knowledge gained at the orientation 
meetings. They unequivocally endorsed the strength of peer education 
approach to combat stigma and discrimination in their community in spite of it 
being the very reason for their inability to enrol clients or for not serving in 
their own communities. 
 
“The PTE [peer treatment education] programme proved extremely beneficial 
to tackle issues related to stigma and discrimination.”  
 
“It has helped in removing HIV/AIDS related fears and instilling faith and 
hope for a better life. This had been possible due to the knowledge we 
gained in the trainings and the referrals we could make for care and support 
services.”  (Peer educators at the consultation meeting) 
 
Even though the behaviour and practices of the „beneficiaries‟ is regulated at 
the first instance, they subsequently learn to manipulate the environment to 
achieve locally relevant outcomes and establish their credibility. Nearly two 
years into the project (April 2005 to March 2007, when the study concluded), 
the consultation participants mutually re-established the need for – 
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 Re-introducing the remuneration to peer educators and providing an 
increment for achievement of minimum targets; 
 More comprehensive training for a longer duration (equivalent to that 
of master trainers), and provision of refresher training courses and 
modules;  
 Developing an efficient system of reporting to increase peer 
educator‟s accountability and orientation on basic documentation and 
reporting skills; and 
 Provision of day care shelter, nutrition, livelihood support and income 
generation opportunities to peer educators.  
 
These decisions subsequently transpired into further project plans, 
proposals, and funding opportunities.    
 
5.4.4 Translating figures into achievements and gaps 
An innovative and distinct feature of the Fund programmes in India is its 
claim to technology centred management of information or statistics. Each 
network office is provided with computers that have a management 
information system (CMIS) installed and a network officer who undergoes 
training to handle the software. Besides the computerised input, the 
employees are required to maintain extensive documentation in the form of 
registers and forms for every interaction undertaken and each activity 
performed. This implies that at any given point, the project staff in the 
network unit were maintaining between six and seven registers: a master 
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register of all people with HIV enrolled, record of every individual counselled 
(separate records for those taking ART and those who are not), all support 
meetings organised, peer educator trainings held and their minutes, each 
person followed up on treatment, peer educator‟s working registers, and 
other similar records. Information from all these registers is then entered into 
cumbersome databases (on computer) accessible to the state and national 
network office, and the partner agencies.  Additionally, progress reports are 
generated at the end of each month both by the state and the network head 
office, collating the information from different districts, to be submitted to the 
Fund every quarter. 
 
A common complaint of all respondents (in network offices as well as other 
service delivery centres) was the excessive burden of paperwork and 
reporting linked to the Fund‟s activities and deliverables. To handle all this 
workload, there were a total of at least five employees within the Fund project 
at the district network: network officer, social worker, peer counsellor, 
outreach worker and accountant. During my visits to the DLN, a majority of 
staff was found absent, leaving one or two individuals to manage the records 
alongside their other responsibilities including home visits, counselling and 
other provisions. Moreover, given the multitude of projects functional at the 
network office, there was an abundance of training programmes20 to build the 
capacities of the project officers at all levels. These take up a considerable 
                                                 
20
 A variety of “training and capacity building” programmes as mandated by different funding 
agencies and NGOs took a considerable staff time. Training content ranged from project orientation to 
advocacy and institutional development. Several international agencies- Futurz plus, Engender Health, 
Insa India and others – have capacity building as their primary role in the partnership.  
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time from their working hours. Despite the thrust on capacity and skill 
building, respondents revealed that the workforce and their capacities were 
not sufficient to cope with the scale of interventions the network was 
engaging with. This also emerged as a barrier in effective documentation.  
 
“All are NGOs working in two or three districts. Suddenly we are expected to 
cover so many more districts and achieve high targets. Earlier there were 
very few district networks, mainly supported by Gates Foundation. Through 
the Fund we have MoU with 22 districts in our state and four more this 
month. This is the scale we are talking about. The staff at the State network 
is also not adequate to support and supervise.”  (Senior member, State 
network of people with HIV) 
 
“Much of the time the majority of the staff is away on trainings. Only I am left 
to do the record keeping. Others have very poor education levels and no 
skill. So, the entire burden of record keeping is on me.”  (Project officer, 
district network for people with HIV) 
 
Being responsible for a majority of the deliverables of the civil society 
consortium (in Fund round four), the network was also the target of the 
interventions of other members of the consortium. As a result, besides 
meeting the demands of the state network offices, the Fund project officers at 
the district network had to respond to increasing demands of the consortium 
partners. These included participating in training programmes, a deliverable 
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of an international NGO partner; making subjects (people with HIV or peer 
educators) available for operations research studies to be conducted by a 
NGO partner.  These deliverables, although regarded unrealistic, had to be 
met.  
 
“It was very hectic. By the time we started one study, the concept of the next 
study was sent. As per mandate...[a partner organisation] has to do all these 
8 operational researches in the first phase or the programme.”  (Project 
officer, network member civil society consortium) 
 
At other instances, the staff such as the counsellor and outreach worker 
complained of not finding time to perform their primary duties because they 
are required to fill in for other staff and complete documentation while they 
are away on training programmes. As most respondents pointed out, the 
stress on reporting and evaluation is linked to the „performance based‟ nature 
of the Global Fund grant.  The project staffs, particularly the outreach 
workers, is under constant pressure to meet the deliverables or outputs 
against which the performance is measured. For instance, reported monthly 
targets included “30 new enrolments”, “four support group meetings per 
taluka (block)”, “1000 peer treatment educators trained by 2010” among 
others. As a result, various strategies were adopted by the staff to meet the 
targets. These included providing added incentives like nutritional support or 
employees of the TCC coercing people with HIV to visit the network while 
they came for testing. 
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“Prior to opening the TCC [an intervention by the network] in the public 
hospital, we [the district network] had 30-40 clients every month. After TCC 
the number has increased to 70. They [the TCC staff] convince the PLHA to 
visit the DLN during lunch hour. We provide lunch and sometimes staying 
facility. That is how we get our clients.”  (Project officer, District level network) 
 
“DLN [District level network] people do only one thing: increase their 
membership. One of their founders is a doctor who is popular for treating 
PLHA. So he refers to their pharmacy and the DLN does not inform them of 
the free medication provided at the government centre.” (Member of an 
independent network of people with HIV)  
 
Pressure to meet targets in a competitive and uncertain environment that has 
resulted from the creation of several „monster-like-projects‟21 has led the 
different constituencies in making  counter-claims on the achievement of 
outcomes of one project vis-à-vis the other. The formats, registers and 
operational research studies thus become crucial sites for establishing the 
organisational relevance to the Fund as well as employees competence in 
the project. Both in turn translate to making claims on the next cycle of the 
grant and legitimise the re-organisation of key people in the project cycle.  
 
                                                 
21
 The nature of this term has been teased out in the previous chapter. The term relates to the 
proliferation of several independent units/ structures in response to the yearly rounds of the Fund. 
Once established, these units grow out of their shelf life and strive to attain sustainability and make 
claims on the limited resources 
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Thus, the process of translation is not unidirectional i.e. it does not begin at 
the interface of aid givers and ends with recruiting the „beneficiaries‟. Rather, 
the system is maintained through a constant cycle of interpretation: 
translating the meaning of a project in different institutional languages (top to 
bottom) and at the same time translating back the significance of the project 
(bottom upwards) by using tools such as progress reports and operational 
research (OR) studies and organising speak out sessions in an attempt to 
illustrate the reduced level of stigma. In the process, the Fund brokers render 
the “beneficiaries” to the development apparatus and simultaneously 
reinstate the legitimacy of their own role and ease organisational access to 
the Fund revenue (Neubert 2000:256).  
 
5.5 Towards sustainability 
In this environment of fierce competition and multiple project sites 
established, maintaining organisational sustainability i.e. the ability of an 
organisation to constantly seek new funds and projects becomes imperative. 
Since the district networks rely only on project funding, which on average 
lasts for two to five years, the network board is on constant lookout for new 
funders and projects.  
 
“Sustainability of DLNs will be an issue unless they start a self supporting 
mechanism. Each office, like a community based organisation, has to 
individually fund itself. They should not be dependent on ACT [Fund 
programme] alone.” (Senior governing member, Network for people with HIV) 
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5.5.1 Multiple ‘partnership’ models for delivery of ART 
 
Case Study 4: „Partnering‟ with a pharmaceutical company 
Taal is an initiative of the network set up in partnership with a pharmaceutical 
company, to dispense antiretroviral and opportunistic infection drugs at 
subsidised costs.  Since the public script behind its creation was to fill in the 
treatment deficit created by the over burdened public health systems and 
unaffordable private sector, the network‟s website refers to it as “a 
partnership to bail out persons in private ART facility”. 
 
“We want people to use the government services but they are apprehensive 
to go and get medicines from the centre. There is a long waiting period and 
they have to go many times to get all tests done. So, we started the 
pharmacy in January 2006 because at that time there was a shortage of 
medicines. Emcure gives us drugs at rock bottom prices. We add 5-10% 
extra for our maintenance costs and sell it for 250/- when the market price is 
419/-.”  (Senior member, State network of people with HIV) 
 
“Basic reason [for preferring Taal over government services] is confidentiality 
and time. You have to wait at least 2 to 3 hours for drugs in government 
hospital whereas I deliver it in 15 minutes. Also I retain privacy. Diagnosis of 
HIV is a big hurdle. People don‟t know their sero-positive status leave alone 
CD4 count…And there is stigma which is why they are not ready to come for 
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treatment. Behaviour of government doctors is really bad. So when they don‟t 
have any money, only then they go there.”  (Project officer, State network of 
people with HIV) 
 
“We offer entire package…we also have a positive living centre [another 
service point run by the NGO consortium], so a doctor is available to visit. 
For CD4 count, x-rays, blood report and other tests we have established links 
through them and with one of the private clinics. But people prefer to get CD4 
done from government itself because outside it costs around 570/- while in 
government it is free.”  (Project officer, Network of people with HIV) 
 
The model, although heralded as a „one-stop-treatment-shop‟ providing 
treatment literacy, all types of counselling, peer support and referrals, was 
dependent on either the public or private health facility for laboratory tests 
and hospital admissions (inpatient facilities). Bureaucrats and project officers 
at the state divisions of NACO and the medical staff at the public ART 
centres resented this initiative and expressed concern over the duplication of 
effort and potential deception of patients who were being charged for a 
service that is provided free in the public hospitals. A senior bureaucrat in the 
state division of NACO expressed: 
 
“They [the network of people with HIV] have started their own drug 
distribution centres, their own opportunist(ic) infection treatment, their 
doctors... But for investigations, or when the patient is unable to afford, they 
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send them to public health facility. Why the need to duplicate? They should 
add to the programme. Our need is to encourage institutional delivery, 
partner testing and counselling and, tackle stigma and discrimination. That is 
what needs attention.” (Senior bureaucrat, State division of NACO) 
 
Case Study 5 – Graduated cost recovery model: An NGO-GO „partnership‟ 
Under round two of the Fund grant, NACO, the principal recipient of the 
grant, entered into an arrangement with a leading NGO working on HIV and 
AIDS to offer low cost drugs through price negotiations with the 
pharmaceutical company. The hidden transcript that emerged from the 
interviews revealed that the partnership was commissioned in accordance 
with the recommendation made by the Technical Review Panel (TRP) of the 
Fund in Geneva, to address the lacunae on the basis of which the proposal 
for round two was initially rejected. Addressing the protocol, the CCM put 
together a NGO consortium to deliver part of the mandate. The consortium 
comprised of three agencies: two pioneering organisations in the field of HIV 
and a quasi governmental institution (autonomous body under Government 
of Maharashtra). While the latter was meant to be the lead agency for the 
project, it was unable to handle the wide scope and demands (with respect to 
documentation) of the project. A decision was therefore made, by virtue of 
which, the funds were channelled to the three agencies via the government 
instead of directly from the Fund.  
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“Organisation Y [one of the three members of the NGO consortium] fell 
grossly short of being able to handle this project. So the net result was that 
though it was originally supposed to be a consortium led initiative, because 
they were unable to take anything forward, we finally decided that the 
respective organisations will work directly with NACO.”  [Project officer, sub 
recipient NGO consortium] 
 
However, the launch of the cost-recovery initiative was delayed considerably. 
The delay, in part, was at the proposal acceptance stage by the Global Fund, 
and subsequently, in the release of the funds from NACO to the respective 
agencies. This was soon followed by central government‟s decision to 
introduce free antiretroviral through the national programme. 
 
“When the proposal was put in, it was considered a very unique strategy 
because at that time antiretroviral was considered frightfully expensive. What 
it meant was that we would get into negotiations with pharmaceutical 
companies and have clients recruited at various levels: from those who pay 
the price at which the drugs are negotiated to those who will get them free. 
But by the time the project actually came through and the money was 
released, one and half years had gone by and few months later the 
government announced its free roll out.”  (Senior management, member of 
NGO consortium) 
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The decision itself was, as it emerged from the interviews held with key 
informants, a politically motivated move by the government to garner support 
before the elections.  
 
“Sushma Swaraj [the then health minister] launched this in April 2004, was 
more of an election gimmick. The elections were round the corner. The first 
round of polling was 10th April and she announced it on 1st April.” 
(Senior bureaucrat, Fund governance) 
 
“I also discovered that it was more of a political thing because the idea was 
the ministry comes out with something substantial before elections…It was a 
topless policy because there was absolutely no planning as to how the 
government will go about it. The minister‟s statement was that by April 2005 
we will have 100,000 people on ART. The Planning Commission asked 
where she is going to get the money or how will she reach out? That 
question was never answered.” (Senior management, NGO consortium) 
 
The decision however posed as a major hindrance for the organisation in 
achieving its deliverables for the round two of the Fund and thus impacted its 
performance. As part of the review exercise undertaken at the end of phase 
one (i.e. second year of implementation), the targets were re-negotiated with 
Global Fund and brought down to “a more realistic level”. However, the Fund 
did not agree to an altogether suspension of this component from the 
country‟s mandate. As a result, the organisation adopted a two pronged 
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strategy: (i) to „sell‟ the cost recovery model by making counter claims on the 
quality of drugs and treatment provided in the public health facilities, and (ii) 
to look out for alternative partners to bid for the next round of the Fund. 
 
“Government roll out became a big challenge for this particular project. Why 
would anyone come here and pay for drugs when there is a free roll out? So 
this is an ongoing challenge. But we have tried to do our best and managed 
to achieve numbers simply by focusing on issues of quality.”  
(Senior management, recipient NGO) 
 
“The project is formally supposed to end next year and we are now more or 
less on target in terms of the numbers, although the challenges continue to 
persist. Because of the free roll out, there is tremendous pressure on NACO 
that they somehow need to get numbers. So the focus continues to be more 
on increasing numbers in the government roll out rather than looking at any 
of the other alternatives, which are all similar initiatives.” 
(Senior project officer, NGO consortium) 
 
5.5.2 Social Mobility22 
The presence of multiple donors funding different projects facilitates 
movement of personnel within and outside the network.  The movement is 
particularly stark in case of the Fund, which as described in earlier chapters, 
                                                 
22
 Social mobility in this context is described as the movement or opportunities for movement between 
different social groups in terms of security of employment, income, opportunities for professional and 
social advancement at workplace or in community.   
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has rounds commencing every year, with different objective, partnership 
arrangement and funding. The Fund, therefore, legitimates parallel projects 
under one umbrella programme. This implies that an organisation A which 
partners with B in one Fund round is also able to undertake a separate set of 
activities (with different fund and salary structures) through partnership with a 
third organisation C, in another round. This directs the movement of 
personnel from one to another organisation and/ or project thus reinstating 
„professional‟ and „social mobility‟ as the defining and organising principle of 
the AIDS industry (Khanna 2009). This mobility is highly asymmetrical, to the 
detriment of projects running on lesser funds, grassroots advocacy groups, 
and finally the public health sector since they lose their human workforce and 
considerable investments in training and capacity building, orientation to the 
monitoring mechanisms, and the use of technology. Influential and 
resourceful stakeholders such as the corporate sector, internationally funded 
NGOs, and independent institutions which are an outcome of the partnership 
arrangements have drawn senior bureaucrats from the state divisions of 
NACO. The personnel who move from public bureaucracy into international 
bureaucracies prove an asset for managing the Fund projects owing to their 
relations with the state government employees and the authority they 
command at the intervention sites where they continue to be regarded as 
representing the government.   
 
“Because I was a senior officer at SACS previously, I knew most officers 
there. So, coordinating with them wasn‟t a problem and the introductory part 
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was very smooth. Only thing that changed on my resume was that I was now 
on the other side of the table.”  (Senior project officer, civil society 
consortium) 
 
Likewise, recruiting former network employees ensured community 
acceptance, credibility through their experience in outreach work in the 
community and greater involvement of people with HIV (GIPA). In the context 
of the network this mobility manifested at two levels: 
 
i) External or outward mobility from the network to Indian operations of 
international partner agencies, corporate service centres, or to higher 
positions in competing networks of people with HIV. 
 
“Positive women‟s network [an independent network operating at a smaller 
scale] persons have gone out from here. The president of our board had 
gone for training when she was offered a better job by their president to set 
up new networks. They offered good salary etc.”  (Board member of a district 
network) 
 
ii) Internal mobility within the network was observable in senior management 
(state and country office) and at the level of implementation (district office). 
Movement within the district network- a site of multiple programmes and 
funding agencies, disparate technologies, working environment, and 
rewards- was more common.  
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“Pay scales [of different projects] cannot be matched. Despite a degree and 
years of experience, I get half of what the other project staff in our network 
draws. The coordinator of that project is planning to move to state level, I will 
try to get a transfer to that post”.  (Project officer, district network) 
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Impact on the ‘civil society’: widening or shrinking spaces? 
The AIDS epidemic has given voice as well as visibility to non-state actors as 
organisers, planners, implementers, and advocates. From the very onset of 
the epidemic, they have been at the forefront of promoting prevention, care 
and treatment. Their contribution has ranged from addressing stigma and 
generating awareness in the communities to importing ARV drugs when 
none existed as part of the national programme. For example, a local 
organisation which started the first care and support unit in India in mid 
1990s (with subsequent assistance by the NACO), began importing 
antiretroviral for its clients in 2000, four years prior to its introduction in the 
programme. However, earlier the programme was structured around a 
centralised state that sought out NGOs to play an active role in addressing 
the epidemic in the community. In doing so, these non-state actors extended 
the state authority. The entry of the Fund and the authority of its protocol, 
which mandates civil society involvement as principal recipient, have 
transformed this equation.  
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Firstly, the imposition of global structures and ideas on local systems 
facilitates a reconfiguration of non-state actors around newer forms of 
expertise and power centres. This is made possible as the Fund facilitates 
the entry of organisations that enjoy a certain level of credibility owing to one 
or all of the following attributes: 1) their access to resources, which includes 
expertise of Fund brokers, to translate „innovative‟ project ideas into 
successful bids, 2) their international standing and links with the government, 
and 3) their ability to generate support of the „beneficiaries‟ (in this case, the 
people with HIV). These organisations include international organisations 
whose registration as Indian entities and national organisations whose 
movement into the AIDS industry can be traced around the same time as the 
entry of the Fund. On the other hand, some local and community based 
groups remain at the mercy of the government for minimal grants to run care 
centres or provide ad-hoc group counselling at the treatment centres. Failure 
to maintain computerised records or detailed registers is understood as a 
marker of „inefficiency‟ and „non-performance‟ and often results in the 
withholding of these small grants leading to a closure of activities. This 
aspect is further explored in the following chapter (chapter six). While some 
networks have come into being in the wake of the Fund, the existence of 
many others is threatened. Often, the latter include women‟s networks and 
other marginalised and grassroots groups who remain in the periphery of the 
spaces that global initiatives like the Fund create. Their invisibility from the 
Fund arrangements limits their visibility in the industry and thus their ability to 
make claim on country wide resources. In order to sustain in such 
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competitive environment, they therefore ally with the workforce at the public 
hospitals who are already hostile to the more prominent network‟s activities 
or the Fund partners. They establish their credibility by providing counselling 
and other outreach services voluntarily and make counter claims on the work 
of more prominent networks.  
 
This necessitates a re-visit of our understanding of the „civil society‟. The 
Fund‟s particular strength is regarded as “boosting the engagement of NGOs 
and faith-based agencies, bringing them into planning structures and 
enabling their access to significant funds” (Biesma et al. 2009). However, 
exposing the hidden transcript demands critical questions to be asked: Who 
are the actors that are involved and, as a result, empowered through these 
arrangements? How do hierarchies get reproduced through these 
interactions? Can country wide operations of associations of the business 
sector (Global Business Coalition, Confederation of Indian Industries, 
Pharma companies) and the bilateral and international agencies be treated at 
par with local and grassroots groups undertaking advocacy and prevention 
activities and working with the marginalised communities since the start of 
the epidemic? Yet, it is the former and not the latter which has visibility in the 
Fund governance. Of the latter, only those actors who are able to conform to 
the „ethos‟ of the AIDS industry are able to have a stake in the national 
processes. Amoore and Langley (2004) have argued that the term „civil 
society‟ enables a dishonest creation of an idealised space where a large 
collection of individuals and organisations are assumed to pool their interests 
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to secure optimal outcomes. In agreement and on the basis of the evidence 
presented in this chapter, I argue that this notion of civil society underplays 
differences and power relations between various institutions and confers 
spurious legitimacy on policy decisions and the actions of international 
agencies and global governance strategies. This results in reinforcing rather 
than challenging the „democratic deficit‟ of the international systems 
(Anderson and Rieff 2004, Seckinelgin 2003).  
 
Secondly, it has increased inequities within the programme and as a result, 
dissatisfaction among health workers and other actors in the industry across 
the different constituencies: public, private-for-profit and not-for-profit. The 
apparent transition from critical to increasingly technical discourses, in order 
to fit in with formalised models and frameworks of mainstream development 
agencies, has also changed the very nature of „expertise‟ that was earlier 
rewarded. For instance, the cadre of community workers who are the main 
links with the community (responsible for generating awareness on treatment 
through community education and home visits, strengthening links with the 
community) are encouraged to work voluntarily whereas employees with 
professional degrees (in social work and management) and computer skills 
are increasingly sought to fill up network positions. Moreover, the 
environment of inequities instilled through different pay scales for the same 
activity under differently funded projects within the network has also resulted 
in increasing discontent among workers. This has led to a high project-
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specific turn over (peer counsellors and other employees) and thus impacted 
the actual links with the community and follow up.  
 
Finally, as David Mosse (2004) argues, success of policy models is not 
inherent but depends upon stabilization of particular interpretations/ 
narratives. The more the interests that are attached to a particular policy 
interpretation, the more secure and stable the policy approach becomes.  
Evidently, as case studies 3 and 4 suggest, within the AIDS industry the „civil 
society‟ constituency acts as the “interpretive communities” that are needed 
to socially sustain the discursive model of partnerships and reproduce all its 
underlying ideas on volunteerism, greater involvement of people with HIV, 
and other. The success also arises from, as Bruno Latour (1996:78) argues, 
“their ability to continually recruit support and impose their growing 
coherence on those who oppose them”.  
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Chapter 6 
Knowledge production, translation and management: 
Examining the Monitoring and Evaluation 
mechanisms of the Fund 
 
“...People cannot even fill registers and they are computerising everything. 
They are making us run before we learn to crawl!” 
– Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The performance oriented protocol of the Fund makes the disbursement, 
management, and utilisation of the funds an integral and, as highlighted in 
the previous chapters, exhaustive component of the grant cycle. In this 
context, the process of production and translation of „knowledge‟ gains 
significance for its ability to demonstrate effectiveness. In this chapter I 
discuss how the interpretive communities created by the Fund protocol utilise 
this knowledge to legitimise the project rationale and practice in order to 
make justified claims over further resources and stabilise the Fund 
organisation.  
 
Several systems and mechanisms are therefore set up to ensure regular 
generation and translation of „facts‟ on deliverables to enable reporting by the 
chain of brokers within the Fund system. These operate at different levels: i) 
the global secretariat which monitors and reviews the country performance 
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through „Local Fund Agents‟ (LFA) and independent country wide evaluations 
of the programme, ii) India CCM which has the mandate of „oversight‟ of the 
national programmes for the three focal diseases, and where officers in-
charge of the respective programmes present the progress; iii) separate M&E 
division and project offices of national recipients who monitor the sub-
recipients, their data collection and reporting systems. 
 
However, the task of monitoring the performance, and consequently the 
process of production and translation of knowledge, is impeded by several 
difficulties arising due to asymmetrical flow of information and power, multiple 
levels of international and national bureaucracy, and conflicting interests 
operating within the partnership environment. Another challenge is the weak 
capacities in resource poor settings further constrained by high turnover of 
human resources in a highly competitive environment of public and private 
provision. This aspect has also been highlighted by previous research 
(Guinness 2005) in the area of HIV and AIDS in India. These difficulties are 
compounded in time-bound evaluations of health partnerships by difficulties 
of attribution of specific contributions of the different actors to specific outputs 
(Oliveira-Cruz 2007). Attribution is impractical since outcomes result from 
long term efforts, multiple interventions and investments, and endogenous 
and exogenous determinants, and are accounted for using country‟s national 
systems. Thus, several factors determine the implementation of the AIDS 
programme and service delivery in a complex multi-funded terrain. This 
interplay of factors and the resulting difficulties in attribution to specific 
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intervention is also acknowledged in other studies on global health. Biesma 
et al. (2009) thus call for the need for assessing value for money through 
donor-specific measurements of performance.  
 
These challenges in producing knowledge and utilising it to rationalise 
practices and representations make it imperative to carry out an analysis of 
how knowledge acts as a determinant of social relationships and 
organisational cultures within the partnership environment. As Bina Desai (in 
Lewis and Mosse 2006) articulates, “actors produce knowledge, and 
knowledge makes actors”. In the context of the Fund, the actors in their role 
of „brokering‟ the delivery and management, strategically employ (and 
demonstrate) certain types of knowledge to legitimise their professional 
identities while moving or negotiating between organisations.  Knowledge 
thus becomes an essential resource in negotiating differences and 
presenting the tensions of daily practice as stories of success.  
 
This knowledge-power-practice link is the object of analysis of this chapter. I 
seek to understand how conflicting perspectives and the disjuncture between 
theory and practice are turned into consensus when presented upwards in 
the chain/hierarchy of the Fund. The various motivations for the Fund brokers 
and the ways in which they manipulate their environment to balance official 
realities with ground realities are examined and its possible implication for 
the programme is discussed. At the outset, the policy and tools adopted for 
monitoring and evaluation of the Fund programme are explicated. This is 
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followed by an examination of monitoring practices as a departure from the 
official transcript.  
 
In the previous two chapters, I discuss partnerships in practice or the Fund 
governance on the ground and examine the characteristics of the interpretive 
communities created by the Fund and the role they play in stabilising the 
system. This chapter examines the Fund protocol (or mechanisms) in further 
detail and discusses the process of stabilising the discourse i.e. how 
knowledge is generated, translated, and managed and how ground level 
practices are manipulated to stabilise the AIDS programme and the Fund 
system.  
 
Similar to the previous two chapters, the evidence for this chapter was drawn 
from a combination of information sources: interview data and notes from 
direct observation of the operations at the implementation sites, district visits 
and monitoring structures such as state coordination meetings. In addition, I 
referred to minutes of CCM and state coordination meetings, reports and 
other documentation related to NACP III, GFATM score cards, evaluation 
reports and statistical information gathered from the centres. Finally, I also 
made use of informal accounts and documents (e.g. emails, letters, 
presentations) as provided by key informants and NGO representatives.  
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6.2 Knowledge production and translation tools 
6.2.1 Financial Management and audit system of the Fund 
The Fund operates on an independent Local Fund Agent (LFA) based 
financial management and audit model whereby an independent agency with 
a country presence is contracted to “oversee, verify and report on grant 
performance” to enable the Fund board to take funding decisions. The LFA 
regards itself as the “eyes and ears of the Global Fund in the field” with its 
mandate restricted to “ensuring the utilisation of the funds as per the original 
proposal and monitoring the monitoring of PRs” (India LFA). In the first two 
years of the Fund operations in India, the World Bank was the LFA. 
Subsequently the Bank was replaced by the United Nations Office of Project 
Services (UNOPS) which established its India operations as it embarked on 
this role. Based on desk reviews of the reporting of the national recipients, 
the LFA assesses the progress on both financial and physical targets for 
each quarter and reports to the Fund. The Fund in turn approves or 
terminates future grants based on the reporting. The role of the LFA as 
perceived by the partner agencies and the challenges faced in implementing 
the Fund protocol is further discussed in section 6.4.1.2. 
 
6.2.2 National and sub-national monitoring systems 
Since the national AIDS programme in India is a vertical programme, the 
guidelines on services and monitoring systems have constantly evolved in 
accordance with the principal funding agency supporting the programme or a 
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particular component of it. Constant shifts in the policy guidelines and in 
effect reporting tools and formats, can be observed. Moreover, as clarified 
earlier, the fund operates through multiple recipients who lead specific 
programmes on prevention, care, treatment, or support with varying focus 
and objectives. This compounds the task of co-ordinating and streamlining 
the disparate indicators into a single national M&E framework.  
 
6.2.2.1 The national programme and policy  
The national AIDS control programme (NACP) is currently in its third phase. 
The first phase (1992-1999), which was launched with a World Bank credit of 
USD 84 million, focused on prevention of HIV transmission. The second 
phase (1999-2006) of the programme saw a scaling up of testing and 
counselling services alongside provision of palliative care and support 
services. Multiple donors funded the programme in this phase, and World 
Bank‟s assistance of USD 192 million amounted to approximately 47% of the 
total earmarked funds (NACO website, Funds and Expenditures). The Global 
Fund was introduced in 2002 and the first grant agreement was signed in 
January 2003. Subsequently, the programme received increasing 
contributions from the Fund with its share increasing from 6% of the funds 
earmarked in NACP II to 25% in NACP III (NACO website). A landmark 
achievement in this period was the phased out introduction of free 
antiretroviral treatment in 2004.  
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With the Bank as its single largest external donor, monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) was an integral component in the NACP II with a separate budget 
provisioned for it. The M&E strategy had two major components: national 
Behaviour Science Surveillance for general population and high risk groups 
which was held twice, in 2001 and 2006, and the Computerised Monitoring 
Information System (CMIS). Additionally, periodic evaluations of targeted 
interventions and programme support units were undertaken through an 
external agency.  
 
Although the amount and types of information being collected grew 
substantially during NACP II, primarily due to the involvement of newer 
funders and partners, the information remained largely un-utilised. Firstly, the 
biggest challenge reported in the study and highlighted in the evaluation of 
NACP II, was the limited use of CMIS at various levels as it was highly 
dependent on the technical capacity at the reporting units (Paithankar 2008). 
Secondly, the utilisation of the data generated through the system was 
grossly inadequate. A lot of information was collected but data analysis, 
sharing of information to partner organisations and feedback was very limited 
rendering the CMIS as a one way reporting system.  Given these lacunae, 
and a growing complexity of the policy environment with increasing 
involvement of stakeholders, the policy framework and M&E approaches 
underwent several changes.  
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6.2.2.2 Aligning the national systems with the requirements of the Fund 
The revision exercise can be seen in the context of the ongoing grant 
evaluations and the processes triggered thereafter. The pressure generated 
from the “recommended time bound actions” made by the Fund in its end of 
phase 1 evaluation of round two and round four led to a re-formulation of the 
M&E framework in accordance with the criteria of the Fund. The renewal of 
phase 2 was made contingent to the actions taken upon the 
recommendations made. These included an upward revisions to the targets 
in view of the underutilized funds. 
 
Excerpts from grant scorecards23: 
“The most serious concerns with this Program have been the conservative 
target setting considering ...the significant under-utilization of grant funds. 
Programmatic achievement has been strong to date with a very significant 
budget under-spent...the results to date have been achieved with 
approximately one third of the funds available for phase 1. This indicates that 
the grant should have achieved far greater programmatic delivery. Therefore, 
as a condition to continued funding a substantial upward revision of the 
targets in line with the phase 2 budget is required prior to phase 2 grant 
signing.” (Grant Score card for phase one of round two) 
 
“Suggested time bound actions: 
                                                 
23
 At the end of phase 1 (i.e. at month 23 of the grant implementation) of one grant, the Global Fund 
secretariat prepares a report card, or grant scorecard, which contains an analysis of the performance 
in that phase and a recommendation to the Board on funding for the remaining years of the proposal. 
The Board takes a decision to go with one of the four recommendation categories: „Go‟, „Conditional 
Go‟, „Revised Go‟ and „Not go‟ 
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By 31 December 2007, the PR shall deliver to the Global Fund an 
operational plan for M&E of the Program, taking into account the national 
M&E operational plan of NACPIII. 
By 31 December 2007, the PR shall integrate Global Fund financial 
management and recording needs in the computerised financial MIS”. (Grant 
Scorecard for phase two of round four, government recipient) 
 
The involvement of an NGO as a national recipient in round four, in 
particular, raised several issues around the decision to streamline multiple 
programme indicators into a single M&E framework. In 2004, WHO, jointly 
with CDC and as part of its „three ones principles‟, facilitated the formation of 
a UN working group for M&E. The concept paper, entitled “revisions to the 
NACO CMIS”, resulting from the deliberations of the group formed the basis 
of the NACP III process (WHO/India 2009). The NACP thus witnessed a 
transition from a stage where there was little focus on indicator based 
reporting on programme performance, to a stage where M&E became the 
core component of the policy.  
 
6.2.2.3 Revised M&E framework 
The field studies for my research commenced when the programme was nine 
months into its third phase. NACP III (2006-2011) sought to integrate 
prevention efforts with care, support, and treatment initiatives. The strategic 
objectives of the third phase laid emphasis on strengthening infrastructure, 
systems, and human resources in the above programmes at all levels- 
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district, state and national. Acting upon the Fund recommendations and 
acknowledging the limitations in the NACP II, in the third phase, NACO 
sought to institutionalise the monitoring and evaluation strategy. The 
subsequent deliberations of technical committees, presided by multilateral 
and bilateral partners as well as the Fund bureaucrats, led to the creation of 
„Strategic Information Management System‟ (SIMS). It entailed an 
elaborately defined organisational structure (Figure 11) called the Strategic 
Information Management Unit (SIMU) at the state level and District AIDS 
Prevention and Control Unit (DAPCU) at the district level and a national plan 
developed in accordance with accepted international standards.  
Figure 11: Organisational Structure for M&E
 
The M&E strategy, as per the operational plan for the SIMS, outlines a 
comprehensive process (Figure 12) and an indicator framework (Figure 13), 
which account for the externally set goals and objectives of the SIMS.   
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Figure 12: National M&E framework (process)
 
 
In theory, the conceptual framework aimed at “simplifying data collection to a 
set of key indicators while providing programme managers regular in-depth 
reports” (NACO 2007e). It also attempted to address the gap in NACP II by 
emphasising analysis and utilisation of the information collected. In this 
process, a list of 157 indicators was prepared to be reported on at various 
levels and from multiple sources. Similarly, the single M&E framework and 
the revisions to the MIS of NACO, other donors, and NGOs claimed to 
generate “a more complete picture of all activities related to HIV and AIDS in 
India” (WHO/India 2009). 
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However, in reality, SIMS continued to largely draw on the earlier version of 
the CMIS and no changes were observed in the way data was either 
collected or analysed. The indicators continued to be largely input/activity 
oriented and there was a lack of uniformity in indicators of programmes, 
states, and partners. In the six months period of field studies in 2007, no 
initiative towards improving staffing for monitoring and evaluation or building 
their capacity was reported.   
 
6.2.3 The CMIS 
At the heart of the national monitoring system for HIV and AIDS lies the 
computerised management information system or the CMIS which is 
designed to routinely collect and facilitate the analysis of the inputs and the 
outputs of the programme. CMIS facilitates decentralised data entry and 
generation of standardised monthly reports at multiple reporting sites. Once 
Table 7:  Indicator framework for NACP III 
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uploaded in the system, the data can be retrieved at multiple levels of 
management, enabling the generation of different types of analysis reports 
(SIMS, NACP3), thereby ensuring transparency in the process. The study 
participants reported several difficulties and limitations of the current 
reporting system.  These are outlined in the following section. 
 
6.3The Process: Knowledge generation and interpretation 
To enable data generation, extensive monthly and quarterly reporting formats 
are developed for the service delivery sites and sub-recipients to report back 
on. Information is collected through a series of standardised data collection 
tools (registers, patient cards, registration forms) which are specific to the 
different types of reporting units or intervention sites. For example, different 
formats exist for treatment centres, community care centres, district level 
networks and others. This data is then entered into the CMIS and made 
available to the sub-national and national offices of the respective 
organisation. The data from the national databases then becomes part of 
complex databases in Geneva, where the figures on manipulation help the 
international bureaucrats and technical experts to make sense of the 
movement of national programmes towards international goals. 
 
Each reporting unit is also required to generate its monthly progress report 
based on the MIS records. These monthly reports go to the respective state 
offices where reports from all districts are compiled and forwarded to the 
NACO. The flow of information was found to be asymmetric since the district 
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and state offices did not have the complete countrywide picture of the 
performance of the national programme. Additionally, there was little scope 
for communicating the limitations and challenges faced by the officers at the 
district level. In comparison, in the civil society consortia, there was greater 
scope for a two-way discussion between the programme management and 
the implementing team although this could also be attributable to the small 
scale of operations. The civil society consortia followed a reporting format 
similar to that of NACO although it varied with each partner and the 
indicators it reported on. For instance, the network for people with HIV, with 
its state and district level offices had a governance structure similar to that of 
the NACO (the government recipient). Hence, the information flowed through 
a similar channel i.e. from the service units (such as the TCC, care and 
support centre) to the district office, from the district to the state network 
office and eventually to the national office. The corporate partner, on the 
other hand, accessed information directly from the company head office, 
which in turn received the information from the human resource manager and 
the in-charge of the company run treatment centres.  
 
6.3.1.1 Challenges in the knowledge production exercise: Implications for 
service delivery and providers 
As a departure from the rhetoric on technocentric responses, the knowledge 
production exercise was fraught with several problems. Firstly, as highlighted 
in chapters four and five, the majority of the staff at the service delivery units 
such as the treatment centres, the counselling centres and the district 
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networks, reported being over burdened with the task of filling up an 
increasing number of registers. At most centres, this high patient and 
paperwork load translated to a diversion of the employees from their primary 
responsibilities, leaving little scope for doctor or counsellor-PLHA interaction. 
This gap was acknowledged at various levels.  
 
“At the ART centre the doctor is very busy because of the patient load. When 
a PLHA walks in, the doctor has hardly anything to talk with him at a comfort 
level. So, the patient talks and the doctor just writes [entering the patient 
form]. Then you have the counsellor who is in a very different state, filling up 
patient cards and managing the queues. Also there are the NGOs who claim 
to be doing work with PLHAs adding to this chaos.” (Senior project officer, 
civil society consortium)  
 
Most ART centres I visited conformed to this description. Peer educators and 
outreach workers from multiple non government and community based 
organisations undertook “group counselling” addressing stigma and 
discrimination while the people with HIV watched over: the counsellors 
completing patient registration, the pharmacist or nurse counting pills and 
assisting doctors with patient cards, and the doctor-PLHA interaction, which 
restricted to seeking information sought in the forms. (Observation notes) 
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Secondly, poor infrastructure including space constraints (in public hospitals), 
power shortage, and the limited support for software were reported as major 
hindrances to the generation of information through the CMIS. 
 
“In our country there are power shortages and few centres run on no or 
intermittent power supply. We have computerised the system, want 
experienced data entry operators, but sometimes you don‟t have protection 
from virus and other such problems. So, the whole system crashes.”  (Senior 
project officer, State division of NACO) 
 
“...look at all the mess. Since we started in ...there are thousands of records 
of patients. Who can search for any record in this mess? And NACO keeps 
changing the format, increasing the size. The new formats are very 
cumbersome and there is no space for storing the formats and client 
information.”  (Senior medical officer, public ART centre) 
 
Thirdly, as highlighted earlier, there was high turnover of data entry operators 
and trained M&E officers. The difficulty of recording was compounded by the 
reported poor capacities of the existing project workers. 
 
“Capacities are there but turnover may be high. These are contractual posts 
so people are always looking for security of better job. You cannot hold a 
training every other day. So there may be a lapse in trained staff.”  (Senior 
bureaucrat, State division of NACO) 
 289 
 
“Most people lack the capacity. Even with simple registers they fumble. ART 
[treatment roll out] M&E is totally paper based recording and it‟s not 
happening perfectly. I have seen 90% incomplete registers. They [data entry 
operators] have to fill twice, once on the cards and then the registers. But 
dual entry doesn‟t take place. And cohort is also there in the registers but 
transposing from that to excel sheet and analysis is something they are 
unable to do.”  (Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO) 
 
The difficulty arising due to weak infrastructure and capacity of the staff was 
compounded by the lack of standardised protocol for the service delivery 
centres. Given the constant shifts in reporting formats, the absence of any 
national protocols standardising the functioning or staffing of service delivery 
centres resulted in further chaos. In the year prior to the commencement of 
this research, operational guidelines for human resources, drugs and 
equipments, and routine functioning of the centres were being developed. 
While the field studies were undertaken, various experiences of the 
imposition of these guidelines on the states and districts emerged. 
 
“For 3 yrs there were no instructions. The operational guidelines have just 
come out in April. Meanwhile, they [the staff at the ART centre] have adopted 
a flow. Someone else fills the registers, data entry operator and the 
pharmacist does the counselling work. How do you expect the order to 
change suddenly?”   (Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO) 
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“..Only in the last one year we are coming out with modules, guidelines for 
centres, performance based reporting formats, quality care etc. Someone 
should be held responsible otherwise this system will collapse.”  
(Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO) 
 
Finally, flaws with the system of monitoring were reported at the sub national 
level. The M&E officers reported difficulty in measuring and validating the 
adherence rates and lost to follow up figures, indicators key to the Fund 
programme which is increasingly structured around finding and effectively 
treating infective patients. Treatment adherence in particular, emerged as 
both a concern as well as a contentious issue across all interviews. From a 
programme point of view, the non-government actors expressed their 
discontent with the existing review processes since it did not provide an 
explanation for the poor outcomes.    
 
“GFATM has set up targets, deliverables…all that is fine. We started centres, 
enrolled PLHA, trained the service providers and worry about QPRs 
[Quarterly Progress Reports] to go to GFATM. This is all the service part, 
which is wonderful. The question arises when the national programme says 
that treatment adherence rate is very low. The country has a programme, so 
many people working on it. Then why is treatment adherence low?”  
(Senior management, civil society consortium)  
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On the other hand, the state monitoring team pointed out that a fundamental 
flaw with the MIS system was that it did not allow the generation of 
knowledge on treatment adherence and defaulters. A senior M&E officer in-
charge of the programme highlighted that the system was primarily based on 
cumulative numbers and thus, prohibited a cohort analysis of the situation.  
 
“The monitoring mechanism itself is faulty ...We generate a list of indicators 
based on monthly reports. It could be fascinating for programme managers 
but as a doctor you would like to know what happened to patient x or y… It 
does not capture that. It only captures how many patients you have got. The 
numbers are increasing but we don‟t have a cohort analysis.” 
 
In one of the four states where the research was conducted, an independent 
initiative was carried out locally whereby cohort analysis was undertaken for 
two sites for a period of one year alongside the usual MIS data generation. 
However, the attempt, although successful in generating useful data, was 
withdrawn as it added to the existing workload of the employees at the 
implementation sites.  
 
“The problem is overloading of these centres. DEOs [data entry operator] 
start complaining that they are already overloaded. In one centre there are 
180-200 outpatients every day. Even NACO was initially keen on 
implementing it but now they say that the staffs don‟t have the capacity, we 
haven‟t trained them adequately.”  
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A paradoxical state of affairs thus emerged. On the one hand there was 
resistance from the NACO to alter the standard protocol to enable a cohort 
analysis at the reporting sites on the grounds of poor capacities. On the other 
hand, however, in compliance with the Fund demands of constant revisions 
of the M&E strategy, it sanctioned a framework of 157 indicators under the 
revised strategy (SIMS).  
 
“This is the fourth version of MIS being tried. Earlier there was no system of 
monitoring done, only PLHA registered, data entered and captured. As days 
pass we are forcing difficulties and newer methods, constantly refining and 
re-refining old reporting tools.”  (Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO) 
 
6.3.1.2 Impact of changes in the M&E strategy 
The most visible impact of the shifts in the M & E strategy adopted at the 
centre was on the reporting formats. These underwent several changes. The 
implementation team at the service delivery units (the reporting sites), 
particularly the treatment roll-out centres, reported difficulties in keeping pace 
with these changes. The treatment centre in-charge, usually the head of 
community medicine or another department within the hospital, felt this 
necessitated a constant re-orientation of the staff which, given the case load 
at the treatment centres, was not plausible.  
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Critically reflecting on the paradox highlighted earlier and attributing the 
failure partly to the lack of comprehensive trainings, a senior M&E officer 
stated: 
 
“We need to train doctors, nurses, counsellors, DEO. Like having a mock 
ART centre. Give a card, fill the register, and at the end design monthly 
reports, cohort etc. But in this push for computerisation, trainings have got 
lost. People don‟t keep registers properly, or even enter data completely. 
They are making us run before we learn to crawl. They cannot even fill 
registers and you are computerising everything!” 
 
The result of the poor infrastructure, capacities, and lack of trained human 
resources was the reported poor quality of data generated through the CMIS. 
This emerged as a grave concern across various interviews with the Fund 
bureaucrats such as the LFA, regional coordinators and others. Moreover, no 
attempts were made to incorporate data from other agencies and 
components of M&E, the very rationale on which the new framework was 
developed. The CMIS was unable to account for changing priorities and 
information requirements over a period of time. Research participants 
including the state level senior monitoring officers were largely unaware of 
the information from other sources like sentinel surveillance, BSS and 
operational research. These remained disintegrated and thus unutilised for 
the purpose of planning and management of the programme (Notes from 
informal meetings and interviews). 
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6.4 Knowledge translation and production of order 
 
In this context of a ruptured system of generating knowledge, other 
mechanisms played a crucial role in bringing together the official 
representations with the ground realities, acting as the interface between the 
project staff and the Fund bureaucrats. These mechanisms: periodic reviews 
and supervision visits, country wide evaluations, and operational research 
(OR) studies, served a dual purpose. While they enabled the translation of 
the different discourses and contradictions into a common language to be 
presented to an outsider, they also acted as the basis on which the roles of 
these very outsiders or the Fund bureaucrats could be established.  
 
6.4.1 Periodic reviews and site visits 
 
6.4.1.1 Experience of M&E officers 
A cadre of Fund brokers which specialises in fixing the ruptures comprises of 
M&E officers (State or regional coordinators) appointed by the NACO or the 
NGO principal and sub recipients. The mandate of the M&E officers is to 
“monitor the progress of the programme in respective states, facilitate joint 
working and coordination among partners, and consolidate the figures from 
various reports” (Notes from informal meetings). However, different 
narratives brought to light the dilemma of these project officers who on one 
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hand acted as the „field experts‟ for their region, available for all evaluation 
visits by the donor agencies, and on the other, had little knowledge of and 
control over work procedures and progress made on activities. They 
remained excluded from the centralised decision-making and at the same 
time were regarded as „outsiders‟ by the State officials as well as the non-
State partner organisations.  
 
There was a high imperative for the local authorities and project officers to 
manipulate the knowledge generated and misreport on the programme 
outcomes. This can be attributed to the mismatch between the system 
capacities (with respect to workforce, capacities, infrastructure) and the scale 
of interventions required by the Fund activities, the stress on performance 
measured solely on cumulative figures, and the growing competition resulting 
from multiple providers. In this context, the cadre of project officers operating 
out of the state office were seen as a potential threat as they could leak the  
incidents of misreporting to NACO as a result of which the State divisions of 
NACO could lose the grant (and programme) to its private counterpart. 
These officers often found it difficult to bridge the official reality (public 
transcript) with the ground realities (hidden transcript) due to the sanctions 
laid by the State authorities on field visits undertaken or information shared 
with the higher authorities. 
 
“There is a regional coordinators meeting called by the NACO which I am not 
allowed to attend by the Director [of SACS]. He scrutinises and tempers with 
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all the documents- minutes of previous report, agenda, my presentation, and 
what I am reporting- before they can be included in the presentation. If the 
documents are not cleared, it implies I can neither participate nor present.”  
(Senior M&E officer, deputed by NACO) 
 
The information sanctioned in particular related to the poor treatment 
adherence and other outcome indicators related to the programme which 
formed the very basis of interventions such as treatment, counselling in all its 
forms (pre test, post test, adherence), outreach work, and others. The 
officers were aware of and reported instances of manipulating adherence 
data by reducing the „lost to follow up‟ figures and by increasing the „number 
of reported deaths‟. 
 
“Even I will be concerned if the adherence level is so low. It should be more 
than 80%, if it is something like 55%, it is reason for concern. This is what I 
mentioned in some of the slides in the presentation.” (Senior M&E officer 
deputed by NACO)  
 
Likewise, in the civil society consortia, the imperative on each partner 
organisation to project or demonstrate high levels of performance resulted in 
a lack of transparency among partners on the ground realities. The project 
officers coordinating the initiatives at the state level reported little or no 
coordination among partner organisations of each or successive rounds and 
had limited awareness of the progress and performance of partners. Given 
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the lack of transparency and the ill-defined hierarchies, all attempts at 
coordination at the state level emerged futile. 
 
“We have a quarterly MIS review meet where all districts are called to bring 
their registers so that we may finalise our quarterly progress report. Of the 
four partners, we get monthly progress reports of only one partner. Also, we 
don‟t know what is going on in the corporate arena. If a consortium is 
considered as one unit, why hide information?” (State coordinator, civil 
society consortium) 
 
The coordinators often reported a lack of authority to question or seek 
clarification on the non-performance of their partner organisations. In due 
course, coordination offices at the state level reached an understanding 
(rather, were instructed by the senior authorities at the head office) to only 
“participate and oversee” the activities of the partner organisation. Moreover, 
financial monitoring was kept outside the mandate of the state offices given 
the “sensitivity” of the matter (Meeting notes).  
 
“At least the State level MPRs [monthly progress reports] should be shared 
with us. It includes numbers- on ART, not on ART, SGMs [support group 
meeting] held, members participating, referrals made etc.. That is all the 
information we need, nothing confidential. As the managing partner of the 
consortium, I have to present the numbers. I have brought to the notice of the 
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PMU [project management unit], hopefully they will take action.” (State 
coordinator, civil society consortium) 
 
The state coordinators appointed by the managing partner of the civil society 
consortium, therefore, found it difficult to access relevant information 
necessary to report to the senior authorities in the head office of the 
organisation.  
 
“I‟m not satisfied with the reports and formats. Where ever I go, books are 
put in front of me: these many PLHA enrolled, these many counselled, these 
many support meetings conducted. I would like to see the quality of 
counselling, and know the process. To what extent has the concept of 
support meetings been understood or do they simply gather a few people, 
say a few words and give them travel allowance?”  (Project coordinator, civil 
society consortium) 
 
The problems of asymmetric communication and legitimacy due to 
competition and power hierarchies among project officers and project 
workers were intensified by time. Time was particularly a hindrance for the 
M&E officers in the state divisions of NACO for whom reporting duties in the 
Fund project were additional to other projects implemented under the 
umbrella of the national AIDS programme. These include targeted 
interventions, care and support, antiretroviral roll out and others. This 
overworked cadre reported difficulty in taking time out to make visits to the 
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respective centres or reporting sites and thus restricted itself to desk review 
and compilation of the figures reported.   
 
“Periodic sitting may not be possible because we have one ART centre in 
each district, a total of 24 centres. As per the operational guideline 
frequency, I will have to visit 12 in one month, which is not possible. Initially I 
was very enthusiastic-12 in first month, then 8, 7, 3 and then zero. If I had a 
backup person to do the office work, I could tour.”  (M&E Officer, state 
division of NACO) 
 
This finding corroborated with the narratives of the partner organisations who 
reported a lack of supervisory visits from either NACO or its state divisions. 
 
“Even SACS have no control over ART centres. Last year nobody bothered 
to visit. The first ART centre was established in 2005. Till January 2007 none 
of the SACS officers bothered to visit any of the TCC [counselling centre] or 
ART [treatment] centre.”  (Project coordinator, civil society consortia member 
organisation) 
 
The discontent with the reporting protocol of the Fund and the inherent 
asymmetric communication was visible at the different levels of the Fund 
operations. Having discussed the practice of monitoring at the sub-national 
levels, in the following section I examine the utility of these reporting 
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mechanisms by focusing on the national monitoring mechanism of the Fund: 
the local fund agent (LFA). 
 
6.4.1.2 Experience of the Local Fund Agent 
The LFA follows the quarterly reporting format of the Fund and is responsible 
to ensure that physical and financial achievements are reported along with 
explanations on justifiable delays, if any, within 15 and 45 days respectively 
of the end of each quarter. 
 
The monitoring task of the LFA was constrained by a reported lack of 
flexibility in the Fund guidelines. The Fund policy does not have the provision 
of undertaking field visits or attending co-ordination meetings, thus restricting 
the monitoring format to desk reviews of reports submitted by the national 
recipients. Moreover, the disconnect between the working of the CCM and 
the LFA averted the possibility of sharing the challenges in the grant cycle 
between the two. This, in LFA‟s view, contains the possibility of effectively 
monitoring the progress and performance of the grant. 
 
“Biggest handicap with the functioning of LFA is that GFATM doesn‟t 
encourage field visits. We are supposed to do only desk review. I ask the PR 
to show the reports from district, state and the country level to verify the 
consolidate figure they arrived at. If somewhere some figures are fudged, 
there is no way to know. I can only catch arithmetic discrepancy. I think 
GFATM is penny wise pound foolish.” 
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 In the absence of field visits, the LFA often adopted informal checks through 
informal discussions with the recipients to identify the problems.  
 
“Whatever came to our notice, we reported. And primarily on the basis of 
desk review we did not notice very much. Meetings are not the recognized 
format of the bank. They are my initiative. If I meet the programme officer 
over a cup of tea, there is a tendency to talk. Things you may not be able to 
catch otherwise, comes up.”  (Senior bureaucrat, Fund governance) 
 
When the World Bank was the LFA, it overruled the Fund‟s policy and 
continued to utilize its own monitoring strategy which included a considerable 
period of 2 to 4 weeks spent by the review team in the field.  Subsequently, 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was appointed as the 
LFA in 2003 and the field visits were dropped from the mandate. However, 
there was a growing discontent among the LFA globally with respect to the 
desk review format. Following a South East regional meeting of the Fund in 
Cambodia in 2005 where the LFAs resented the desk review format, the 
Fund issued instructions allowing a one day field visit per state for “data 
verification”. This implied that the LFA could choose one district in a State 
identified by the Fund to visit and verify the records as per the timeline issued 
by the Global Fund.  
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“We were free to choose the district but in a state like UP which has 70 
districts, you may or may not be able to catch something. Still lot of 
improvement was noticed even with one visit. Global Fund decided the time 
table. We were given instructions like visit one district in each state. 
Instructions came separately for HIV and TB.”  
 
The visits were regarded particularly useful as they allowed the LFA to get 
explanations for the poorly maintained reporting systems. However, without 
further notice from the global secretariat the field visits were suspended in a 
year‟s time.  
 
“We got instructions in 2005 and 2006 and made the visit. Suddenly after 
2006, no instructions came. There has been no visit in 2007.” 
 
The LFA articulated the challenges in reporting on grant performance, and 
the disappointment with the Fund‟s ignorance of the contextual factors. The 
discontent was also related to the resulting inadequate compensation for the 
time devoted to the monitoring exercise.  
 
“…programme... [x] is in a clear mess. They are not able to give any 
information. Global Fund keeps shouting for the reports. So, we send it as it 
is…Chapati aadhi bani hai to aap adhi khaiye [if the bread is half baked, eat 
it half baked]. Then they point out gaps in the information. We have been 
working on this report for more than 3 months with more than 5 times the 
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man-days sanctioned. But Global Fund says that if we sanction 20 man-days 
for the task and you take 50, it is not our fault. I don‟t know whose fault it is!” 
 
Lying at the heart of the Global Fund monitoring mechanism, the LFA serves 
as a crucial link in the knowledge verification process as well as between the 
Fund Secretariat and the country recipients. Since the grant is awarded and 
renewed based on the LFAs recommendation, it has a vital role in 
maintaining the grant cycle, re-enforcing the rationale and thus contributing 
to the cognitive function of Schmidt‟s (2002) framework on discourse to 
stabilise the Fund system (and organisation of the grant).  
 
Maintaining the myth of a stabilised system 
Despite the LFA being crucial to the stability of the Fund system in India, it 
was also a point of particular instability and anxiety for the national AIDS 
programme. This is because any departure from the official representation or 
reality at the level of LFA implies disruption of the grant cycle and threatens 
the stability of the Fund organisation. On such occasions, the authority and 
recommendations of the LFA were found overruled. At one such instance, 
the LFA‟s decision to not renew (in effect withdraw) the grant for the second 
phase of a Fund round led to much uproar within the global secretariat. The 
reason for the poor assessment of the programme was the 
underachievement of targets and underutilisation of funds. 
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“Physical targets have not been met and money has not been spent. You 
made a commitment that you will achieve the following in two years. And the 
shortfall is not 5 or 10% which GF is willing to condone if you stick to the 
overall schedule of IPS for 2 years on the understanding that you will make 
good progress. But the shortfall is 25-30%” 
 
“For one activity, we gave B2. All hell broke loose. Global Fund was very 
upset. The mail said, “How can you say no to India?” I think because it is a 
reflection on their performance. When two years back they thought India 
could get the grant for 5 years, how could they accept after two years that 
there are problems?”  
 
The facade of the monitoring mechanisms set up by the Fund revealed itself 
in the arbitration process that followed the LFA‟s decision. The global 
secretariat in Geneva sent a team of three consultants to Delhi who had 
several sittings and deliberations with NACO and state representatives 
followed by field visits. Subsequent to the 15 day visit to India and re-
conciliation of reports, the grant was approved after a little over four months.   
 
“Lots of efforts went into it and the grant was finally released after a lapse of 
4 to 5 months. If GFATM can afford to pay for three persons to travel all the 
way, stay and go to the field for 10 days in India, why can‟t they sanction 5 to 
10 days to LFA for the visits?” 
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6.4.1.3 Recipients view of LFA 
The respondents in most cases viewed the LFA as the “puppet” or the “direct 
arm” of the Fund and as a “foreign entity not well aligned with the national 
government system”. There was much cynicism among the secretariat staff 
and members of the CCM regarding the technical competence of the LFA. In 
their view, the LFA lacked the necessary technical knowledge of the 
programmes and this slowed down the grant making process.  
 
“LFA has the financial capability but do not know enough about health sector. 
They play the role of national auditors but do not have enough knowledge of 
the country context. This delays the verification process.” (CCM member) 
(Secretariat employee) 
 
Besides lacking programmatic skills, the Indian LFA was reported to have 
limited interaction with national recipients and negligible engagement with 
multi-stakeholder processes. Discussions with LFA also revealed that the 
interactions were limited to government recipients within the three focal 
diseases and the LFA was inadequately informed of the non-government 
national recipients‟ activities.  
 
“NGO consortium was not involved at all at the national level. Whatever they 
are involved in is at the lower level, I was not to interact with them. If 
someone sends me communication, it is a different matter. I have had no 
interaction with them till the time I was asked to take field visits in states.” 
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6.4.2 Operational Research 
Operational Research (OR) studies emerged as another important tool by 
which the brokers could stabilise the discursive practice of the Fund and 
disguise the disjuncture behind coherent accounts that demonstrate 
performance. The Fund “strongly encourages” proposals with an integrated 
operational research component (WHO/GFATM 2008) and has extensive 
protocols for the applicants to ensure its integration at the proposal 
development stage.  The rationale behind the significance of OR studies is 
built on its ability to “identify solutions to problems that limit program quality, 
efficiency and effectiveness, or to determine which alternative service 
delivery strategy would yield the best outcomes.” [ibid] 
 
The proposals were thus found to have a strong component of OR studies 
with as many as seven (and sometimes up to 12) studies sanctioned for a 
single national recipient in the first two year phase of the programme. The 
frequency and ambitious target of OR studies emerged as a cause for 
concern. Executing the role of a consultant to develop the concept note for 
one such OR revealed to me the vicious development cycle (complex of 
events) that is set off by the imperative to demonstrate effectiveness even 
before the programme could get off the ground. The cycle typically involved 
commissioning a consultant with research “expertise” (in this case, myself) to 
undertake situational analysis of the identified problem. This exercise, carried 
out through site visits and a series of focus groups, established the need for 
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researching the identified topic. Once the problem was established, a study 
was commissioned, in this case to a leading research institute, which further 
justified the utilisation of allocated resources. The results, which failed to 
generate new learning or change practice, were published with emphasis on 
best practice models. The representation of these models was in conformity 
with other global discourses around HIV and AIDS such as speak out 
sessions, GIPA and peer education strategy. Contrary to the discourse of the 
Fund which regards OR as “the science of better”, the practice of research 
neither enabled improvements to the existing programme nor led to 
alternative strategies for better outcomes. Nevertheless, it served as an 
important resource that enabled the presentation of ongoing tensions and 
ruptures of daily practice as stories of success.  
 
6.4.3 Country wide evaluation 
An important component of the national monitoring systems is the 
independent evaluation of specific programme or intervention. This 
component also serves as a means to fill the lacunae emerging from the 
knowledge generation and translation process. Both the Fund as well as the 
NACO undertakes independent evaluations of the grant and specific 
programme activities respectively. In the following section I describe the 
evaluation process of the care and support programme with respect to its 
implementation site: the Community Care Centre (CCC). 
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6.4.3.1 Case Study: Community Care Centres 
In India, the concept of CCC evolved from community based institutionalised 
care and support services initially set up by a leading national non-
government organisation in early 1990s catering primarily to intravenous 
drug users. The success and international recognition received by these 
centres led the government to adopt this model of care and support as part of 
the national AIDS strategy. Subsequently, under its care and support 
programme, the NACO identified care centres that were run by local NGOs 
or Christian missionary groups and gave additional grants to cover the costs 
of 10-20 beds. By 1999-2000 the centres became recognised as the SACS 
(state division of NACO known as State AIDS Control Society) run care 
centres.  Launched officially by the NACO in 2002, these centres came to be 
referred as the community care centres or CCC and grew in numbers with 
the NACP III setting the national target of one CCC in each district.  
 
Owing to the arbitrary nature of the grant making and the absence of  
separate guidelines until 2007, the CCCs developed as a highly plural 
concept in most states. While a few care and support centres were large 
institutions (50 bedded hospitals) run by missionary groups with funds from 
multiple sources and partially supported by the state divisions, a few 10 
bedded centres were set up primarily for this purpose.  
 
“The role of CCC has constantly evolved under the NACP [national AIDS 
control programme]. Previously they were like stop gap arrangement but now 
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they have a much bigger role once patient is put on antiretroviral. As per 
guidelines they are responsible for outreach, adherence and treatment of 
OIs.”  (Senior M&E officer, State division of NACO) 
 
“Earlier we had low cost care and support centres whose partial costs such 
as human resource, food and nutrition were covered by SACS. Now all are 
developed into CCC. These are huge institutions and infrastructure, 20 and 
sometimes up to 50 bed-hospitals as well.”  (Senior programme officer, State 
division of NACO)  
 
In a contrasting perspective, a public sector bureaucrat viewed CCC as being 
reduced to “hospices for terminally ill patients” (Notes from informal meetings 
with a senior bureaucrat). Thus, there was wide variation in the respondents‟ 
perception of the structure and function of the CCCs. One of the four States 
under investigation followed a different format for care centres. The State 
government distributed the funds sanctioned for one CCC among four 
different organisations running care and support centres. Run on a smaller 
budget, these centres primarily focused on providing palliative care and 
nutritional support to the people living with HIV. 
 
“Situation was very different here. They [the State AIDS Society] thought 
NGOs may not be able to handle so much money. So they split the 16-17 
lacs [hundred thousand] into four sums of 4.2 lacs and gave the existing 
centres. Some were Christian missionary leprosy centres which could 
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function with this amount because they had their own funding.” (Senior M&E 
officer, State division of NACO) 
 
“We followed a different system from NACO- a low cost AIDS care and 
support centre. Previously the CCCs were not treatment specific but now 
their role has changed. NACO has instructed taking them as centre for 
treatment adherence counselling. Until December 2007, the centres were run 
for 4 - 5 lacs [hundred thousand] each, now all are being upgraded to 16 lacs 
per annum. From January 2008, it will be under GF round 6. (Senior officer, 
State division of NACO) 
 
This diversity was however ignored in the nationwide evaluation of CCCs 
which was undertaken in 2006-2007. An independent agency, a US based 
marketing research company with its operations in India, was contracted for 
the purpose of assessing the 250 registered CCCs against a standard 
protocol developed on the basis of the Fund guidelines. The outcome of the 
evaluation was to determine whether the centre would continue getting 
government funds.  
 
6.4.3.2 Experience of the evaluation 
The performance appraisal that followed was termed as „ad-hoc‟ and an „eye-
wash‟ by different respondents. Firstly, the process and the tools, the latter 
comprising of an exhaustive check-list and site visits, seemed divorced from 
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the plural contexts in which the CCCs developed and did not involve any 
interaction with the care givers.  
 
“Have you looked at the instrument, the evaluation sheet? As per that, if you 
have the human resource policy in place, all the documentation in the check 
list and not a single client then you will get an A. There is no mention of 
service delivery. Nothing is asked about the quality of services or clients.”  
(Senior management, NGO running CCC) 
 
“The man didn‟t even come to the head office. We have a separate accounts 
department here. Accounting or HR policy is in the head office not in the site 
office because every six months or so the site office is demolished or has to 
be moved. So the assessors just reported that the organisation does not 
have a policy. All the things they said we didn‟t apparently have, we were 
ready to show. We got some B or C.”  (Senior management, NGO running 
CCC) 
 
Other criteria used to assess performance included bed utilisation and the 
turnover of clients in the care centres. Inclusion of these criteria was in 
accordance with the Fund‟s stipulation, which regarded these as a marker of 
efficiency of the CCC. The requirement, as reported by the project officers‟ 
in-charge of CCC, was that each client could not avail of the in-patient 
service for more than ten days. 
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“They say there is no turnover [of clients]. Arey, us bacche ki ma nahi hain. 
Woh beemar hai aur padha hai to usko utha ke kahan laoge [that child does 
not have a mother. If he is unwell and lying there, where are you going to 
send her]?”  (Senior bureaucrat, State division of NACO) 
 
A project worker at one of the CCC I visited described the process of 
registration and the thorough screening a person with HIV was subjected to 
on arriving at the CCC. The screening enabled an assessment of the severity 
of the condition and an estimate of the duration the patient might stay for. 
Narrating one such instance, the project worker shared that a child, despite 
her terminal condition, had to be referred out after 14 days of her stay. The 
reason cited was that “the two beds, used by the child and the accompanying 
person, could not remain occupied for that long” (Project worker, CCC). 
 
In contrast however, the head of a large NGO also implementing CCC as 
one of its many project, shared instances where the same client was 
registered under different names to avoid successive interrogations from the 
Fund and its implementing agencies. 
 
Secondly, the research participants involved with the evaluation reported a 
high incidence of malpractices. Different sources revealed that the appraising 
team, in order for the centre to secure a high grade, placed demands of 
bribery.  
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“... the appraising person did not visit our CCC in its current location, which 
was nearer to the ART centre as per the instructions of the SACS. 
Instead...they demanded a sum of Rs.50000/- to visit the new location and to 
give a good grade in the appraisal. We refused....Our centre has been 
graded “D”, which contradicts our past and present performance.” (Excerpts 
from a formal complaint to NACO by a CCC in-charge and national 
committee member) 
  
“During our informal inquiries with other CCCs we learnt that the Rapid 
Appraisal form and observation guide could be accessed prior to the 
appraisal by giving Rs.50000. Those who paid were asked to fill the forms on 
their own instead of formal appraisal.” (Senior management, CCC) 
  
Despite the flawed processes, the outcome of the evaluation became a 
determinant for future funding or termination of the centres. Funding was 
discontinued for poorly performing centres (which received a grade below B), 
centres graded B were asked to continue subject to a re-submission and 
evaluation of the proposal, and the rest were terminated. This resulted in 
high levels of discontent within the NGOs as well as the State divisions of 
NACO. Among the poorly graded centres, those that were neither politically 
connected nor had alternative sources of funding (unlike those associated 
with missions), faced the threat of perishing. At the time the study was 
conducted, few CCCs had been running without funds for several months 
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and were struggling to get alternate funding in order to sustain the running 
costs of the programme. 
 
“We have been partnering with the government on care home since 1999-
2000. In 2007 they decide to change the policy of how they implement TI 
[targeted interventions]. It is November and we are still to be paid for the 
period between Feb to June 2007 because that‟s the time they decided to 
freeze everything for the assessment. After June they will decide who they 
work with and who needs to beg them for fresh funds.” (Senior officer, NGO 
running care centre) 
 
The upheaval was greater among the CCCs (and the state society they were 
accountable to) that were functioning on a low-cost model but being 
assessed on similar criteria as others. The issue was raised at the national 
technical resource group meeting for CCCs by a member who also headed 
one such low cost care centre. With the pressure generated through 
individual complaints and on the initiative of some proactive state divisions of 
NACO, few centres were re-evaluated while the rest terminated. Among the 
latter are the two oldest organisations who were pioneers of the community 
care model in India. 
 
“Recently when NACO visited I took them for a visit to two poorly graded 
centres. Grading sometimes depends on our attitudes and the person who is 
evaluating. Now they have modified the grading as B1, B2. Those that were 
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apex centres of excellence from which other centres have been learning got 
B2. So, in our State NACO has approved B1 to continue.”  (Senior 
bureaucrat, State division of NACO) 
 
“I am not happy with grade B [centres] being terminated. At least they should 
have shared with us the reason for grading them low, given them a feedback, 
give them some time. CCC guidelines earlier were not clear-cut. Some were 
10 bedded and others 40 bedded. There was no uniformity. So, they cannot 
be blamed.”  (Senior officer, State division of NACO) 
 
A senior project officer in the State division of NACO expressed her 
dissatisfaction with the M&E system and its mandate of generating results in 
the short duration of a project cycle.  
 
“By the time the centres are set up and pick up, 12 months is over. At least 
give it two years, performance will show only in the 2nd year.” 
 
Discussion on the case study 
The country-wide evaluation of Community Care Centres brought to light the 
common but insufficiently stressed modus-operandi that the global 
development aid apparatus lends itself to and thrives on. Local small scale 
and often „innovative‟ initiatives are sought out and introduced to the aid 
market (public and in effect foreign funds), in the process getting modified in 
structure, content, and scale as per grant and donor requirements. For 
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example, the care centres were constantly restructured, from 10 to 50 
bedded centres and from a single site to multiple sites across states. 
Meanwhile standard protocols are devised in accordance with global 
stipulations and „best practices‟, against which the performance of these 
initiatives is monitored and assessed. Conformity to these extraneous tools, 
which usually differ from the very intent and rationale of the initiative, thus 
becomes the basis on which the initiatives are either terminated or granted 
life. This process not only kills „innovation‟ but also creates an environment 
that promotes opportunist behaviour of the street level bureaucrats (the 
project workers, evaluators and others). While on one hand the autonomy of 
the project officer seems subservient to the authority of the protocol24, on 
another, the agentic power (Habermas 1990b) drawn from their relative 
bargaining positions enables them to manipulate these protocols and 
respond to the needs of the community. In a competitive and uncertain 
environment, the brokers use the M&E tools to generate knowledge that 
demonstrates their effectiveness and helps them to attain short term goals 
such as bribe or renewal of grant or secure position, authority and 
international repute.  
 
Knowledge thus becomes an essential resource serving both cognitive and 
normative functions of the ideational dimension of discourse proposed by 
Schmidt (2002). It ensures i) a justification of the rationale for the next grant 
                                                 
24
 See Haper (2005) for a discussion on the authority of the protocol. Examining the health worker-
patient interface in the public TB clinic, Harper illustrates how the authority of the protocol (and its 
strict diagnostic categories) gets stabilised and defers the autonomy of the staff to make more 
individualist decisions (ibid: 134).  
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proposal, ii) demonstration of achievement of physical and financial targets, 
iii) the legitimacy of the roles of development brokers, and finally, iv) the 
„peaceful‟ co-existence of ground realities and official representation within 
the prevailing discourse.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The chapter highlights the tensions that arise from the bridging of different 
normative worlds:  the hegemonic protocols of the Fund described in terms of 
the monitoring and reporting tools, and the field practices of their 
implementation. The dynamics also reveal the covert manner in which the 
authority of the protocol, and the discursive practices it enables, stabilise the 
national AIDS programme and the Fund system.   
 
Firstly, the harmonisation exercise and other implicit tools such as the Fund 
reporting protocol, M&E plans and M&E systems strengthening, and 
performance based frameworks, has led to a rather contrary trend. Instead of 
streamlining its M&E requirements with national priorities and systems, the 
Fund has enabled a re-structuring of country systems in accordance with 
international priorities. This has resulted in the birth of a new monster: an 
extensive framework, new system (SIMS) and series of monitoring and 
reporting tools at the national and sub-national level dedicated to the 
production and translation of knowledge to stabilise the Fund governance 
and the national AIDS programme.   
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Secondly, these M&E structural arrangements also demonstrate problems 
which are characteristic of aid delivery and development i.e. problems 
associated with effective monitoring and regulation. The evidence presented 
in the chapter reveals the general tendency among the actors in the Fund 
brokerage chain to pass the responsibility to the level below. While the 
brokers at each level (global, country, state and district) were proactive in 
demonstrating performance drawing on the various Fund protocols and 
securing their positions, none seemed to care about the consequences of 
„passing the buck‟ for those below in the hierarchy. As a research participant 
rightly stated, the chain of accountability and systems set off by the Fund 
was characterised by „NIMTOO‟ (not in my term of office) syndrome. This 
implied that officials did not want to take the risk or blame and were happy to 
maintain the status quo by refusing to acknowledge the obvious disruptions 
that were emerging.  
 
Thirdly, a direct impact of the rigid “performance based criteria” which is 
implicit in the evaluation tools and grant score cards is the preoccupation of 
the already overburdened staff with preparation of multiple reports to report 
on the extensive requirements. Given the multiple competing interests, this 
compounds the problems of information and power asymmetries and gives 
the Fund brokers an incentive to manipulate the knowledge produced and 
present the tensions of ground reality as official stories of success. Doing so, 
enables claim on resources, position and authority. The overwhelming 
pressure resulting from the „performance based‟ disbursement condition and 
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rigid mechanisms of the Fund has also compounded the problems related to 
low absorptive capacity of countries. The latter is partially attributable to poor 
budgetary allocations, interests-based as oppose to need-based funding, and 
multiple/ parallel and incompatible donor funds. This finding has also been 
highlighted in other studies (Brugha et al. 2005, Stillman and Bennet 2005).  
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the various inter-related elements of my 
research: global health initiatives, country level public private partnerships 
(PPP) as institutionalised practice, the role of structural and ideational factors 
in constituting these, the importance of analysis of power relations, and the 
implications for the management of HIV and AIDS. I discuss my arguments 
and conclude the thesis in three sections with reflections on: i) the theoretical 
aim of the thesis ii) the substantive aim, and iii) the system and programme 
wide effects with respect to HIV and AIDS in India.  
 
7.2 Reflections on the theoretical issues raised by the thesis 
The inevitability and legitimacy of the practice of PPPs, as argued in the 
thesis, is derived from the discursive construction of public-private 
arrangements which regards partnerships as inevitable, „win-win‟, resource 
pooling strategy and thus, a desired solution to the current global health 
crisis. This understanding on PPPs broadly emerged from the marriage of 
two strands of theoretical considerations that I discuss in chapter two as:  
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a. New public management discourse and the arguments related to 
pooling of resources and improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a „dysfunctional‟ public health system, and 
b. Network governance which, seen as a departure from market 
mechanisms and hierarchical forms, highlights the egalitarian and 
democratic nature of network arrangements and the notion of 
shared decision making within it.  
 
This thesis is a departure from such discursive understanding and rhetoric on 
partnerships in global and national health governance. I argue for a careful 
examination of the plurality of interests and power asymmetries across the 
five dimensions of the multi-dimensional framework presented in chapter two 
(2.1.4) while evaluating a public-private mix arrangement. I also seek a 
rejection of the rhetoric on global PPPs on two grounds. These are 
elaborated below as I draw on the focus of my intervention: the case of the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  
 
Firstly, the rationale behind the Fund is predominantly financial, i.e. to 
increase resources available globally to fight the three „neglected‟ diseases 
namely, tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV and AIDS. Arguably, the budgets of 
WHO and other multilateral and bi laterals are inadequate to address the 
health sector priorities and goals for countries that disproportionately bear 
the burden of global health inequities and consequently, diseases. Likewise, 
at the country level, budget allocations to the health sector (both systems 
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and disease-specific) continue to be deplorable in most middle and low 
income countries. In India the national health budget as a proportion of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) is on a downward trajectory and currently 
stands at less than 1% in contrast to private health expenditure of over 5% of 
GDP (Duggal 2009). Health care and systems research also highlight the 
deficit areas such as inadequate drug supplies and infrastructure, distribution 
and availability of human resources, and poor quality of primary health care 
services including routine immunisations among others. However, like most 
GPPPs, the Fund neither addresses the local priorities nor targets the efforts 
towards raising health budgets and increasing overall resources in the health 
sector. Instead, they continue to reinforce the technocratic discourse and a 
myopic focus on specific diseases, products, and interventions.  
 
Notwithstanding the role of GPPPs in dictating national priorities as argued in 
the thesis, I do not completely negate the value added by them. This can be 
seen with respect to increasing the visibility of certain diseases by generating 
„additional‟ resources for them, and specifically with respect to HIV and AIDS, 
facilitating access to antiretroviral therapy and accelerating the scale of its 
provision. Over the years, the Fund has significantly increased the total aid 
flow in the area of HIV and AIDS (Gorgens-Albino 2007, Oomman 2007) 
which no longer remains “neglected” or “under resourced” (McKinsey 2005). 
On the contrary, in India, the thrust of donor interests is evident from the 
annual budget outlays (GOI 2010). The excerpts from the union budget for 
the health sector for the year 2010-2011 indicates the attention that HIV and 
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AIDS as a single disease component receives both nationally (5 percent of 
the total health budget) and as a share in external aid (31 percent of the total 
aid) (Duggal 2010). The Global Fund alone contributes 25 percent of the 
budget outlays for NACP III (NACO 2007a).  
 
The link between the primary rationale of the Fund and the rationale behind 
its institutions and mechanisms in recipient countries is contested. In other 
words, the discursive construction of the Fund establishes it solely as a 
financing mechanism thus attributing the negative outcomes to either 
governance failure of recipient countries or difficulties of aid delivery. It 
establishes the logic of necessity by channelling „additional‟ resources for 
HIV and AIDS, in particular ART, and reinforces the logic of appropriateness 
by - i) upholding principles of „partnership‟ (egalitarianism, democratic 
decision making) and civil society representation, and ii) setting off a chain of 
brokers who perform the coordinative and communicative roles translating 
the policy objectives to multiple interests and ideologies (as discussed in 
chapter four, five, and six). In this process, however, it sets off contradictory 
processes of competition-collaboration, fragmentation-assimilation thus both 
constituting and constructing the practices and outcomes.  
 
Secondly, although, the public private interactions set off by the Fund regime 
occur within multiple overlapping „policy‟ networks, these do not however 
conform to the common conception which regards policy network as: stable 
patterns of social relations with interdependent and largely equal actors 
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(Kickert et al 1997, Thompson et al. 1991). Instead, as we have seen, these 
networks are complex configurations characterised by divergent interests 
and shifting allegiances, asymmetrical allocations of material and immaterial 
resources, and mediated by both overt and covert forms of power (relations) 
among network actors.  
 
The evidence presented in the thesis unmasks these power relations which 
are reproduced in the country level practices of the Fund arrangements. 
Deviating from either purely constructivist or purely structural accounts, I 
emphasise as much the importance of a „legitimising ideology‟ as the 
material and structural characteristics of power (Hasenclever et al. 1997). 
Power mediates the institutionalised and discursive practice of PPP at 
various levels and in various forms: the disciplinary power (Foucault 1980 in 
Rabinow ed. 1985) of the Fund protocols whereby the required action is 
made the desired action though normalisation and by reproducing the 
structures of domination and, agentic power of the Fund brokers. Power, I 
argue, is both embedded in and wielded through hegemonic structures of 
global governance (structural factors), the ideas-discourse (ideational 
factors) and the actor‟s interface with these (agency of actors). However, the 
myth of “partnership” and the ideas informing the discourse- shared decision 
making, benefits, and risks- perpetuate this ongoing exercise of power.  
 
One of the central arguments presented in the thesis renders this dominant 
discourse on partnerships as „mythical‟ and rhetoric, one which masks any 
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possibility for the expression of progressive political agency that lie imminent 
within the real fabric of the political economy.   
 
7.3 Reflections on the substantive issues raised by the thesis 
Contrary to the monotheism of the PPP policy model which highlights the 
collaborative and complementary nature of public and private interactions, 
the evidence presented in the thesis unmasks the polytheism of practice, the 
power struggles and the resulting competition at the meso and micro 
processes. 
 
The Fund supported initiatives and practices emerge as sites where multiple 
unaccountable agencies compete for resources, power, and individual and 
organisational gains. The literature on PPP more generally, and the Fund in 
particular, disregards the uncertainties and in-coherences that arise from the 
contradictory forces in operation. For instance, the complicity of locally 
powerful actors (such as the NACO, international or large national NGOs and 
the corporate) and their manipulation of the rules in order to establish their 
authority behind subservience to neoliberal donor paradigms (Mosse and 
Lewis 2006) or the strategies of the marginal actors (such as the district 
network for people with HIV and implementing partners) who struggle to 
balance the legitimacy gained from their role in the Fund arrangements and 
that derived from their links with the community. The resulting tensions form 
the sub-text for the analysis undertaken in Chapter four, five, and six as I 
focus on the conflicts and compromise, diverging and converging interests 
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and the diverse interpretations the discourse is continually subjected to 
through the practice of PPIs. The disjuncture between policy goals and actual 
practice, I argue, emerge out of the interaction between externally imposed 
hegemonic structures and agendas and the strategic interactions and 
interpretations of local and transnational actors acting locally.   
 
Power, gets wielded at various levels. First, as discussed in chapter four, the 
hegemonic structure of the Fund (mechanisms, protocols, the policy 
networks such as the CCM, TRP, and the environment it generates) is 
dominated by what Cox (1997:60) refers to as “loose elite network of 
influentials and agencies” who share similar ideas and beliefs, and 
collectively, perform the function of Fund governance.  The policy networks in 
the context of the study include the CCM, the civil society consortia and other 
national consultative and decision-making forums. Within these networks, 
power is wielded by i) virtue of membership ii) suppression of information, 
use of engineered information, spread of misinformation, and lack of effective 
evaluation procedures, and iii) on the basis of professional and technical 
expertise, which is largely understood in the context of successful grant 
application and demonstration of success in achieving programme targets. 
Hence, while the public sector (the NACO and its state divisions), is an 
important actor controlling the decision making process at national and sub-
national level, it often acts on the knowledge and endorses the decisions 
taken by transnational actors. The latter gain legitimacy by establishing the 
dominance of increasingly technical and bio-medical discourses and 
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managerial systems as demanded by the performance-oriented-nature of the 
Fund. On the other hand, even though local community based groups are 
increasingly represented in such networks (as implementers and 
occasionally in advisory roles) they remain outflanked or peripheral to the 
domains of technical and professional expertise. 
 
The result of this is that a particular class of transnational and national elites 
often wields power in these arrangements. The focus on „transnational elites‟ 
is a departure from the orthodox Marxist (and in effect structuralist) unit of 
analysis, the State. This focus stems from a recognition that States function 
as peripheral actors within, what Keohane and McGrew (2002) propose as, a 
global constellation of networks comprised of multiple actors at multiple 
levels of interaction.  
 
“Liberal global governance sutures together the divergent interests of 
corporate, national, technocratic, and cosmopolitan elites, crystallizing in the 
process a nascent transnational capitalist class whose principal objective is 
widening and deepening of the global capitalist project.”   Held and McGrew 
(2002a:63) 
 
I discuss the role of the transnational elites in “co-opting potential leaders of 
subaltern social groups” (Cox 1996:130) and assimilating and domesticating 
the voices from the margins by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant 
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alliance. The case of the network for people with HIV presented in chapter 
five illustrates this point.  
 
Adopting the terminology of “intellectual fascism” proposed by Vincent 
Navarro (2002), Banerji (2006) explains how the elite (or ruling class) in both 
rich and poor countries form a nexus which enables them to impose 
technocentric prescriptive programmes to subserve their political and 
communal interests. In the chapters four and five, I discuss that this 
imposition is made possible through what Foucault refers to as the act of 
normalisation undertaken by the cadre of intellectual brokers and 
bureaucrats implementing this agenda.  An examination of the nature of non-
state actors whose participation is invoked in Fund arrangements is 
undertaken in chapter five. The analysis reveals that under the Fund regime 
the presence and activities of international NGOs (iNGO) is regarded as a 
proxy for political action and „civil society‟ in the country. These iNGOs, in 
turn, gain legitimacy from coordinating efforts (through training and capacity 
development) to “build” civil society and ensure GIPA, thus expanding their 
representation in the national and Fund governance.   
 
7.4 Broader reflections on equity in health care and systems 
The introductory chapter outlines the questions and ideas that guide the 
conceptualisation of this research. An important and rather implicit aim of the 
thesis relates to the third theme identified from the analytical framework (see 
figure 5): the practice of PPIs and the outcomes it generates. Since the Fund 
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represents a new model for addressing global health and providing 
development aid, the processes and policies through which the Fund 
supported initiatives operate have significant implications for equity of the 
health system as well as specific programme related outcomes. Looking 
specifically at HIV and AIDS, which has brought to the fore the linkages 
between health and wider socio-economic factors of inequity and inequality 
(Parker 2000), I discuss the implications for delivery of and access to quality 
treatment and care.   
 
7.4.1 Fragmentation of delivery and accountability systems 
The evidence presented in chapter four suggests the Fund has fostered a 
growing number of vertical initiatives which results in fragmentation of the 
delivery system and duplication of services offered by the public sector, 
private sector corporations and the non profit sector. While it is the case that 
the resources made available enabled wider access to ART, the amount of 
funding has created a defacto parallel public health system, better funded 
and equipped than the existing one. This finding also corroborates with the 
results of multi-country studies on global health initiatives (Brugha et al. 
2004, Grace 2004, Brugha et al 2005, Stillmann & Bennett 2005, Oomman et 
al 2007). Each initiative once created, assumes an identity of its own with 
independent programme management systems, mechanisms and actors, 
which interact in loose network arrangements while competing with each 
other for control over resources (funds, clients, drugs) and legitimising their 
roles. As illustrated in the case studies in chapter five, different 
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constituencies provide anti-retroviral treatment under the national AIDS 
programme (through different rounds of the Fund grant): public sector 
hospitals, corporate ART centres and the non-profit sector (network of PWHA 
and other NGOs). They compete with each other for clients to demonstrate 
efficiency in absorbing funds and achieving results and make counter claims 
on the performance of the other.  
 
Despite the multi-provider environment instilled by the Fund and the 
increasing role of the private sector in decision-making, the administrative 
burden and patient load is disproportionately high for the public sector. There 
has been a substantial increase in the demand for health services particularly 
with respect to treatment of opportunistic infections. Multiple service delivery 
points and consequently a substantial increase in the number of people 
tested and undergoing treatment has led to congestion at the secondary and 
tertiary levels of the public sector since the initiatives in the private sector do 
not provide the complete range of services. A mismatch between the 
demand and supply of services can be observed.  
 
Secondly, the shift from a purely state managed programme to a public-
private mix constitution of the CCM, an entity where the majority of the 
programme related decisions are made, has further diluted the regulatory 
role of the State. In the absence of a regulatory framework the existence of 
multiple providers within the national programme has led to difficulties in 
ensuring accountability and arbitrating in case of failures. Each node (actor) 
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in the chain of brokerage set off by the Fund (in translating the 
Fund/programme objectives into multiple interests and demonstrating the 
success to maintain the Fund cycle) maintains its legitimacy by passing the 
buck and ignoring the difficulties and disruptions at the implementation level.  
The monitoring mechanisms thus serve as a medium to generate knowledge 
to demonstrate effectiveness while evaluations present as an opportunity to 
shift responsibility for non-performance.   
 
Another effect highlighted in chapter 6 is sustainability of the fund supported 
initiatives. While multiple actors and initiatives are set off by the Fund, those 
run by the subordinate groups on limited funds and technical expertise face 
the threat of extinction. Since these initiatives provide essential services such 
as care and support to people with HIV, the closure of the initiatives has had 
a significant impact on equity of care delivered.  
 
7.4.2 Duplication of services 
As the evidence illustrates, the multiple initiatives led by the Fund brokers 
have overlapping objectives which result in duplication of services provided. 
In chapter 4, I illustrate the impact on counselling where, due to the high 
administrative burden generated by the activities of the Fund, counsellors in 
the public sector are unable to counsel the patients. The gap, instead of 
being corrected, serves as a justification for newer projects, independent 
structures, and recruitment of a new cadre of employees (peer counsellors, 
treatment adherence counsellors, pre ART and post ART counsellors) in the 
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private sector. As illustrated by the case of the civil society consortia, this 
response does not tackle the difficulties faced by the counsellors in terms of 
the paperwork and documentation. It rather subjects the new cadre of 
counsellors to similar problems and conflicts over resources and authority. 
 
7.4.3 Human resources 
In the light of the evidence, it can also be concluded that the Fund 
arrangements have a detrimental impact on the health system as they 
actively deplete the pool of skilled human workforce and reconfigure the 
expertise and knowledge valued within the health sector. Ironically, external 
country evaluations of donor programmes and global health initiatives 
including the Fund highlight a shortage of trained and qualified staff as a 
significant barrier to health systems development in general and scale up of 
the antiretroviral treatment in particular (Grace 2004, Brugha et al. 2005). All 
the same, as highlighted in chapter four and five, these problems are often 
induced or aggravated by the Fund activities and the public private mix. I 
discuss these problems under three headings: availability and mobility; 
workload and motivation; and training and skills building. The effects on the 
human resources are discussed below. 
 
7.4.3.1 Availability and mobility 
By inducing an environment characterised by resource and power 
asymmetries and competition between diverse stakeholders, the Fund 
facilitates movement of the health workforce.  While much of the migration of 
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health personnel observed was from the public (state divisions of NACO and 
other public sector agencies) to the Fund supported initiatives run by 
industrial or corporate component and NGOs, movement was also observed 
within the private sector i.e. from local networks to bilateral and international 
agencies, from one project to a better funded project within the same agency, 
and from other disease programmes to HIV and AIDS. This results from 
multiple overlapping projects and activities which poach qualified staff by 
offering better incentives and higher salaries. As a result a high turnover was 
observed in projects run under the national AIDS programme. The turnover 
was particularly high among senior officers at the state level. The observation 
of Fund-induced migration corroborates with findings from other studies 
undertaken in Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya and others (Banteyerga et al. 2005, 
2006; Mtonya et al. 2005, Donoghue et al. 2005a, Drew and Purvis 2006). 
 
Another observable trend is that organisations which earlier focused on 
addressing broader health issues and reproductive health needs are moving 
into the AIDS industry and re-allocating priorities to follow the Fund money. 
This trend was also visible among international actors who are expanding 
their operations to newer regions and countries on the basis of the Fund 
regime.  
 
7.4.3.2 Workload and motivation 
The Fund induced activities have caused workload which is additional to the 
existing responsibilities of the public sector workforce. The human personnel 
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in the state divisions of NACO had multiple projects to report on and monitor 
and received no additional incentive or remuneration for the extra work due 
to the Fund activities. On the other hand, programmes run by large non state 
agencies, who received direct funds (as a national recipient) from the Fund, 
had separate provisions for human resource at higher salaries and limited 
responsibilities. These agencies also operate with multiple sources of funding 
(corporate companies, bilateral, other donors) and are thus able to attract 
more qualified and experienced health workforce from the public sector.  This 
staff leakage to the private sector thus exacerbates the problems arising due 
to inadequate staffing and budget restrictions in the public health sector.  
 
Moreover, the difference with regards to the workload and the workplace 
environment of the public and private sectors working „jointly‟ on the 
programme was stark, particularly at the facility level. These inequities 
among the constituents of the same programme led to dissatisfaction and de-
motivation of human personnel, as highlighted in the interviews held with the 
service providers. 
 
7.4.3.3 Training and skills building 
The evidence demonstrates how the discursive ideas around Fund 
governance and public private arrangements are continually translated into 
the interests of multiple stakeholders to justify and legitimise its practice. The 
stakeholders‟ claim on future funding is dependent on how successfully the 
programme activities reach out to and invoke participation of the 
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beneficiaries, in this case, people with HIV. The involvement of the „disease 
constituency‟ i.e. infected (and affected) community in interventions which 
are founded on overtly bio-medical discourse, further necessitates a 
sensitisation process to enable their transition into health workforce who 
serve as the crucial link between the Fund and the community and at the 
same time are also able to talk as entrepreneurs striving for results.  
Likewise, local NGOs while being key to enable the tokenistic representation 
of the civil society in governance bodies are continually dismissed for their 
lack of expertise and skills.   
 
In this context, training programmes (and similar mechanisms to build 
capacities) act as a crucial site for sensitisation. Thus, heavy investments are 
made in orienting national and sub-national stakeholders to the Fund 
systems, guidelines and processes and in writing successful grant 
applications to secure a grant from the Fund.  
 
The Fund focused training programmes and those provided by other donor 
agencies were not streamlined leading to duplication of efforts. Multiple 
workshops with similar focus are conducted by various organisations. At the 
level of implementation, the trainings focused exclusively on software 
(CMIS), documentation, and providing information on HIV to enable 
counselling. None of the trainings content provided skills that could be 
transferrable to other disease programmes. Likewise, a clear shift could be 
observed in the focus of the capacity building programmes of the network of 
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people with HIV, which moved away from advocacy and campaign skills to 
building management capacities.  
 
Hondeghem (1998) highlights that a consequence of the shift from the 
Weberian bureaucracy to a public sector characterised by business-like 
managerialism is the transition of public servants to public entrepreneurs 
striving for results which takes precedence over the means to achieve them.  
In the context of the public-private mix provision with even greater emphasis 
on (and funds tied to) measuring performance and efficiency in relation to 
specific targets, outcome measures and results, this effect is not restricted to 
public sector alone.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Contrary to the discursive understanding of global PPPs and global 
governance, I argue that these effects are not „unintended‟. The Fund 
arrangements like other „partnership‟ and „network based‟ approaches serve 
as an effective instrument to extend technocratic control and advance the 
interests of transnational elites while concealing the agency of outsiders 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001, Mosse 2001). They achieve cognitive and social 
control by manipulating local elites, co-opting critical discourses and thus, 
contributing to widen and deepen the global neo-liberal agenda under the 
guise of autonomy of the people and the nation State. 
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Over the last eight years, the national AIDS programme has witnessed 
constant changes with the growth of the Fund, which claims to be „a new 
architecture of aid‟. However, as illustrated in the thesis, this new 
governmentality is inherently contradictory in its operation. On the one hand, 
under the rubric of health sector reform, the Fund reflects a conglomeration 
of diverse discourses (and rhetoric) on „good governance‟, „decentralised 
implementation‟, „greater participation of the civil society‟ including the private 
sector and people with HIV to make the health system and services more 
efficient and responsive to local needs. Yet, on the other hand the practice of 
Fund governance represents a shift to highly bureaucratised and centralised 
system (around the State and bi/multilateral-controlled CCM) with an 
exclusive focus on information systems that are increasingly defined by 
globalised interests. The rise of such a technocratic and vertical programme 
mirrors the rise of neoliberal reform process, its associated discourses, and 
elite interests.  
 
Many might argue that the new form of aid is better than the „chaos‟ before, 
characterised by multiple providers, low diagnosis and treatment rates, and 
lack of standardised information on the „epidemic‟. However, the myth of 
„order‟ created by the Fund governmentality, I suggest, conceals the agendas 
and interests that the discourse is established to serve. It also conceals the 
undesirable effects with respect to the quality and equity of treatment and 
care and the damaging effects on the components of the health system 
behind huge webs of complex statistics. In an ethnographic account of the 
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DOTS programme in Nepal, Ian Harper (2005:144) argues that this 
„attempted stabilisation of the system can significantly marginalise patients 
and deny their agency‟ and contribute to „structural violence‟ (Farmer 1998) 
in administering the programme.      
 
7.5 Are the findings generalisable to all PPPs and all 
regions? 
The study examines only one of the several global health partnerships/ 
initiatives, namely the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and the 
public private „partnerships‟ it invokes at the country level. This might lead to 
doubts on the generalisability of the findings to i) all global and country level 
public-private partnerships, and ii) all GFATM recipient countries. I have a 
number of responses to this.   
 
First, the aim of the thesis is to deconstruct the policy rhetoric on PPP and 
examine power in the discursive understanding and practice of public private 
interface arrangements. The thesis demonstrates that power mediates the 
phenomenon at multiple levels and interfaces: ideas and discourse, 
structures and institutions, actors and interests, and social practices. 
Together, these act to maintain the hegemony of the transnational capitalist 
class within the development and AIDS industry and eliminate the very 
possibility of an alternative conceptualisation of public and private 
interactions. Second, I argue that the practices of a policy model, PPP in the 
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case of the thesis, is both constituted and constructed by structural and 
ideational factors. This implies that contrary to the espoused view of the 
Fund and its proponents, the structures and institutions (and the implicit and 
explicit rules, conditionalities) of the grant constitutes the actors and their 
interests, enable the practices, and thus shape the outcomes.  Third, these 
practices and the knowledge that the actors generate legitimises the i) 
discourse on the inevitability or necessity of the Fund, the public private 
„partnerships‟, and many other sub-texts (involvement of certain actors and 
certain kinds of expertise: the international agencies, corporate and business 
houses, people with AIDS), ii) the structures including the coordination, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, grant agreements, and iii) the role of 
actors within the partnership environment.   
 
To this extent, the covert and overt forms of controls operating in the 
discursive notion of partnerships and the intersubjectivities created (as 
identified in the framework) can be applied to all contexts which are largely 
defined by the donor-recipient relationship and the involvement of the non-
state actors in financing and delivering health services.  
 
However, I recognize that the scale and scope of economies have an impact 
on these power asymmetries and determine the system-wide practices and 
consequently their effects.  A caveat to the generalisability of the findings 
therefore lies in the scale and scope (magnitude of operations and diversity 
of contexts) that the Global Fund operations face in the context of India, 
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which sets it apart from its African, south Asian and other counterparts. 
Although these regions have their own complexities with regards to donor 
monopoly and aid dependence especially in fragile states, which have other 
implications for power, sustainability, and inequities, the structural dominance 
is subject to less normalisation and interpretation given the smaller number 
of actors, vertical interventions, and regional differences in health care 
delivery and systems. India, in contrast, is far more plural and diverse in 
terms of interests of the state and non-state actors and their involvement in 
delivering health care, the regional contexts and priorities, and interventions 
designed to address these. Given this diversity, attempts at incorporating 
universal principles of harmonisation and coordination such as the three 
ones, one national CCM to coordinate all Fund activities and others are 
deemed to fail. This necessitates further research to examine the role of the 
Fund structure, the underlying ideas and discourse in shaping practices and 
outcomes in other Fund recipient countries. 
 
As established in the thesis, a plethora of arrangements are referred to as 
partnerships and far greater plurality exists in country level public private 
interface arrangements. Addressing these was beyond the intent and scope 
of this thesis. This thesis limits itself to examining public private 
arrangements set off and co-ordinated by the GFATM. However, the 
framework proposed in chapter two can serve as a useful tool and be further 
tested to examine different global and country level arrangements and their 
power implications.  
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7.6 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis examines the operations of public private partnerships or global 
health initiatives as a departure from its discursive understanding (and 
development rhetoric). In doing so, it makes a significant contribution to the 
challenge of conceptualising the relationship between global policy models 
and initiatives and the practices and material outcomes they are expected to 
produce and legitimise.  
 
The limited empirical evidence of country level effects of global health 
initiatives, such as the Fund, relies heavily on impact assessments and 
evaluations commissioned or conducted by the Fund. This, on one hand, as 
Biesma et al. (2009) argue, may affect the validity of the findings. On the 
other hand, the largely uncritical perspective evident in these studies, 
contribute to reproducing the rhetoric on partnerships. Moreover, the 
evidence base is restricted to impact assessments largely conducted in sub-
Saharan Africa or countries with high aid dependence and donor monopoly, 
so much so that sustainability of the country level programme emerges as 
the overarching concern. Thus, my thesis is the first systematic examination 
of the operations of the Fund in South Asia.  
 
Another significant feature of the thesis is its theoretical contribution. Building 
on the nascent constructivist attempts to examine the policy discourse, the 
thesis merges structural/critical approaches to health policy with actor 
oriented approaches which focus on the ways through which development 
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meanings are produced and negotiated in practice (Long and Long 1992). 
Thus, while it questions the larger political economy of inequality and power/ 
domination in which „global governance‟ is located, it also examines how the 
hegemonic policy model gets transformed into social and political trajectories 
of brokers and translators who are constantly enrolled.  Drawing attention to 
the nature of discourse, the thesis reveals the role of these brokers in 
reproducing the system, and gives insights into the social processes and 
practices that are silenced or concealed behind the attempted stabilisation of 
the Fund system. 
 
As I reject the inevitability of PPPs, I argue for the possibility of 
conceptualising public and private interactions in alternate terms in order to 
avoid duplication and further fragmentation of the health systems. While this 
thesis does not propose alternative organisational forms, it sets agenda for 
future research and policy discussions to seek equitable alternatives and/or 
strengthen earlier channels of funding. This agenda for change should not be 
restricted to the Fund but should engage with other such organisational 
forms and relationships at global, national and sub-national level.  
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Appendix 1 
Draft Interview Guide 
 
I. Background & History of the partnership 
 
1. Describe your role and association with the GF (Rd 4, 6 and 7)  
 History and process of involvement with the fund- changes between the rounds 
and process of renewal 
 Key stated objectives and commitments(health systems development, equity, 
gender) 
 Designated responsibility by the contracting agency; CCM; other partners 
2. Process of warding the i) grant ii) contract (Competitive bidding/ tender; direct 
negotiation; any other) 
3. Who in the organisation have been key in initiating and managing the programme 
(i.e. identifying the funder, negotiating the contract, developing the proposal & 
overseeing the project)? 
4. Different relationships within the partnership programme and objective function 
and institutional arrangement of each  
OR 
Draw/ map out your organisation’s association (formal and informal) with other 
stakeholders – CCM/ PRs/ SRs/ planning & implementing bodies - describing the 
nature of relationship. for instance, contractual or collaborative- any other 
 
II. Governance 
Decision making 
5. Constitution of the decision making bodies like CCM, PAB, NACB- 
representation of all constituencies across sectors, states and districts 
6. Process (of negotiation, compromise and conflict of interest) involved in decision 
making around - 
- development and review of proposals (identifying activities and sites) 
- budget allocation and financial outlays 
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- nomination and selection of PRs, SRs/implementing agencies 
- review of programme implementation (performance-non performance of 
actors) and subsequent action 
 
Communication 
7. What information systems have been established for communicating key 
decisions (incl. information on call for proposals and grant making) from CCM 
members to constituencies and, concerns of constituencies to CCM? 
8. Ways of disseminating information to all concerned parties at the Proposal 
development, bidding (for sub recipients) and grant making stages 
9. Systems and processes through which efforts of partner organisations are 
coordinated- purpose and frequency of coordination meetings 
10. Any consultative process/coordination meetings (at the central and state level) 
with other state specific HIV & AIDS programmes and donors/ multilateral-
bilateral funded programmes? 
 
Institutional arrangements/ structures (including M&E) 
11. Formal agreements OR good practice norms and informal controls that exist 
within the institution- how are these exercised? 
12. Any written TORs/ by laws/operational guidelines and procedures – DO they 
clearly specify - 
i. roles and responsibilities of all coordinating bodies  
ii. conflict resolution 
iii. performance assessment criteria and penalties for non-performance 
13. What measures are taken to ensure adherence by all parties to GF rules or 
guidelines? Are these outlined in the contract with sub contracted constituencies? 
14. Mechanism for review and assessment of performance – 
 Internal performance monitoring  (PR level) 
 Performance evaluation by CCM  
 M&E frameworks across and within the organisation – process of developing 
the national framework and MIS and sharing with other stakeholders 
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15. How are deliverables ensured? Any reward-penalty systems set up in case of 
breach of contract?  
16. What are the strengths (if any) and constraints(if any) in the present M&E 
system? What specific problems do you face, if any, in reporting back? 
17. Has there been any experience of disputes/ conflict of interests? How would you 
expect these to be resolved? What measures are put in place to deal with 
differences?  
 
BUDGET/ Financial disbursement 
 
18. Process of negotiation with the funder/ contracting agency for the setting of the 
budget  
19. Are the funds adequate for provision of the services mandated by the contracting 
party? What are the additional costs, if any? 
20. Is there any other source of financial (or other) contribution to the programme? If 
so, provide details. 
21. What are the implications of i) over/under spending ii) delay in disbursement for 
the organisation and/or programme? Can the unspent money be utilised for other 
items related to the project? 
 
Free word association – one word to describe the - 
a) Partnership’s policy environment (decision making processes) 
b) Management of Global Fund & CCM 
c) Relationship with sub-recipients, NACO, CII, PFI 
 
III. Perceptions of the partnership, its performance and impact  
SWOT analysis of the partnership. Write on stickies and prioritise. Some guiding 
questions- 
 
22. What according to you are some significant outcomes of the programme?  
i. Has it enhanced the quality (incl efficiency) and equity of service 
provision? How?  
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ii. Has the target/ beneficiary group (number or people, spread, population 
types etc.) changed overtime in the project period? How?  
iii. Has the change affected the quality of services and existing delivery 
systems (including drug supplies, management & distribution)? In what 
way? 
23. Has this change been fed back and accounted for by the CCM in deciding the 
inputs & priorities of the programme? If so, how? 
24. Has the programme built/enhanced the capacity of your organisation and the 
staff? In what way? Is it adequate? 
 
Impact of the programme on distribution, skills, motivation, time and routine activities of 
staff/ health workers. Explore costs of reporting and managing the information 
systems/visits 
25. What is the funding (/contracting) agency required to do under the contract? Has 
it failed to meet any of the requirements? In that case, have you been able to 
address this?  
26. What are the gaps (if any) in an efficient governance of the partnership- 
constraints (capacity/funds etc.) faced in meeting the programme objectives and 
reporting on them. How have you/do you intend to address the gaps? 
 
27. Pressure faced in meeting the programme objectives and reporting on them - how 
is slow progress/delays and inefficiencies, non performance of other partners 
dealt with? 
28. What further inputs from the partners you seek essential? 
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Guiding questions for CCM members 
33 members (Ref : Rd 6 proposal) as per new constitution Aug 04-06 
 
I. Your role and delegated responsibilities within – 
- The CCM 
- Partnership programme 
 
II. About the CCM 
Background information (not for all respondents) 
- Employees (full/ part time) 
- Proportion of the private-public and civil society constituencies within CCM? 
- Regularity/ frequency of meetings held? (quarterly/ bi monthly/ monthly etc) 
 
Specific Questions 
COMPOSITION (and representation) 
- How are the members identified and brought on board? 
- Representation of your constituency (Academia-NGOs/CBOs-commercial/business 
enterprise-the beneficiaries/target group) in the CCM? 
- Perceived representation of all constituencies (public-private; governmental-NGOs, 
advocacy-CBOs) actively involved in fighting TB, malaria, HIV&AIDS? And regions- 
states/ districts? 
 
PARTICIPATION & COMMUNICATION 
- Do all members have prior access to key documents (minutes, disbursement reports, 
reviews, disbursement and other decisions)? 
- How are decisions communicated i) within the CCM and, ii) to other stakeholders? 
- Is information related to  i) call for proposals ii) decisions taken (including information 
on approved proposals) made available to all interested parties? How is this ensured?  
- Levels of participation of your constituency and concerns related to- 
- Setting the agenda for the meeting 
- Developing the proposal for the Global Fund 
- Overseeing implementation 
 369 
- Evaluating the functioning of the CCM 
GOVERNANCE / MANAGEMENT 
- Written TORs/by laws/ operating procedures/ guidelines for- 
i. defining roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis other coordinating bodies 
ii. mechanisms for decision making and conflict resolution 
iii. selection of chair, vice chair 
iv. ethical behaviour/ code of conduct for members 
- How are key decisions around nominating PRs, SRs; reviewing proposals and 
overseeing program implementation made? 
- Is there a transparent process to ensure inputs from a broad range of 
stakeholders(members and non-members) and constituencies in the proposal 
development? Is it documented? 
- How is participation within the CCM assessed and documented? Are there plans to 
improve? 
- Comments on  
- Processes to address conflict of interest 
- involvement in the decision making, in reaching consensus, assessing CCM 
- Value given to the contributions and involvement of your constituency 
- Documentation available to inform your constituency of decisions taken in 
the meeting 
Coordination between other development partners (WB, UNAIDS, Dfid, USAID etc.) 
ensured? Frequency of coordination meetings at the central and the state level- how is 
input from a broad range of stakeholders (members and non-members) and constituencies 
while developing the proposal ensured?  
 
How is integration with the existing government interventions/ services ensured? 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Information sheet for participants 
 
My name is Anuj Kapilashrami and I am a postgraduate research student at the 
Institute for International Health and Development at Queen Margaret University in 
Edinburgh, UK. I am undertaking a research project tilted “Public private 
partnerships and governance: implications for health systems and outcomes” as part 
of my PhD.  
 
The study attempts to examine the governance mechanisms adopted by the country 
level partnerships of Global Public-Private Partnership (Global Fund) and how these 
impact on the health systems and outcomes. This will be undertaken in the context of 
specific partnership projects implemented with the objective of scaling up access to 
HIV&AIDS treatment and care in India. It is hoped that the findings from this 
research will enable a nuanced understanding of public-private partnerships and raise 
crucial governance issues related to partnerships.  
 
If you agree to participate in the study, you will be requested to share your opinion 
and respond to questions related to the project planning, implementation and 
outcomes of the project. I would also like to observe the functioning of the centres 
established for care, treatment and counselling of people living with HIV&AIDS. I 
would appreciate very much if you felt able to contribute towards this research either 
through individual interviews, or through your activities in community groups you 
may be part of.   
 
Information gathered will be anonymised with no names being quoted at any stage. 
Should you wish to withdraw at any stage or choose not to respond to a question, 
your decision will be respected. The results may be published in a journal and/or 
presented at conferences.  
 
If you have read and understood this information sheet, your questions have been 
answered and you wish to participate in the study, please proceed to the consent 
form. 
Thank you. 
 
Contact details of the researcher:  Anuj Kapilashrami 
PhD student, 
Institute for International Health 
&Development 
Queen Margaret University 
Edinburgh EH12 8TS 
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Email: akapilashrami@qmu.ac.uk  
Ph: +44 (0)131 317 3493 
 
 
Should you wish to contact an independent person (in India and in Edinburgh) who 
knows of the project but is not involved in it, please contact them at the details given 
below. 
 
Advisor (in India)   (In UK) 
 
Dr. Imrana Qadeer   Suzanne Fustukian 
Prof. (Retd.)    Senior Lecturer 
Jawaharlal Nehru University Institute for International Health 
&Development 
C4 Safdarjang Development Area  Queen Margaret University 
Ph: 011- 26510824   Edinburgh EH12 8TS 
Email: sfustukian@qmu.ac.uk  
Ph: +44 (0)131 317 3492 
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Appendix 3      
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Study title: Public private partnerships and governance: implications for health 
systems and outcomes 
 
I have had the information form explained to me / read and understood the 
information sheet and this consent form.  I have had an opportunity to clear doubts 
regarding my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in this study and that I have 
the right to withdraw from this study at any stage without giving any reason. 
 
I understand that by signing this form, I would consent to: 
 
1. My participation in the interviews/ discussions/ other activities initiated by 
the researcher in pursuit of the information 
2. The recording (audio/ written) of the information shared by me 
3. The publishing (or other forms of dissemination) of parts of the information 
shared and the results of the study 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
Name of the participant: ____________________________ 
 
Signature of Participant: ____________________________ 
 
Signature of researcher: ____________________________ 
 
 
Contact Details of the researcher:       
 
Anuj Kapilashrami 
PhD student 
Institute for International Health and Development 
Queen Margaret University 
Edinburgh  
 
Email: akapilashrami@qmu.ac.uk 
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Ph:  +44 131 317 3493 (UK)  
+91 9891608865 (India) 
 
Should you wish to contact an independent person (in India and in Edinburgh) who 
knows of the project but is not involved in it, please contact them at the details given 
below. 
 
Advisor (in India) :   In UK 
 
Dr. Imrana Qadeer   Suzanne Fustukian 
(address to be confirmed)  Senior Lecturer 
Institute for International Health & 
Development 
Queen Margaret University 
Edinburgh EH12 8TS 
Email: sfustukian@qmu.ac.uk  
Ph: +44 (0)131 317 3492 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
